DMV hearing in New York

2025However, the plaintiff demonstrated that, under the circumstances of this case, he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of the liability of the drivers at the DMV hearing ( see Curtin v Curtin , 244 AD2d 927, 928 ; cf. Alamo v McDaniel , 44 AD3d at 154 ).

2025However, the plaintiff demonstrated that, under the circumstances of this case, he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of the liability of the drivers at the DMV hearing ( see Curtin v Curtin , 244 AD2d 927, 928 ; cf. Alamo v McDaniel , 44 AD3d at 154 ).

2018The cooperation of a licensed motorist in submitting to a chemical test upon arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol is necessary for the successful administration of a breath test, thus prompting all fifty states to enact "implied consent" laws to secure that cooperation from motorists as a condition of their license to drive on the public highways ( see Birchfield v. North Dakota , 579 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 2168-2169, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 [2016] ).

2018The cooperation of a licensed motorist in submitting to a chemical test upon arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol is necessary for the successful administration of a breath test, thus prompting all fifty states to enact "implied consent" laws to secure that cooperation from motorists as a condition of their license to drive on the public highways ( see Birchfield v. North Dakota , 579 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 2168-2169, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 [2016] ).

2022While there were some inconsistencies between the arresting officer's trial testimony and his testimony more than 1½ years earlier during a DMV hearing concerning the same events (e.g., the number of unsignaled left turns defendant made and how many people were in the Honda Civic with defendant), we accord great deference to "the jury's determinations . . . , including its evaluation of inconsistencies in testimony" ( People v Thomas , 102 AD3d 561, 561 [2013]).

2022While there were some inconsistencies between the arresting officer's trial testimony and his testimony more than 1½ years earlier during a DMV hearing concerning the same events (e.g., the number of unsignaled left turns defendant made and how many people were in the Honda Civic with defendant), we accord great deference to "the jury's determinations . . . , including its evaluation of inconsistencies in testimony" ( People v Thomas , 102 AD3d 561, 561 [2013]).

2022Thus, although an acquittal of the convicted charges, save the charge of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree, would not have been unreasonable ( see People v Danielson , 9 NY3d 342, 348 [2007] ["weight of the evidence review requires a court first to determine whether an acquittal would not have been unreasonable"]), based upon the totality and quality of the evidence presented at trial, we decline to disturb the jury's determinations here.

2022Thus, although an acquittal of the convicted charges, save the charge of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree, would not have been unreasonable ( see People v Danielson , 9 NY3d 342, 348 [2007] ["weight of the evidence review requires a court first to determine whether an acquittal would not have been unreasonable"]), based upon the totality and quality of the evidence presented at trial, we decline to disturb the jury's determinations here.

2021Under the circumstances presented, plaintiff was required to establish that the issue whether defendant was negligent, i.e., whether she violated a driver's well-settled "duty to see what should be seen and to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to avoid an accident" ( Byrne v Calogero , 96 AD3d 704, 705 [2d Dept 2012]; see Deering v Deering , 134 AD3d 1497, 1499 [4th Dept 2015]), was identical to the issue at the DMV hearing, i.e., whether defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 (a) by failing to "exercise due care to avoid" the collision ( id. ).

2021We agree with plaintiff that he met that burden ( see generally Jeffreys v Griffin , 1 NY3d 34, 41 [2003]; Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co. , 93 NY2d 343, 350 [1999]).

2021We agree with plaintiff that he met that burden ( see generally Jeffreys v Griffin , 1 NY3d 34, 41 [2003]; Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co. , 93 NY2d 343, 350 [1999]).

2021Under the circumstances presented, plaintiff was required to establish that the issue whether defendant was negligent, i.e., whether she violated a driver's well-settled "duty to see what should be seen and to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to avoid an accident" ( Byrne v Calogero , 96 AD3d 704, 705 [2d Dept 2012]; see Deering v Deering , 134 AD3d 1497, 1499 [4th Dept 2015]), was identical to the issue at the DMV hearing, i.e., whether defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 (a) by failing to "exercise due care to avoid" the collision ( id. ).

2020Consequently, "the court providently exercised its discretion in denying [defendant's] motion, made during the trial, to reopen the suppression hearing. . . . [D]efendant failed to demonstrate that the new facts he proffered . . . were likely to affect the original determination" ( People v Moore , 118 AD3d 916, 918 [2014]).

2020Consequently, "the court providently exercised its discretion in denying [defendant's] motion, made during the trial, to reopen the suppression hearing. . . . [D]efendant failed to demonstrate that the new facts he proffered . . . were likely to affect the original determination" ( People v Moore , 118 AD3d 916, 918 [2014]).

2010A driver is bound to see what is there to be seen with the proper use of his senses (see Spicola v Piracci, 2 AD3d 1368 [2003]; Gonzalez v County of Suffolk, 277 AD2d 350 [2000]), and there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident (see generally Tapia v Royal Tours Serv., Inc., 67 AD3d 894, 896 [2009]; Cox v Nunez, 23 AD3d 427 [2005]; Romano v 202 Corp., 305 AD2d 576 [2003]).

2010A driver is bound to see what is there to be seen with the proper use of his senses (see Spicola v Piracci, 2 AD3d 1368 [2003]; Gonzalez v County of Suffolk, 277 AD2d 350 [2000]), and there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident (see generally Tapia v Royal Tours Serv., Inc., 67 AD3d 894, 896 [2009]; Cox v Nunez, 23 AD3d 427 [2005]; Romano v 202 Corp., 305 AD2d 576 [2003]).

2006(Cf. People v Asaro, 94 NY2d 792, 793 [1999].) The fact that the defendant apparently had a fraudulently obtained license, that appeared valid on its face, in his possession at the time of his arrest does not negate this inference.

1997Further, the record establishes that the Curtins did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of the respective fault of the drivers at the DMV hearing (see, Rice v Massalone, 160 AD2d 861, 862 ; see also, Levine v Tolchin, supra).