paga claim in California

2026The provision prohibits Foster from asserting representative claims for Labor Code violations under PAGA. 6 This court recently summarized: “Iskanian[, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 ] held that an employee’s right to bring a PAGA action was ‘unwaivable’ and that the rule against PAGA waivers was not preempted by the FAA. [Citation.] Iskanian also rejected the employer’s argument that a PAGA waiver could be upheld if it only waived the employee’s right to bring a PAGA claim on behalf of others while preserving the employee’s right to bring such a claim on his own behalf. [Citation.] ‘Appellate courts i

2026The provision prohibits Foster from asserting representative claims for Labor Code violations under PAGA. 6 This court recently summarized: “Iskanian[, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 ] held that an employee’s right to bring a PAGA action was ‘unwaivable’ and that the rule against PAGA waivers was not preempted by the FAA. [Citation.] Iskanian also rejected the employer’s argument that a PAGA waiver could be upheld if it only waived the employee’s right to bring a PAGA claim on behalf of others while preserving the employee’s right to bring such a claim on his own behalf. [Citation.] ‘Appellate courts i

2026Code § 2699, former subd. (c).) A PAGA action is “brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees.” (Id., former subd. (a), italics added.) PAGA allows “an enforcement action between the LWDA and the employer, with the PAGA plaintiff acting on behalf of the government.” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73 , 86; Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664 , 681– 682 (Turrieta); ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 185 [“All” PAGA claims “are brought on the state’s behalf”].) The aggrieved employee “

2026Code § 2699, former subd. (c).) A PAGA action is “brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees.” (Id., former subd. (a), italics added.) PAGA allows “an enforcement action between the LWDA and the employer, with the PAGA plaintiff acting on behalf of the government.” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73 , 86; Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664 , 681– 682 (Turrieta); ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 185 [“All” PAGA claims “are brought on the state’s behalf”].) The aggrieved employee “

2026The provision prohibits Foster from asserting representative claims for Labor Code violations under PAGA. 6 This court recently summarized: “Iskanian[, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 ] held that an employee’s right to bring a PAGA action was ‘unwaivable’ and that the rule against PAGA waivers was not preempted by the FAA. [Citation.] Iskanian also rejected the employer’s argument that a PAGA waiver could be upheld if it only waived the employee’s right to bring a PAGA claim on behalf of others while preserving the employee’s right to bring such a claim on his own behalf. [Citation.] ‘Appellate courts i

2026The provision prohibits Foster from asserting representative claims for Labor Code violations under PAGA. 6 This court recently summarized: “Iskanian[, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 ] held that an employee’s right to bring a PAGA action was ‘unwaivable’ and that the rule against PAGA waivers was not preempted by the FAA. [Citation.] Iskanian also rejected the employer’s argument that a PAGA waiver could be upheld if it only waived the employee’s right to bring a PAGA claim on behalf of others while preserving the employee’s right to bring such a claim on his own behalf. [Citation.] ‘Appellate courts i

2026The provision prohibits Foster from asserting representative claims for Labor Code violations under PAGA. 6 This court recently summarized: “Iskanian[, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 ] held that an employee’s right to bring a PAGA action was ‘unwaivable’ and that the rule against PAGA waivers was not preempted by the FAA. [Citation.] Iskanian also rejected the employer’s argument that a PAGA waiver could be upheld if it only waived the employee’s right to bring a PAGA claim on behalf of others while preserving the employee’s right to bring such a claim on his own behalf. [Citation.] ‘Appellate courts i

2026The provision prohibits Foster from asserting representative claims for Labor Code violations under PAGA. 6 This court recently summarized: “Iskanian[, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 ] held that an employee’s right to bring a PAGA action was ‘unwaivable’ and that the rule against PAGA waivers was not preempted by the FAA. [Citation.] Iskanian also rejected the employer’s argument that a PAGA waiver could be upheld if it only waived the employee’s right to bring a PAGA claim on behalf of others while preserving the employee’s right to bring such a claim on his own behalf. [Citation.] ‘Appellate courts i

2025(Osuna v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 516 , 524, citing Williams v. Superior the plaintiff in the underlying action, given that the amicus curiae indicates it is a law firm that regularly represents plaintiffs, and its argument agrees with the position espoused by the real party in interest, Gavriiloglou, requesting that we affirm the holding of Gavriiloglou, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 595 . 6 Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 545 .) Those deputized are referred to as “aggrieved employee[s].” (See § 2699, former subd. (a).) “A PAGA claim for civil penalties ‘“‘is fundamentally

2025(Osuna v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 516 , 524, citing Williams v. Superior the plaintiff in the underlying action, given that the amicus curiae indicates it is a law firm that regularly represents plaintiffs, and its argument agrees with the position espoused by the real party in interest, Gavriiloglou, requesting that we affirm the holding of Gavriiloglou, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 595 . 6 Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 545 .) Those deputized are referred to as “aggrieved employee[s].” (See § 2699, former subd. (a).) “A PAGA claim for civil penalties ‘“‘is fundamentally

2026(Id. at pp. 360, 383-384; see also ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 181 [explaining that Iskanian held that “a court may not enforce an employee’s alleged predispute waiver of the right to bring a PAGA claim in any forum”].) After Iskanian, the courts of appeal held that employees could not be compelled to arbitrate their representative PAGA claims, and representative and individual PAGA claims could not be split into bifurcated proceedings.

2026(Id. at pp. 360, 383-384; see also ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 181 [explaining that Iskanian held that “a court may not enforce an employee’s alleged predispute waiver of the right to bring a PAGA claim in any forum”].) After Iskanian, the courts of appeal held that employees could not be compelled to arbitrate their representative PAGA claims, and representative and individual PAGA claims could not be split into bifurcated proceedings.

2025In Correia – a case involving interstate commerce where the FAA applied – the court agreed with other Court of Appeal cases which “have uniformly held that an employee’s predispute agreement to arbitrate PAGA claims is not enforceable without the state’s consent.” (Correia, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 621 , citing cases.)8 Correia explained: “Relying on the rationale 8 The cases Correia cited are: Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853 , 869-872; id. at p. 860 [“We hold that an agreement to arbitrate a PAGA claim, entered into before an employee is statutorily authorized to bring su

2025In Correia – a case involving interstate commerce where the FAA applied – the court agreed with other Court of Appeal cases which “have uniformly held that an employee’s predispute agreement to arbitrate PAGA claims is not enforceable without the state’s consent.” (Correia, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 621 , citing cases.)8 Correia explained: “Relying on the rationale 8 The cases Correia cited are: Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853 , 869-872; id. at p. 860 [“We hold that an agreement to arbitrate a PAGA claim, entered into before an employee is statutorily authorized to bring su

2025(E.g., Brooks v. AmeriHome Mortgage Co., LLC (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 624 , 629 [plaintiff’s complaint “alleged a single cause of action under PAGA and did not allege an individual claim for wage recovery”]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 633 [trial court “compelled arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claim, dismissed the class claims, bifurcated the representative PAGA claim, and stayed the PAGA claim pending the completion of arbitration”]; Reyes v. Macy’s Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1124 [“the PAGA claim is not an individual claim”].) Consequently, this opinion uses the

2025(E.g., Brooks v. AmeriHome Mortgage Co., LLC (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 624 , 629 [plaintiff’s complaint “alleged a single cause of action under PAGA and did not allege an individual claim for wage recovery”]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 633 [trial court “compelled arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claim, dismissed the class claims, bifurcated the representative PAGA claim, and stayed the PAGA claim pending the completion of arbitration”]; Reyes v. Macy’s Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1124 [“the PAGA claim is not an individual claim”].) Consequently, this opinion uses the

2025There, the court stated the second amended complaint “retained the PAGA claim from the original complaint” and that claim “sought PAGA penalties for various Labor Code violations[.]” (Id. at p. 595; see also, Williams v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 642, 649 [“case law suggests that a single representative PAGA claim cannot be split into an arbitrable individual claim and a nonarbitrable representative claim”]; Viking River, supra, at p. 654, fn. 6 .) Individual PAGA claim.

2025There, the court stated the second amended complaint “retained the PAGA claim from the original complaint” and that claim “sought PAGA penalties for various Labor Code violations[.]” (Id. at p. 595; see also, Williams v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 642, 649 [“case law suggests that a single representative PAGA claim cannot be split into an arbitrable individual claim and a nonarbitrable representative claim”]; Viking River, supra, at p. 654, fn. 6 .) Individual PAGA claim.

2025Other cases are in accord. ‘“Without the state’s consent, a predispute agreement between an employee and an employer cannot be the basis for compelling arbitration of a representative PAGA claim because the state is the owner of the claim and the real party in interest, and the state was not a party to the arbitration agreement.”’ (Contreras, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 474, quoting Correia v. NB Baker Electric, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 602, 622 (Correia).) For these reasons, we conclude that individual PAGA claims may be subject to arbitration, but that, under the holding of Adolph, the arb

2025(Contreras, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 474.) “By virtue of an arbitration to which it did not consent, the state will have lost one of its weapons in the enforcement of California’s labor laws.” (Ibid.) ‘“Without the state’s consent, a predispute agreement between an employee and an employer cannot be the basis for compelling arbitration of a representative PAGA claim because the state is the owner of the claim and the real party in interest, and the state was not a party to the arbitration agreement.” (Correia, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 622 .) There is nothing in the PAGA statutes that per

2020(Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 546 ; see Iskanian, at p. 381; Brown, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 501 .) Although representative in nature, a PAGA claim is not simply a collection of individual claims for relief, and so is different from a class action.

2020(Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 546 ; see Iskanian, at p. 381; Brown, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 501 .) Although representative in nature, a PAGA claim is not simply a collection of individual claims for relief, and so is different from a class action.

2025Correia recognized, as do we, that several federal courts have reached a different conclusion, including the Valdez case defendants cite for the proposition that “Iskanian and Sakkab clearly contemplate that an individual employee can pursue a PAGA claim in arbitration, is brought on behalf of the state”]; and Tanguilig v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 665 , 677-680; id. at p. 678 [“[b]ecause a PAGA plaintiff, whether suing solely on behalf of himself or herself or also on behalf of other employees, acts as a proxy for the state only with the state’s acquiescence [citation] and see

2025Correia recognized, as do we, that several federal courts have reached a different conclusion, including the Valdez case defendants cite for the proposition that “Iskanian and Sakkab clearly contemplate that an individual employee can pursue a PAGA claim in arbitration, is brought on behalf of the state”]; and Tanguilig v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 665 , 677-680; id. at p. 678 [“[b]ecause a PAGA plaintiff, whether suing solely on behalf of himself or herself or also on behalf of other employees, acts as a proxy for the state only with the state’s acquiescence [citation] and see

2025(See, e.g., Munoz v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 291, 311 (Munoz) [presence of PAGA claim following denial of class certification precluded application of death knell doctrine]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 635 [order compelling arbitration of individual claims, dismissing class claims, and staying PAGA claim nonappealable as it did not entirely terminate all class claims]; Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232, 243 (Nguyen) [same].) As explained in Munoz, plaintiffs have “ample financial incentive” to pursue the remaining r

2025(Cortez, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 9 [concluding “the death knell exception to the one final judgment rule does not apply when a PAGA claim remains pending in the trial court following termination of the class claims”]; Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232 , 243-244 [same]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 635 (Young) [same]; Munoz v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 291 , 310-311 (Munoz) [“Denial of class certification where the PAGA claims remain in the trial court would not have the ‘legal effect’ of a final judgment . . . .”].

2025(Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 6 pp. 384-389.) It reasoned that a PAGA claim lies outside the FAA’s coverage because “the FAA aims to ensure an efficient forum for the resolution of private disputes, whereas a PAGA action is a dispute between an employer and [a] state [a]gency.” (Id. at p. 384.) Following the decision in Iskanian, California courts unanimously endorsed the view espoused in Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123-1124 , that every PAGA action is a representative action on behalf of the state and that “a single representative PAGA claim cannot be split into an a

2025(Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 6 pp. 384-389.) It reasoned that a PAGA claim lies outside the FAA’s coverage because “the FAA aims to ensure an efficient forum for the resolution of private disputes, whereas a PAGA action is a dispute between an employer and [a] state [a]gency.” (Id. at p. 384.) Following the decision in Iskanian, California courts unanimously endorsed the view espoused in Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123-1124 , that every PAGA action is a representative action on behalf of the state and that “a single representative PAGA claim cannot be split into an a

2023(See, e.g., Raines v. Coastal Pacific Food Distributors, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 667, 670 [lower court erred in granting summary adjudication on PAGA claim based on the plaintiff ’s failure to prove injury from a section 226, subdivision (a) violation, as injury is required only for individual claim under section 226, subdivision (e), not a PAGA claim]; Lopez v. Friant & Associates, LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 773, 788 [“a plaintiff seeking civil penalties under PAGA for a violation of section 226[, subdivision] (a) does not have to satisfy the ‘injury’ and ‘knowing and intentional’ requireme

2023(See, e.g., Raines v. Coastal Pacific Food Distributors, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 667, 670 [lower court erred in granting summary adjudication on PAGA claim based on the plaintiff ’s failure to prove injury from a section 226, subdivision (a) violation, as injury is required only for individual claim under section 226, subdivision (e), not a PAGA claim]; Lopez v. Friant & Associates, LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 773, 788 [“a plaintiff seeking civil penalties under PAGA for a violation of section 226[, subdivision] (a) does not have to satisfy the ‘injury’ and ‘knowing and intentional’ requireme

2025(Osuna v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 516 , 524, citing Williams v. Superior the plaintiff in the underlying action, given that the amicus curiae indicates it is a law firm that regularly represents plaintiffs, and its argument agrees with the position espoused by the real party in interest, Gavriiloglou, requesting that we affirm the holding of Gavriiloglou, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 595 . 6 Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 545 .) Those deputized are referred to as “aggrieved employee[s].” (See § 2699, former subd. (a).) “A PAGA claim for civil penalties ‘“‘is fundamentally

2025(Osuna v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 516 , 524, citing Williams v. Superior the plaintiff in the underlying action, given that the amicus curiae indicates it is a law firm that regularly represents plaintiffs, and its argument agrees with the position espoused by the real party in interest, Gavriiloglou, requesting that we affirm the holding of Gavriiloglou, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 595 . 6 Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 545 .) Those deputized are referred to as “aggrieved employee[s].” (See § 2699, former subd. (a).) “A PAGA claim for civil penalties ‘“‘is fundamentally

2026(See Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001 , review granted Apr. 16, 2025, S289305.) 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code. 2 We conclude the trial court did not err in ruling the operative complaint did not include an individual PAGA claim.

2026(E.g., Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001 , 1008, fn. 7, review granted April 16, 2025, 1 court further ruled that PAGA and the caselaw interpreting it allowed Shin to plead only a non-individual PAGA claim in this fashion.

2026The provision prohibits Foster from asserting representative claims for Labor Code violations under PAGA. 6 This court recently summarized: “Iskanian[, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 ] held that an employee’s right to bring a PAGA action was ‘unwaivable’ and that the rule against PAGA waivers was not preempted by the FAA. [Citation.] Iskanian also rejected the employer’s argument that a PAGA waiver could be upheld if it only waived the employee’s right to bring a PAGA claim on behalf of others while preserving the employee’s right to bring such a claim on his own behalf. [Citation.] ‘Appellate courts i

2026The provision prohibits Foster from asserting representative claims for Labor Code violations under PAGA. 6 This court recently summarized: “Iskanian[, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 ] held that an employee’s right to bring a PAGA action was ‘unwaivable’ and that the rule against PAGA waivers was not preempted by the FAA. [Citation.] Iskanian also rejected the employer’s argument that a PAGA waiver could be upheld if it only waived the employee’s right to bring a PAGA claim on behalf of others while preserving the employee’s right to bring such a claim on his own behalf. [Citation.] ‘Appellate courts i

2025Jurado opposed the motion, pointing out the “sole remaining predicate violation [regarding failure to timely produce her payroll records and personnel file] . . . was asserted only on behalf of Plaintiff, not other aggrieved current or former employees.” She argued the death knell doctrine applied because “the minimal recovery available for Plaintiff’s only remaining claim for failure to produce her employment records creates a substantial risk that no formal final judgment will ever be entered.”8 In its reply, Neotech insisted a PAGA claim “is inherently representative in nature,” and Jurado

2025Jurado opposed the motion, pointing out the “sole remaining predicate violation [regarding failure to timely produce her payroll records and personnel file] . . . was asserted only on behalf of Plaintiff, not other aggrieved current or former employees.” She argued the death knell doctrine applied because “the minimal recovery available for Plaintiff’s only remaining claim for failure to produce her employment records creates a substantial risk that no formal final judgment will ever be entered.”8 In its reply, Neotech insisted a PAGA claim “is inherently representative in nature,” and Jurado

2025Jurado opposed the motion, pointing out the “sole remaining predicate violation [regarding failure to timely produce her payroll records and personnel file] . . . was asserted only on behalf of Plaintiff, not other aggrieved current or former employees.” She argued the death knell doctrine applied because “the minimal recovery available for Plaintiff’s only remaining claim for failure to produce her employment records creates a substantial risk that no formal final judgment will ever be entered.”8 In its reply, Neotech insisted a PAGA claim “is inherently representative in nature,” and Jurado

2025Jurado opposed the motion, pointing out the “sole remaining predicate violation [regarding failure to timely produce her payroll records and personnel file] . . . was asserted only on behalf of Plaintiff, not other aggrieved current or former employees.” She argued the death knell doctrine applied because “the minimal recovery available for Plaintiff’s only remaining claim for failure to produce her employment records creates a substantial risk that no formal final judgment will ever be entered.”8 In its reply, Neotech insisted a PAGA claim “is inherently representative in nature,” and Jurado

2023Citing Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1126 (Securitas), the court wrote, “Although the superior court correctly concluded the PAGA waiver is unenforceable, it erred by severing the unenforceable PAGA waiver from the remainder of the Waiver of Class and Collective Claims and the remainder of the arbitration agreement.

2021Defendants cannot now complain that the court did not have authority to decide the very issues defendants requested the court decide.5 (Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1124 [failure to raise contention that arbitrator should have decided severability was invited error].) 5 Because we conclude defendants forfeited their argument based on the delegation clause, we need not consider McQueen’s argument that the delegation clause is unenforceable. 24 DISPOSITION The order denying defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is reversed and the matter

2026With regard to the motion to compel arbitration, the court agreed with the parties’ mutual position that (1) the FAA applies to the DRP’s arbitration provisions and (2) the PAGA claim waiver is invalid and unenforceable, citing Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 662 ; Galarsa, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 649, and Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 383, 574 (Iskanian), overruled on an unrelated issue in Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562 and abrogated in part on a different issue in Viking River, at pages 640– 641.

2026With regard to the motion to compel arbitration, the court agreed with the parties’ mutual position that (1) the FAA applies to the DRP’s arbitration provisions and (2) the PAGA claim waiver is invalid and unenforceable, citing Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 662 ; Galarsa, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 649, and Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 383, 574 (Iskanian), overruled on an unrelated issue in Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562 and abrogated in part on a different issue in Viking River, at pages 640– 641.

2025In Correia – a case involving interstate commerce where the FAA applied – the court agreed with other Court of Appeal cases which “have uniformly held that an employee’s predispute agreement to arbitrate PAGA claims is not enforceable without the state’s consent.” (Correia, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 621 , citing cases.)8 Correia explained: “Relying on the rationale 8 The cases Correia cited are: Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853 , 869-872; id. at p. 860 [“We hold that an agreement to arbitrate a PAGA claim, entered into before an employee is statutorily authorized to bring su

2025In Correia – a case involving interstate commerce where the FAA applied – the court agreed with other Court of Appeal cases which “have uniformly held that an employee’s predispute agreement to arbitrate PAGA claims is not enforceable without the state’s consent.” (Correia, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 621 , citing cases.)8 Correia explained: “Relying on the rationale 8 The cases Correia cited are: Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853 , 869-872; id. at p. 860 [“We hold that an agreement to arbitrate a PAGA claim, entered into before an employee is statutorily authorized to bring su

2025(See, e.g., Munoz v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 291, 311 (Munoz) [presence of PAGA claim following denial of class certification precluded application of death knell doctrine]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 635 [order compelling arbitration of individual claims, dismissing class claims, and staying PAGA claim nonappealable as it did not entirely terminate all class claims]; Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232, 243 (Nguyen) [same].) As explained in Munoz, plaintiffs have “ample financial incentive” to pursue the remaining r

2025(E.g., Brooks v. AmeriHome Mortgage Co., LLC (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 624 , 629 [plaintiff’s complaint “alleged a single cause of action under PAGA and did not allege an individual claim for wage recovery”]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 633 [trial court “compelled arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claim, dismissed the class claims, bifurcated the representative PAGA claim, and stayed the PAGA claim pending the completion of arbitration”]; Reyes v. Macy’s Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1124 [“the PAGA claim is not an individual claim”].) Consequently, this opinion uses the

2019(See Thurman , supra , 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1148 , 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 130 [an aggrieved employee who is acting as the proxy or agent of the Labor Commissioner or Labor and Workforce Development Agency by bringing a PAGA action may recover the civil penalty provided for in section 558 ].) Given that a claim for recovery of civil penalties provided for in section 558 is one that was originally bestowed by the Legislature on the Labor Commissioner, and that the only way an aggrieved employee can seek the civil penalties addressed in section 558 is through a representative PAGA claim, it becomes cle

2019(See Thurman , supra , 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1148 , 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 130 [an aggrieved employee who is acting as the proxy or agent of the Labor Commissioner or Labor and Workforce Development Agency by bringing a PAGA action may recover the civil penalty provided for in section 558 ].) Given that a claim for recovery of civil penalties provided for in section 558 is one that was originally bestowed by the Legislature on the Labor Commissioner, and that the only way an aggrieved employee can seek the civil penalties addressed in section 558 is through a representative PAGA claim, it becomes cle

2025(Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664 , 692, fn. 12 (Turrieta) [“the PAGA plaintiff ‘ “represents a single principal” ’—the LWDA”].) This choice of possessive noun is based in part on case law stating PAGA actions “belong[] solely to the state” (Provost v. YourMechanic, Inc. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 982 , 988); “a PAGA claim is representative and does not belong to an employee individually” (Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Group (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 539 , 557); and “[t]he PAGA claims alleged in the former employees’ complaint are owned by the state” (Herrera v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto (

2025(Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664 , 692, fn. 12 (Turrieta) [“the PAGA plaintiff ‘ “represents a single principal” ’—the LWDA”].) This choice of possessive noun is based in part on case law stating PAGA actions “belong[] solely to the state” (Provost v. YourMechanic, Inc. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 982 , 988); “a PAGA claim is representative and does not belong to an employee individually” (Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Group (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 539 , 557); and “[t]he PAGA claims alleged in the former employees’ complaint are owned by the state” (Herrera v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto (

2026It is simply a procedural statute allowing an aggrieved employee to recover civil penalties—for Labor Code violations—that otherwise would be sought by state labor law enforcement agencies.” (Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1765, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003 .) The employee “does not own” an interest in a PAGA claim.

2026As we have held in the past, the right to recover a statutory penalty may not be assigned.” (Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1765, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003 (Amalgamated).) For example, a labor union lacks standing to pursue a PAGA claim assigned to it because the union was not an “ ‘ “aggrieved employee.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1005.) “Ordinarily a right that cannot be assigned does not survive the death of the person entitled to it.” (Estate of Blair (1954) 42 Cal.2d 728, 731 .) Further, “an action to enforce a statutory penalty does not survive death and is not assignab

2025(See Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at pp. 336, 352 [FAA preempts California’s rule conditioning enforceability of arbitration agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures].) As Prell does not assert a PAGA claim against The Lobster, we need not determine whether 13 We presume Prell is referring to the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab.

2025(See Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at pp. 336, 352 [FAA preempts California’s rule conditioning enforceability of arbitration agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures].) As Prell does not assert a PAGA claim against The Lobster, we need not determine whether 13 We presume Prell is referring to the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab.

2026In the context of Civil Code section 1599, a court may “ ‘sever[] or restrict[] illegal terms rather than voiding the entire contract.’ ” (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 514, quoting Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 123 , italics added.) Similarly, subdivision (a) of Civil Code section 1670.5 provides that a court may merely “limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.” It is arguable that no act of severing (i.e., striking) language from the DRP will result in eliminating only the PAGA claim waiver contained in the DRP without affecting other

2026If the illegality is collateral to the main purpose of the contract, and the illegal provision can be extirpated from the contract by means of severance or restriction, then such 17. severance and restriction are appropriate.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 124 .) “The ‘strong legislative and judicial preference is to sever the offending term and enforce the balance of the agreement.’ ” (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 513.) Here, the central purpose of the arbitration agreement (to send qualifying claims to arbitration) remains valid notwithstanding the inclusion of the invalid PAGA cl