58 California opinions name it 3 courts 1981–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Petricka v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2025(See § 14112, subd. (a); Petricka, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348 .) And it is true DMV hearing officers are empowered to issue subpoenas after a hearing has 17 commenced and to continue the proceedings pending compliance. (§ 14104.5, subd. (a); see, e.g., Bussard v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 858, 862, 865 (Bussard).) But this does not mean there are no deadlines, and no due diligence is required at all when seeking the production of documents for use at an APS hearing. 2025(See § 14112, subd. (a); Petricka, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348 .) And it is true DMV hearing officers are empowered to issue subpoenas after a hearing has 17 commenced and to continue the proceedings pending compliance. (§ 14104.5, subd. (a); see, e.g., Bussard v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 858, 862, 865 (Bussard).) But this does not mean there are no deadlines, and no due diligence is required at all when seeking the production of documents for use at an APS hearing. | 4 | 6 |
Lake v. Reedgreen2 sentences2015(See § 13382; see also Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 454-455 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 860 , 940 P.2d 311 ] (Lake).) Plaintiff, charged with drunk driving (§ 23152), was allowed to plead to a “wet reckless” (§§ 23103 [misdemeanor reckless driving], 23103.5 [prosecutorial statement that alcohol was involved]; see People v. Claire (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 647 , 650 & fn. 2 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 269 ]), but requested a hearing before the DMV to challenge her license suspension (§ 13558). 2015(See § 13382; see also Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 454-455 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 860 , 940 P.2d 311 ] (Lake).) Plaintiff, charged with drunk driving (§ 23152), was allowed to plead to a “wet reckless” (§§ 23103 [misdemeanor reckless driving], 23103.5 [prosecutorial statement that alcohol was involved]; see People v. Claire (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 647 , 650 & fn. 2 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 269 ]), but requested a hearing before the DMV to challenge her license suspension (§ 13558). | 3 | 8 |
Daniels v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences1996(Daniels v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1983) 33 Cal.3d 532, 536 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 512 , 658 P.2d 1313 ].) At the outset of the DMV hearing the hearing officer correctly limited the scope of the issues (Daniels v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 536) to the following: “1. 1996(Daniels v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1983) 33 Cal.3d 532, 536 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 512 , 658 P.2d 1313 ].) At the outset of the DMV hearing the hearing officer correctly limited the scope of the issues (Daniels v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 536) to the following: “1. | 2 | 4 |
Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Educationgreen2 sentences2025Due process protections are not dispensed with simply because the ‘DMV hearing officer typically introduces two or three official documents into evidence and decides a limited number of issues.’ Rather, ‘whenever “due process requires a hearing, the adjudicator must be impartial.” ’ (Today’s Fresh Start, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 212 .)” (DUI Lawyers, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 532.) We read this passage to say, assuming a hearing officer actually acts as both an advocate and an adjudicator in an APS hearing, the duality is intolerable even if they only advocate a little. 2022Due process protections are not dispensed with simply because the “DMV hearing officer typically introduces two or three official documents into evidence and decides a limited number of issues.” Rather, “whenever ‘due process requires a 15 hearing, the adjudicator must be impartial.’” (Today’s Fresh Start, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 212 .) Accordingly, we conclude combining the roles of advocate and adjudicator in a single person employed by the DMV violates due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and the California constitution Article I, section 7. | 2 | 3 |
Dibble v. Gourleygreen2 sentences2014(Dibble v. Gourley (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 496, 503 [objection at administrative hearing necessary to preserve challenge based on hearsay], overruled on another ground in MacDonald v. Gutierrez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 150 , 158–159; Jackson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 730, 738 [failure to make foundational objection to arrest report at DMV hearing forfeited challenge to admissibility of document]; see also Bledsoe v. Biggs Unified School Dist. (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 127 , 141 & fn. 11 [current version of Govt. 2003(Lake v. Reed, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 458, 460; Solovij, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1233 .) The DMV may not, however, avoid the statutory requirement of a sworn report simply by categorizing other reports as “ ‘additional evidence.’ ” (Dibble v. Gourley (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 496, 501 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 ], quoting Solovij, supra, at p. 1234 .) If the DMV hearing officer finds that each issue is established by a preponderance of the evidence, the person’s driver’s license is suspended. (§ 13557, subd. (b)(1), (b)(2)) A person whose driver’s license has been suspended under these statutory | 2 | 3 |
Bussard v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2025(See § 14112, subd. (a); Petricka, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348 .) And it is true DMV hearing officers are empowered to issue subpoenas after a hearing has 17 commenced and to continue the proceedings pending compliance. (§ 14104.5, subd. (a); see, e.g., Bussard v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 858, 862, 865 (Bussard).) But this does not mean there are no deadlines, and no due diligence is required at all when seeking the production of documents for use at an APS hearing. 2025(See § 14112, subd. (a); Petricka, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348 .) And it is true DMV hearing officers are empowered to issue subpoenas after a hearing has 17 commenced and to continue the proceedings pending compliance. (§ 14104.5, subd. (a); see, e.g., Bussard v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 858, 862, 865 (Bussard).) But this does not mean there are no deadlines, and no due diligence is required at all when seeking the production of documents for use at an APS hearing. | 2 | 2 |
Davenport v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2009On the other hand, the licensee “presented no *1003 evidence that the test was not reliable, either by cross-examining the officer as to his qualifications, his manner of administering the test, and the condition of the machine, or by offering his own evidence on any of those matters.” (Davenport, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 140.) The licensee contended that under that state of the evidence, the breath test results were unreliable to prove his blood-alcohol content. 2009On the other hand, the licensee “presented no *1003 evidence that the test was not reliable, either by cross-examining the officer as to his qualifications, his manner of administering the test, and the condition of the machine, or by offering his own evidence on any of those matters.” (Davenport, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 140.) The licensee contended that under that state of the evidence, the breath test results were unreliable to prove his blood-alcohol content. | 2 | 2 |
Coffey v. Shiomotogreen2 sentences2025A. Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of Review A driver served with a notice of suspension or revocation of their driver’s license following an arrest for driving under the influence “is entitled to a hearing on request (§ 13558, subd. (a)), at which the only issues to be decided . . . are whether the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe she was driving, whether she was arrested for an enumerated offense, and whether she was driving with 0.08 percent BAC or higher.” (Coffey v. Shiomoto (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1198 , 1207−1208, fn. omitted (Coffey).) “If the DMV hearing officer find 2025A. Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of Review A driver served with a notice of suspension or revocation of their driver’s license following an arrest for driving under the influence “is entitled to a hearing on request (§ 13558, subd. (a)), at which the only issues to be decided . . . are whether the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe she was driving, whether she was arrested for an enumerated offense, and whether she was driving with 0.08 percent BAC or higher.” (Coffey v. Shiomoto (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1198 , 1207−1208, fn. omitted (Coffey).) “If the DMV hearing officer find | 1 | 4 |
Miyamoto v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2019(Coffey, at p. 1208; § 13353.3, subds. (b)(1), (2).) The Vehicle Code governs the type of evidence the DMV may consider at an administrative per se suspension hearing and incorporates portions of the Administrative Procedures Act. (§§ 14100 et seq., 14112; Miyamoto v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1216 (Miyamoto).) The DMV hearing officer "shall consider its official records and may receive sworn testimony." (§ 14104.7.) The hearing officer is not required to follow the technical rules of evidence and shall admit any relevant evidence that "is the sort of evidence on whi 2019(Coffey, at p. 1208; § 13353.3, subds. (b)(1), (2).) The Vehicle Code governs the type of evidence the DMV may consider at an administrative per se suspension hearing and incorporates portions of the Administrative Procedures Act. (§§ 14100 et seq., 14112; Miyamoto v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1216 (Miyamoto).) The DMV hearing officer "shall consider its official records and may receive sworn testimony." (§ 14104.7.) The hearing officer is not required to follow the technical rules of evidence and shall admit any relevant evidence that "is the sort of evidence on whi | 1 | 2 |
Hall v. Superior Court of San Diego Countygreen2 sentences2018License Suspension Hearing Because Hall refused to submit to a blood alcohol test, police seized his driver's license, notified him that his license would be suspended or revoked by the DMV in 30 days, and advised him of his right to request a DMV hearing to show that the suspension or revocation was not justified. ( Hall I , supra , 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 798 , 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 .) Hall requested a hearing, which was conducted by Alva Garrido Benavidez, a DMV-appointed hearing officer. ( Ibid . ) At the hearing, the DMV offered documentary evidence including an "Officer's Statement" indicating 2018License Suspension Hearing Because Hall refused to submit to a blood alcohol test, police seized his driver's license, notified him that his license would be suspended or revoked by the DMV in 30 days, and advised him of his right to request a DMV hearing to show that the suspension or revocation was not justified. ( Hall I , supra , 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 798 , 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 .) Hall requested a hearing, which was conducted by Alva Garrido Benavidez, a DMV-appointed hearing officer. ( Ibid . ) At the hearing, the DMV offered documentary evidence including an "Officer's Statement" indicating | 1 | 2 |
MacDonald v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2014(Dibble v. Gourley (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 496, 503 [objection at administrative hearing necessary to preserve challenge based on hearsay], overruled on another ground in MacDonald v. Gutierrez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 150 , 158–159; Jackson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 730, 738 [failure to make foundational objection to arrest report at DMV hearing forfeited challenge to admissibility of document]; see also Bledsoe v. Biggs Unified School Dist. (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 127 , 141 & fn. 11 [current version of Govt. 2011(MacDonald v. Gutierrez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 150, 155, 159 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 48 , 81 P.3d 975 ].) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required, and we presume that the person conducting the hearing has the education, experience, knowledge, and abilities required by State Personnel Board specifications to be a DMV hearing officer. | 1 | 2 |
Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2013We see no need to resolve that dispute since it is well-settled that the DMV may not suspend or revoke a person’s license unless that person is “ ‘lawfully arrested.’ ” (Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 760 .) Discussion of the exclusionary rule is a moot point since a necessary precondition for suspension of Ochoa’s license, i.e., that he was lawfully arrested, did not occur. 7 If there had not already been an unlawful entry into Ochoa’s garage, we think the DMV hearing officer was under no obligation to believe Ochoa’s self-serving version of events where Broyer 2013We see no need to resolve that dispute since it is well-settled that the DMV may not suspend or revoke a person’s license unless that person is “ ‘lawfully arrested.’ ” (Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 760 .) Discussion of the exclusionary rule is a moot point since a necessary precondition for suspension of Ochoa’s license, i.e., that he was lawfully arrested, did not occur. 7 If there had not already been an unlawful entry into Ochoa’s garage, we think the DMV hearing officer was under no obligation to believe Ochoa’s self-serving version of events where Broyer | 1 | 2 |
Solovij v. Gourleygreen2 sentences2003The trial court also noted its belief that it was precluded by our opinion in Solovij v. Gourley (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1229 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 278 ] (hereafter, Solovij) from considering the live testimony received at the DMV hearing or any other information contained in the administrative record. 2003The trial court also noted its belief that it was precluded by our opinion in Solovij v. Gourley (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1229 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 278 ] (hereafter, Solovij) from considering the live testimony received at the DMV hearing or any other information contained in the administrative record. | 1 | 2 |
Calvert v. County of Yubagreen2 sentences2024(See Calvert v. County of Yuba (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 613, 630 [limiting retroactivity of the decision to cases in which no final judgment had been rendered].) First, none of the APS proceedings currently pending before a DMV hearing officer (i.e., those matters where the hearing officer has not rendered a final administrative decision) would be affected by retroactivity. 2024(See Calvert v. County of Yuba (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 613, 630 [limiting retroactivity of the decision to cases in which no final judgment had been rendered].) First, none of the APS proceedings currently pending before a DMV hearing officer (i.e., those matters where the hearing officer has not rendered a final administrative decision) would be affected by retroactivity. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2023(People v. Williams (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408, 417 (Williams); Davenport, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 140, 142; Petricka, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349 [foundation requirement applies to evidence collection].) But because DMV 5 “Somewhat different rules apply to those under 21 years of age [citation], those driving commercial vehicles [citation], and those on probation for prior drunk driving convictions [citation].” (Coffey v. Shiomoto, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1208, fn. 9 .) None of these other rules is relevant here. administrative hearings are not criminal trials and the foundational fact of 2023(People v. Williams (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408, 417 (Williams); Davenport, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 140, 142; Petricka, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349 [foundation requirement applies to evidence collection].) But because DMV 5 “Somewhat different rules apply to those under 21 years of age [citation], those driving commercial vehicles [citation], and those on probation for prior drunk driving convictions [citation].” (Coffey v. Shiomoto, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1208, fn. 9 .) None of these other rules is relevant here. administrative hearings are not criminal trials and the foundational fact of | 1 | 1 |
| Joyce v. Blackgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Village Trailer Park, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rancho Pauma Mutual Water Co. v. Yuima Municipal Water Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Princegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Clairegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. McNealgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Josegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bledsoe v. Biggs Unified School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gootee v. Lightnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| River Garden Retirement Home v. Franchise Tax Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| CALIFORNIANS FOR DISAB. RIGHTS v. Mervyn'sgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Action Apartment Ass'n v. City of Santa Monicagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hunt v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tabory v. State Personnel Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ocheltree v. Gourleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Burygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Manriquez v. Gourleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Berlinghieri v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Santos v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carlton v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pollack v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Grupe Development Co. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Monaghan v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
2 sentences2025(Cf. Monaghan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1621 , 1625–1626.) Government Code section 11524, subdivision (b), includes a requirement of reasonable diligence when a party seeks to continue an administrative hearing. 2025(Cf. Monaghan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1621 , 1625–1626.) Government Code section 11524, subdivision (b), includes a requirement of reasonable diligence when a party seeks to continue an administrative hearing. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Smith v. LoanMe, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024Courts usually adopt the plain meaning of the statute, unless a literal “construction would frustrate the manifest purpose of the enactment as a whole” (Arias v. Superior Court, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 979 ) or “would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend” (Smith v. LoanMe, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 190 ). 2024Courts usually adopt the plain meaning of the statute, unless a literal “construction would frustrate the manifest purpose of the enactment as a whole” (Arias v. Superior Court, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 979 ) or “would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend” (Smith v. LoanMe, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 190 ). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Arias v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2024Courts usually adopt the plain meaning of the statute, unless a literal “construction would frustrate the manifest purpose of the enactment as a whole” (Arias v. Superior Court, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 979 ) or “would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend” (Smith v. LoanMe, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 190 ). 2024Courts usually adopt the plain meaning of the statute, unless a literal “construction would frustrate the manifest purpose of the enactment as a whole” (Arias v. Superior Court, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 979 ) or “would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend” (Smith v. LoanMe, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 190 ). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Lamere v. the Superior Court
green
2 sentences2018Common law standing CDLA also contends that it has taxpayer standing under the common law. "[C]ommon law authority for taxpayer suits [states] that a 'taxpayer in his representative capacity can sue a municipality only in cases involving fraud, collusion, ultra vires, or a failure on the part of the governmental body to perform a duty specifically enjoined .' " ( Los Altos Property Owners Assn. v. Hutcheon (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 22 , 26, 137 Cal.Rptr. 775 .) "[A] governmental agency that acts outside of the scope of its statutory authority acts ultra vires and the act is void." ( Lamere v. Super 2018Common law standing CDLA also contends that it has taxpayer standing under the common law. "[C]ommon law authority for taxpayer suits [states] that a 'taxpayer in his representative capacity can sue a municipality only in cases involving fraud, collusion, ultra vires, or a failure on the part of the governmental body to perform a duty specifically enjoined .' " ( Los Altos Property Owners Assn. v. Hutcheon (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 22 , 26, 137 Cal.Rptr. 775 .) "[A] governmental agency that acts outside of the scope of its statutory authority acts ultra vires and the act is void." ( Lamere v. Super | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Karuk Tribe of Northern California v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd., North Coast Region
green
2 sentences2018For that reason, the DMV's reliance on Center for Biological Diversity , supra , 195 Cal.App.4th 128 , 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 467 and Karuk Tribe of Northern California v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd., North Coast Region (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 330 , 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 40 for the proposition that Hall was not successful in the litigation is misplaced. 2018For that reason, the DMV's reliance on Center for Biological Diversity , supra , 195 Cal.App.4th 128 , 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 467 and Karuk Tribe of Northern California v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd., North Coast Region (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 330 , 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 40 for the proposition that Hall was not successful in the litigation is misplaced. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Center for Biological Diversity v. California Fish and Game Commission
green
2 sentences2018For that reason, the DMV's reliance on Center for Biological Diversity , supra , 195 Cal.App.4th 128 , 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 467 and Karuk Tribe of Northern California v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd., North Coast Region (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 330 , 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 40 for the proposition that Hall was not successful in the litigation is misplaced. 2018For that reason, the DMV's reliance on Center for Biological Diversity , supra , 195 Cal.App.4th 128 , 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 467 and Karuk Tribe of Northern California v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd., North Coast Region (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 330 , 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 40 for the proposition that Hall was not successful in the litigation is misplaced. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Los Altos Property Owners Assn. v. Hutcheon
green
2 sentences2018Common law standing CDLA also contends that it has taxpayer standing under the common law. "[C]ommon law authority for taxpayer suits [states] that a 'taxpayer in his representative capacity can sue a municipality only in cases involving fraud, collusion, ultra vires, or a failure on the part of the governmental body to perform a duty specifically enjoined .' " ( Los Altos Property Owners Assn. v. Hutcheon (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 22 , 26, 137 Cal.Rptr. 775 .) "[A] governmental agency that acts outside of the scope of its statutory authority acts ultra vires and the act is void." ( Lamere v. Super 2018Common law standing CDLA also contends that it has taxpayer standing under the common law. "[C]ommon law authority for taxpayer suits [states] that a 'taxpayer in his representative capacity can sue a municipality only in cases involving fraud, collusion, ultra vires, or a failure on the part of the governmental body to perform a duty specifically enjoined .' " ( Los Altos Property Owners Assn. v. Hutcheon (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 22 , 26, 137 Cal.Rptr. 775 .) "[A] governmental agency that acts outside of the scope of its statutory authority acts ultra vires and the act is void." ( Lamere v. Super | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Burg v. Municipal Court
green
2 sentences2015In determining whether the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, the appellate court opined that “[t]he issue boils down to whether non-chemical-test circumstantial evidence can prove that Coffey’s BAC at the time of driving was consistent with her BAC at the time of her chemical tests.” Relying on this court’s opinion in Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 145 , 673 P.2d 732 ], the appellate court held in the affirmative. 2015In determining whether the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, the appellate court opined that “[t]he issue boils down to whether non-chemical-test circumstantial evidence can prove that Coffey’s BAC at the time of driving was consistent with her BAC at the time of her chemical tests.” Relying on this court’s opinion in Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 145 , 673 P.2d 732 ], the appellate court held in the affirmative. | 2 | 2013–2015 |
Nightlife Partners, Ltd. v. City of Beverly Hills
green
1 sentence2026Therefore, when an AHO in an APS hearing introduces and admits “the documents that law enforcement duly forward[] to the DMV, which are routinely admitted into evidence at APS hearings, the [AHO] is merely collecting and developing evidence, not advocating for the DMV.”8 (Romane, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1018.) Because that is what the 8 Urias argues that CDLA rejected this argument and points to the following passage: “Due process protections are not dispensed with simply because the ‘DMV hearing officer typically introduces two or three official documents into evidence and decides a limi | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Howitt v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2026Therefore, when an AHO in an APS hearing introduces and admits “the documents that law enforcement duly forward[] to the DMV, which are routinely admitted into evidence at APS hearings, the [AHO] is merely collecting and developing evidence, not advocating for the DMV.”8 (Romane, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1018.) Because that is what the 8 Urias argues that CDLA rejected this argument and points to the following passage: “Due process protections are not dispensed with simply because the ‘DMV hearing officer typically introduces two or three official documents into evidence and decides a limi | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People Ex Rel. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Dahan
green
2 sentences2024(Id. at pp. 659–661.) Finally, in Hall v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th 372 , an APS hearing was found to involve an intolerable probability of bias from a DMV hearing officer. 2024(Id. at pp. 659–661.) Finally, in Hall v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th 372 , an APS hearing was found to involve an intolerable probability of bias from a DMV hearing officer. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Daly v. Wallace
green
2 sentences2023(Daly, supra, 234 Cal.App.2d at p. 692 .) Appellant provides no authority suggesting that we may properly consider his argument that the trial court erred in giving Okorocha’s testimony little weight. 2023(Daly, supra, 234 Cal.App.2d at p. 692 .) Appellant provides no authority suggesting that we may properly consider his argument that the trial court erred in giving Okorocha’s testimony little weight. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Cal. Dui Lawyers Ass'n v. Cal. Dep't of Motor Vehicles
green
2 sentences2022In California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1247 (CDLA I), this court reversed the judgment, with instructions to vacate the orders granting the DMV’s summary judgment motion and denying CDLA’s summary judgment motion. 2022(CDLA I, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1266 .) On remand, the trial court vacated the previous orders on the summary judgment motions, and directed the parties to file new motions incorporating prior filings, along with supplemental briefs. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
ROZE v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
2 sentences2021If the presumption is rebutted, “ ‘the burden shifts to the DMV to prove that the test was reliable despite the violation.’ ” (Roze v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1183 .) When a motorist’s license is suspended at a DMV hearing, the licensee can petition for writ review in the Superior Court. 2021If the presumption is rebutted, “ ‘the burden shifts to the DMV to prove that the test was reliable despite the violation.’ ” (Roze v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1183 .) When a motorist’s license is suspended at a DMV hearing, the licensee can petition for writ review in the Superior Court. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Oxford v. Foster Wheeler LLC
green
2 sentences2021Moreover, contrary to Corkery’s claim, the two reports are not irreconcilable.3 The DMV hearing officer reasonably found, based on both the sworn DS-367 form and the unsworn report, that Officers Hoang and Tsang worked together to arrest Corkery for a DUI and transport him to the police station, where Officer Tsang read him the appropriate admonishments 3 Corkery relies on case law holding that irreconcilable verdicts must be reversed, citing Oxford v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 700, 716 . 2021Moreover, contrary to Corkery’s claim, the two reports are not irreconcilable.3 The DMV hearing officer reasonably found, based on both the sworn DS-367 form and the unsworn report, that Officers Hoang and Tsang worked together to arrest Corkery for a DUI and transport him to the police station, where Officer Tsang read him the appropriate admonishments 3 Corkery relies on case law holding that irreconcilable verdicts must be reversed, citing Oxford v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 700, 716 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Coshow v. City of Escondido green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Leiserson v. City of San Diego green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Gray v. Don Miller & Associates, Inc. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Masters v. San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Ass'n green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Nissan Motor Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Board green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Nasha L.L.C. v. City of Los Angeles green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Shannon v. Gourley green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Brierton v. Department of Motor Vehicles green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Leal v. Gourley green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Thompson v. Department of Motor Vehicles green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Reimel v. House neutral | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People Ex Rel. Gallegos v. Pacific Lumber Co. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Alford v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Coniglio v. Department of Motor Vehicles green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Gananian v. Zolin green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Snelgrove v. Department of Motor Vehicles green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Medina v. Department of Motor Vehicles green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Hughes v. Alexis green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| August v. Department of Motor Vehicles green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Fallis v. Department of Motor Vehicles green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Noll v. Department of Motor Vehicles green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.