paga claim in California

2026The provision prohibits Foster from asserting representative claims for Labor Code violations under PAGA. 6 This court recently summarized: “Iskanian[, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 ] held that an employee’s right to bring a PAGA action was ‘unwaivable’ and that the rule against PAGA waivers was not preempted by the FAA. [Citation.] Iskanian also rejected the employer’s argument that a PAGA waiver could be upheld if it only waived the employee’s right to bring a PAGA claim on behalf of others while preserving the employee’s right to bring such a claim on his own behalf. [Citation.] ‘Appellate courts i

2026The provision prohibits Foster from asserting representative claims for Labor Code violations under PAGA. 6 This court recently summarized: “Iskanian[, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 ] held that an employee’s right to bring a PAGA action was ‘unwaivable’ and that the rule against PAGA waivers was not preempted by the FAA. [Citation.] Iskanian also rejected the employer’s argument that a PAGA waiver could be upheld if it only waived the employee’s right to bring a PAGA claim on behalf of others while preserving the employee’s right to bring such a claim on his own behalf. [Citation.] ‘Appellate courts i

2025(Id. at p. 1116; Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 980 .) 4 A PAGA claim is “ ‘legally and conceptually different’ ” from an employee’s individual claim for damages and statutory penalties.

2025(Id. at p. 1116; Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 980 .) 4 A PAGA claim is “ ‘legally and conceptually different’ ” from an employee’s individual claim for damages and statutory penalties.

2026The provision prohibits Foster from asserting representative claims for Labor Code violations under PAGA. 6 This court recently summarized: “Iskanian[, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 ] held that an employee’s right to bring a PAGA action was ‘unwaivable’ and that the rule against PAGA waivers was not preempted by the FAA. [Citation.] Iskanian also rejected the employer’s argument that a PAGA waiver could be upheld if it only waived the employee’s right to bring a PAGA claim on behalf of others while preserving the employee’s right to bring such a claim on his own behalf. [Citation.] ‘Appellate courts i

2026The provision prohibits Foster from asserting representative claims for Labor Code violations under PAGA. 6 This court recently summarized: “Iskanian[, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 ] held that an employee’s right to bring a PAGA action was ‘unwaivable’ and that the rule against PAGA waivers was not preempted by the FAA. [Citation.] Iskanian also rejected the employer’s argument that a PAGA waiver could be upheld if it only waived the employee’s right to bring a PAGA claim on behalf of others while preserving the employee’s right to bring such a claim on his own behalf. [Citation.] ‘Appellate courts i

2026Code § 2699, former subd. (c).) A PAGA action is “brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees.” (Id., former subd. (a), italics added.) PAGA allows “an enforcement action between the LWDA and the employer, with the PAGA plaintiff acting on behalf of the government.” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73 , 86; Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664 , 681– 682 (Turrieta); ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 185 [“All” PAGA claims “are brought on the state’s behalf”].) The aggrieved employee “

2026Code § 2699, former subd. (c).) A PAGA action is “brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees.” (Id., former subd. (a), italics added.) PAGA allows “an enforcement action between the LWDA and the employer, with the PAGA plaintiff acting on behalf of the government.” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73 , 86; Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664 , 681– 682 (Turrieta); ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 185 [“All” PAGA claims “are brought on the state’s behalf”].) The aggrieved employee “

2025In Correia – a case involving interstate commerce where the FAA applied – the court agreed with other Court of Appeal cases which “have uniformly held that an employee’s predispute agreement to arbitrate PAGA claims is not enforceable without the state’s consent.” (Correia, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 621 , citing cases.)8 Correia explained: “Relying on the rationale 8 The cases Correia cited are: Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853 , 869–872; id. at p. 860 [“We hold that an agreement to arbitrate a PAGA claim, entered into before an employee is statutorily authorized to bring su

2025In Correia – a case involving interstate commerce where the FAA applied – the court agreed with other Court of Appeal cases which “have uniformly held that an employee’s predispute agreement to arbitrate PAGA claims is not enforceable without the state’s consent.” (Correia, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 621 , citing cases.)8 Correia explained: “Relying on the rationale 8 The cases Correia cited are: Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853 , 869–872; id. at p. 860 [“We hold that an agreement to arbitrate a PAGA claim, entered into before an employee is statutorily authorized to bring su

2025(E.g., Brooks v. AmeriHome Mortgage Co., LLC (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 624 , 629 [plaintiff’s complaint “alleged a single cause of action under PAGA and did not allege an individual claim for wage recovery”]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 633 [trial court “compelled arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claim, dismissed the class claims, bifurcated the representative PAGA claim, and stayed the PAGA claim pending the completion of arbitration”]; Reyes v. Macy’s Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1124 [“the PAGA claim is not an individual claim”].) Consequently, this opinion uses the

2025(E.g., Brooks v. AmeriHome Mortgage Co., LLC (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 624 , 629 [plaintiff’s complaint “alleged a single cause of action under PAGA and did not allege an individual claim for wage recovery”]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 633 [trial court “compelled arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claim, dismissed the class claims, bifurcated the representative PAGA claim, and stayed the PAGA claim pending the completion of arbitration”]; Reyes v. Macy’s Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1124 [“the PAGA claim is not an individual claim”].) Consequently, this opinion uses the

2025There, the court stated the second amended complaint “retained the PAGA claim from the original complaint” and that claim “sought PAGA penalties for various Labor Code violations[.]” (Id. at p. 595; see also, Williams v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 642, 649 [“case law suggests that a single representative PAGA claim cannot be split into an arbitrable individual claim and a nonarbitrable representative claim”]; Viking River, supra, at p. 654, fn. 6 .) Individual PAGA claim.

2025There, the court stated the second amended complaint “retained the PAGA claim from the original complaint” and that claim “sought PAGA penalties for various Labor Code violations[.]” (Id. at p. 595; see also, Williams v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 642, 649 [“case law suggests that a single representative PAGA claim cannot be split into an arbitrable individual claim and a nonarbitrable representative claim”]; Viking River, supra, at p. 654, fn. 6 .) Individual PAGA claim.

2025In Correia – a case involving interstate commerce where the FAA applied – the court agreed with other Court of Appeal cases which “have uniformly held that an employee’s predispute agreement to arbitrate PAGA claims is not enforceable without the state’s consent.” (Correia, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 621 , citing cases.)8 Correia explained: “Relying on the rationale 8 The cases Correia cited are: Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853 , 869–872; id. at p. 860 [“We hold that an agreement to arbitrate a PAGA claim, entered into before an employee is statutorily authorized to bring su

2025In Correia – a case involving interstate commerce where the FAA applied – the court agreed with other Court of Appeal cases which “have uniformly held that an employee’s predispute agreement to arbitrate PAGA claims is not enforceable without the state’s consent.” (Correia, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 621 , citing cases.)8 Correia explained: “Relying on the rationale 8 The cases Correia cited are: Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853 , 869–872; id. at p. 860 [“We hold that an agreement to arbitrate a PAGA claim, entered into before an employee is statutorily authorized to bring su

2020(Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 546 ; see Iskanian, at p. 381; Brown, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 501 .) Although representative in nature, a PAGA claim is not simply a collection of individual claims for relief, and so is different from a class action.

2020(Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 546 ; see Iskanian, at p. 381; Brown, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 501 .) Although representative in nature, a PAGA claim is not simply a collection of individual claims for relief, and so is different from a class action.

2025Correia recognized, as do we, that several federal courts have reached a different conclusion, including the Valdez case defendants cite for the proposition that “Iskanian and Sakkab clearly contemplate that an individual employee can pursue a PAGA claim in arbitration, is brought on behalf of the state”]; and Tanguilig v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 665 , 677–680; id. at p. 678 [“[b]ecause a PAGA plaintiff, whether suing solely on behalf of himself or herself or also on behalf of other employees, acts as a proxy for the state only with the state’s acquiescence [citation] and see

2025Correia recognized, as do we, that several federal courts have reached a different conclusion, including the Valdez case defendants cite for the proposition that “Iskanian and Sakkab clearly contemplate that an individual employee can pursue a PAGA claim in arbitration, is brought on behalf of the state”]; and Tanguilig v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 665 , 677–680; id. at p. 678 [“[b]ecause a PAGA plaintiff, whether suing solely on behalf of himself or herself or also on behalf of other employees, acts as a proxy for the state only with the state’s acquiescence [citation] and see

2025(Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 6 pp. 384-389.) It reasoned that a PAGA claim lies outside the FAA’s coverage because “the FAA aims to ensure an efficient forum for the resolution of private disputes, whereas a PAGA action is a dispute between an employer and [a] state [a]gency.” (Id. at p. 384.) Following the decision in Iskanian, California courts unanimously endorsed the view espoused in Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123-1124 , that every PAGA action is a representative action on behalf of the state and that “a single representative PAGA claim cannot be split into an a

2025(Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 6 pp. 384-389.) It reasoned that a PAGA claim lies outside the FAA’s coverage because “the FAA aims to ensure an efficient forum for the resolution of private disputes, whereas a PAGA action is a dispute between an employer and [a] state [a]gency.” (Id. at p. 384.) Following the decision in Iskanian, California courts unanimously endorsed the view espoused in Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123-1124 , that every PAGA action is a representative action on behalf of the state and that “a single representative PAGA claim cannot be split into an a

2025(Cortez, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 9 [concluding “the death knell exception to the one final judgment rule does not apply when a PAGA claim remains pending in the trial court following termination of the class claims”]; Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232 , 243–244 [same]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 635 (Young) [same]; Munoz v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 291 , 310–311 (Munoz) [“Denial of class certification where the PAGA claims remain in the trial court would not have the ‘legal effect’ of a final judgment . . . .”].

2025(See, e.g., Munoz v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 291, 311 (Munoz) [presence of PAGA claim following denial of class certification precluded application of death knell doctrine]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 635 [order compelling arbitration of individual claims, dismissing class claims, and staying PAGA claim nonappealable as it did not entirely terminate all class claims]; Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232, 243 (Nguyen) [same].) As explained in Munoz, plaintiffs have “ample financial incentive” to pursue the remaining r

2023(See also Lopez v. Friant & Associates, LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 773, 784, fn. 6 . 16 multiple PAGA penalties may be recovered for the same underlying conduct.5 Plaintiffs further explained that calculating exposure for a PAGA claim is inherently speculative because courts have discretion to reduce PAGA penalties where an award would be unjust or oppressive. (§ 2699, subd. (e)(2); see also § 226.3) The trial court was able to consider Moreli’s evidence and arguments, and the settling Parties’ responses to it, before approving the Settlement.

2023(See also Lopez v. Friant & Associates, LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 773, 784, fn. 6 . 16 multiple PAGA penalties may be recovered for the same underlying conduct.5 Plaintiffs further explained that calculating exposure for a PAGA claim is inherently speculative because courts have discretion to reduce PAGA penalties where an award would be unjust or oppressive. (§ 2699, subd. (e)(2); see also § 226.3) The trial court was able to consider Moreli’s evidence and arguments, and the settling Parties’ responses to it, before approving the Settlement.

2025(Orange Catholic Foundation v. Arvizu (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 283, 297, fn. 8 .) As a condition for bringing a PAGA claim, “an aggrieved employee acting on behalf of the state and other current or former employees must provide notice to the employer and the responsible state agency ‘of the specific provisions of [the Labor Code] alleged to have been violated, including the facts and theories to support the alleged violation.’” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 545 .) Appellants’ PAGA notice does not set forth the specific theories of liability they assert in their opening brief w

2025(Orange Catholic Foundation v. Arvizu (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 283, 297, fn. 8 .) As a condition for bringing a PAGA claim, “an aggrieved employee acting on behalf of the state and other current or former employees must provide notice to the employer and the responsible state agency ‘of the specific provisions of [the Labor Code] alleged to have been violated, including the facts and theories to support the alleged violation.’” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 545 .) Appellants’ PAGA notice does not set forth the specific theories of liability they assert in their opening brief w

2025Jurado opposed the motion, pointing out the “sole remaining predicate violation [regarding failure to timely produce her payroll records and personnel file] . . . was asserted only on behalf of Plaintiff, not other aggrieved current or former employees.” She argued the death knell doctrine applied because “the minimal recovery available for Plaintiff’s only remaining claim for failure to produce her employment records creates a substantial risk that no formal final judgment will ever be entered.”8 In its reply, Neotech insisted a PAGA claim “is inherently representative in nature,” and Jurado

2025Jurado opposed the motion, pointing out the “sole remaining predicate violation [regarding failure to timely produce her payroll records and personnel file] . . . was asserted only on behalf of Plaintiff, not other aggrieved current or former employees.” She argued the death knell doctrine applied because “the minimal recovery available for Plaintiff’s only remaining claim for failure to produce her employment records creates a substantial risk that no formal final judgment will ever be entered.”8 In its reply, Neotech insisted a PAGA claim “is inherently representative in nature,” and Jurado

2025Jurado opposed the motion, pointing out the “sole remaining predicate violation [regarding failure to timely produce her payroll records and personnel file] . . . was asserted only on behalf of Plaintiff, not other aggrieved current or former employees.” She argued the death knell doctrine applied because “the minimal recovery available for Plaintiff’s only remaining claim for failure to produce her employment records creates a substantial risk that no formal final judgment will ever be entered.”8 In its reply, Neotech insisted a PAGA claim “is inherently representative in nature,” and Jurado

2025Jurado opposed the motion, pointing out the “sole remaining predicate violation [regarding failure to timely produce her payroll records and personnel file] . . . was asserted only on behalf of Plaintiff, not other aggrieved current or former employees.” She argued the death knell doctrine applied because “the minimal recovery available for Plaintiff’s only remaining claim for failure to produce her employment records creates a substantial risk that no formal final judgment will ever be entered.”8 In its reply, Neotech insisted a PAGA claim “is inherently representative in nature,” and Jurado

2025(E.g., Brooks v. AmeriHome Mortgage Co., LLC (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 624 , 629 [plaintiff’s complaint “alleged a single cause of action under PAGA and did not allege an individual claim for wage recovery”]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 633 [trial court “compelled arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claim, dismissed the class claims, bifurcated the representative PAGA claim, and stayed the PAGA claim pending the completion of arbitration”]; Reyes v. Macy’s Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1124 [“the PAGA claim is not an individual claim”].) Consequently, this opinion uses the

2025(E.g., Brooks v. AmeriHome Mortgage Co., LLC (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 624 , 629 [plaintiff’s complaint “alleged a single cause of action under PAGA and did not allege an individual claim for wage recovery”]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 633 [trial court “compelled arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claim, dismissed the class claims, bifurcated the representative PAGA claim, and stayed the PAGA claim pending the completion of arbitration”]; Reyes v. Macy’s Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1124 [“the PAGA claim is not an individual claim”].) Consequently, this opinion uses the

2023Citing Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1126 (Securitas), the court wrote, “Although the superior court correctly concluded the PAGA waiver is unenforceable, it erred by severing the unenforceable PAGA waiver from the remainder of the Waiver of Class and Collective Claims and the remainder of the arbitration agreement.

2021Defendants cannot now complain that the court did not have authority to decide the very issues defendants requested the court decide.5 (Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1124 [failure to raise contention that arbitrator should have decided severability was invited error].) 5 Because we conclude defendants forfeited their argument based on the delegation clause, we need not consider McQueen’s argument that the delegation clause is unenforceable. 24 DISPOSITION The order denying defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is reversed and the matter

2019(See Thurman , supra , 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1148 , 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 130 [an aggrieved employee who is acting as the proxy or agent of the Labor Commissioner or Labor and Workforce Development Agency by bringing a PAGA action may recover the civil penalty provided for in section 558 ].) Given that a claim for recovery of civil penalties provided for in section 558 is one that was originally bestowed by the Legislature on the Labor Commissioner, and that the only way an aggrieved employee can seek the civil penalties addressed in section 558 is through a representative PAGA claim, it becomes cle

2019(See Thurman , supra , 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1148 , 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 130 [an aggrieved employee who is acting as the proxy or agent of the Labor Commissioner or Labor and Workforce Development Agency by bringing a PAGA action may recover the civil penalty provided for in section 558 ].) Given that a claim for recovery of civil penalties provided for in section 558 is one that was originally bestowed by the Legislature on the Labor Commissioner, and that the only way an aggrieved employee can seek the civil penalties addressed in section 558 is through a representative PAGA claim, it becomes cle

2025In Correia – a case involving interstate commerce where the FAA applied – the court agreed with other Court of Appeal cases which “have uniformly held that an employee’s predispute agreement to arbitrate PAGA claims is not enforceable without the state’s consent.” (Correia, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 621 , citing cases.)8 Correia explained: “Relying on the rationale 8 The cases Correia cited are: Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853 , 869–872; id. at p. 860 [“We hold that an agreement to arbitrate a PAGA claim, entered into before an employee is statutorily authorized to bring su

2025In Correia – a case involving interstate commerce where the FAA applied – the court agreed with other Court of Appeal cases which “have uniformly held that an employee’s predispute agreement to arbitrate PAGA claims is not enforceable without the state’s consent.” (Correia, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 621 , citing cases.)8 Correia explained: “Relying on the rationale 8 The cases Correia cited are: Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853 , 869–872; id. at p. 860 [“We hold that an agreement to arbitrate a PAGA claim, entered into before an employee is statutorily authorized to bring su

2023(Uribe, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 1003; Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 824 .) Because a proxy’s PAGA authority derives from and is bounded by the LWDA notice on which it is founded (Khan v. Dunn-Edwards Corp. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 804 , 808–810; Esparza v. Safeway, Inc. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 42, 59 ), the enforcement power a PAGA claimant receives upon perfecting a PAGA claim is not a roving warrant to collect penalties for any violation of the Labor Code that may be discovered in subsequent litigation, or that may be raised in settlement negotiations by rogue PAGA claiman

2023(See Hutcheson v. Superior Court, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at pp. 941, 943; Esparza v. Safeway, Inc. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 42, 62 [“an untimely PAGA claim may relate back to an earlier complaint only if the complaint was preceded by timely notice to the LWDA”].) Luckett contends his October 24, 2019 letter “provided sufficient notice of the [section] 14([B]) claim by stating [McDonald’s] ‘fail[ed] to provide suitable seating [to] him and other current and former ‘aggrieved’ . . . employees in California who worked as cashiers and/or performed other duties that reasonably permitted the use of seat

2021Neither purpose depends on requiring employees to submit only allegations that can already be backed by some particular quantum of admissible proof.” ( Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 545-546.) As stated by another court, the purpose of the notice provision is to “‘allow[ ] the [LWDA] to act first on more “serious” violations such as wage and hour violations and give employers an opportunity to cure less serious violations.’” (Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 375 , disapproved on another ground in ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 196, fn.

2021Neither purpose depends on requiring employees to submit only allegations that can already be backed by some particular quantum of admissible proof.” ( Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 545-546.) As stated by another court, the purpose of the notice provision is to “‘allow[ ] the [LWDA] to act first on more “serious” violations such as wage and hour violations and give employers an opportunity to cure less serious violations.’” (Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 375 , disapproved on another ground in ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 196, fn.

2026It is simply a procedural statute allowing an aggrieved employee to recover civil penalties—for Labor Code violations—that otherwise would be sought by state labor law enforcement agencies.” (Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1765, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003 .) The employee “does not own” an interest in a PAGA claim.

2026As we have held in the past, the right to recover a statutory penalty may not be assigned.” (Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1765, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003 (Amalgamated).) For example, a labor union lacks standing to pursue a PAGA claim assigned to it because the union was not an “ ‘ “aggrieved employee.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1005.) “Ordinarily a right that cannot be assigned does not survive the death of the person entitled to it.” (Estate of Blair (1954) 42 Cal.2d 728, 731 .) Further, “an action to enforce a statutory penalty does not survive death and is not assignab

2014Even if we were to accept Fry’s’s assertion that the agreement included an implied representative action waiver requiring Ramos to arbitrate his PAGA claim on an individual basis, such a provision would be unenforceable under Iskanian.5 The defendant employer in Iskanian raised a similar argument, asserting that the agreement at issue was not contrary to public policy because it only prohibited “representative claims, not individual PAGA claims for Labor Code violations that an employee suffered.” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 383 .) The California Supreme Court disagreed, stating: “[W]he

2014Even if we were to accept Fry’s’s assertion that the agreement included an implied representative action waiver requiring Ramos to arbitrate his PAGA claim on an individual basis, such a provision would be unenforceable under Iskanian.5 The defendant employer in Iskanian raised a similar argument, asserting that the agreement at issue was not contrary to public policy because it only prohibited “representative claims, not individual PAGA claims for Labor Code violations that an employee suffered.” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 383 .) The California Supreme Court disagreed, stating: “[W]he

2025(See Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at pp. 336, 352 [FAA preempts California’s rule conditioning enforceability of arbitration agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures].) As Prell does not assert a PAGA claim against The Lobster, we need not determine whether 13 We presume Prell is referring to the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab.

2025(See Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at pp. 336, 352 [FAA preempts California’s rule conditioning enforceability of arbitration agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures].) As Prell does not assert a PAGA claim against The Lobster, we need not determine whether 13 We presume Prell is referring to the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab.

2026Proc., § 1281.)” (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 492.) Terms within an arbitration agreement that are illegal or contrary to public policy provide such grounds. ( Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 110, 123–124.) As mentioned, the parties agree that a wholesale waiver of PAGA claims in any forum is contrary to California public policy and that the PAGA claim waiver in the DRP violates our state’s public policy.

2026Proc., § 1281.)” (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 492.) Terms within an arbitration agreement that are illegal or contrary to public policy provide such grounds. ( Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 110, 123–124.) As mentioned, the parties agree that a wholesale waiver of PAGA claims in any forum is contrary to California public policy and that the PAGA claim waiver in the DRP violates our state’s public policy.

2026(Ibid.) “The plaintiff is not even the real party in interest in the action— the government is.” (Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 745, 757 .) 8 Aggrieved employees’ ability to file a PAGA claim “does not convert the state’s interest into their own or render them real parties in interest.” (Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 955 , 972, affirmed in Turrieta, supra, 16 Cal.5th 664 .) The LWDA shares any civil penalty with employees.

2026(Ibid.) “The plaintiff is not even the real party in interest in the action— the government is.” (Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 745, 757 .) 8 Aggrieved employees’ ability to file a PAGA claim “does not convert the state’s interest into their own or render them real parties in interest.” (Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 955 , 972, affirmed in Turrieta, supra, 16 Cal.5th 664 .) The LWDA shares any civil penalty with employees.

2023(Uribe, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 1003; Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 824 .) Because a proxy’s PAGA authority derives from and is bounded by the LWDA notice on which it is founded (Khan v. Dunn-Edwards Corp. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 804 , 808–810; Esparza v. Safeway, Inc. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 42, 59 ), the enforcement power a PAGA claimant receives upon perfecting a PAGA claim is not a roving warrant to collect penalties for any violation of the Labor Code that may be discovered in subsequent litigation, or that may be raised in settlement negotiations by rogue PAGA claiman

2023(Uribe, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 1003; Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 824 .) Because a proxy’s PAGA authority derives from and is bounded by the LWDA notice on which it is founded (Khan v. Dunn-Edwards Corp. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 804 , 808–810; Esparza v. Safeway, Inc. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 42, 59 ), the enforcement power a PAGA claimant receives upon perfecting a PAGA claim is not a roving warrant to collect penalties for any violation of the Labor Code that may be discovered in subsequent litigation, or that may be raised in settlement negotiations by rogue PAGA claiman

2023(Uribe, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 1003; Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 824 .) Because a proxy’s PAGA authority derives from and is bounded by the LWDA notice on which it is founded (Khan v. Dunn-Edwards Corp. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 804 , 808–810; Esparza v. Safeway, Inc. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 42, 59 ), the enforcement power a PAGA claimant receives upon perfecting a PAGA claim is not a roving warrant to collect penalties for any violation of the Labor Code that may be discovered in subsequent litigation, or that may be raised in settlement negotiations by rogue PAGA claiman

2023(Uribe, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 1003; Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 824 .) Because a proxy’s PAGA authority derives from and is bounded by the LWDA notice on which it is founded (Khan v. Dunn-Edwards Corp. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 804 , 808–810; Esparza v. Safeway, Inc. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 42, 59 ), the enforcement power a PAGA claimant receives upon perfecting a PAGA claim is not a roving warrant to collect penalties for any violation of the Labor Code that may be discovered in subsequent litigation, or that may be raised in settlement negotiations by rogue PAGA claiman