tax refund claim in Washington

2014New Cingular asserts that it "diligently pursued its claim by seeking redress through the administrative process and then filing suit promptly after Bothell sent its summary denial." New Cingular claims that our Supreme Court's decision in Qwest Corp. v. City of Bellevue21 supports its argument: "Because the trial court shared original jurisdiction with Bothell over the tax refund claim, the trial court did not operate in an appellate capacity, and administrative exhaustion requirements did not apply." We disagree and distinguish Qwest. 21 161 Wn.2d 353 , 166 P.3d 667 (2007). -8- NO. 70810-4-1

2013App. 140, 145 , 995 P.2d 1284 (2000) for the proposition that where a court has original jurisdiction over a dispute, the administrative exhaustion requirement does not apply." Qwest, 161 Wn.2d at 370 ~71. 3 Although the Qwest opinion mentions the proposition only in passing, Chaney explains its reasoning in detail: 3 The Court of Appeals below did not cite Qwest, but it did cite Chaney for the proposition that the superior court and hearing officer had concurrent original jurisdiction over the tax refund claim.

2011The trial court separated the tax refund claim from the tort claim, and the refund action remains at the trial court. [4] In 2006, the Washington State Supreme Court called the public duty doctrine a "focusing tool" used to determine whether a public entity owed a duty to a "`nebulous public' or a particular individual." Osborn v. Mason County, 157 Wash.2d 18, 27 , 134 P.3d 197 (2006) (quoting Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wash.2d 159, 166 , 759 P.2d 447 (1988)).

2011In 2006, the Washington State Supreme Court called the public duty doctrine a “ ‘focusing tool’ ” used to determine whether a public entity owed a duty to a “ ‘nebulous public’ or a particular individual.” Osborn v. Mason County, 157 Wn.2d 18, 27 , 134 P.3d 197 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wn.2d 159, 166 , 759 P.2d 447 (1988)).

2011The trial court separated the tax refund claim from the tort claim, and the refund action remains at the trial court. [4] In 2006, the Washington State Supreme Court called the public duty doctrine a "focusing tool" used to determine whether a public entity owed a duty to a "`nebulous public' or a particular individual." Osborn v. Mason County, 157 Wash.2d 18, 27 , 134 P.3d 197 (2006) (quoting Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wash.2d 159, 166 , 759 P.2d 447 (1988)).

2011The trial court separated the tax refund claim from the tort claim, and the refund action remains at the trial court. [4] In 2006, the Washington State Supreme Court called the public duty doctrine a "focusing tool" used to determine whether a public entity owed a duty to a "`nebulous public' or a particular individual." Osborn v. Mason County, 157 Wash.2d 18, 27 , 134 P.3d 197 (2006) (quoting Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wash.2d 159, 166 , 759 P.2d 447 (1988)).

2011The trial court separated the tax refund claim from the tort claim, and the refund action remains at the trial court. [4] In 2006, the Washington State Supreme Court called the public duty doctrine a "focusing tool" used to determine whether a public entity owed a duty to a "`nebulous public' or a particular individual." Osborn v. Mason County, 157 Wash.2d 18, 27 , 134 P.3d 197 (2006) (quoting Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wash.2d 159, 166 , 759 P.2d 447 (1988)).

2011In 2006, the Washington State Supreme Court called the public duty doctrine a “ ‘focusing tool’ ” used to determine whether a public entity owed a duty to a “ ‘nebulous public’ or a particular individual.” Osborn v. Mason County, 157 Wn.2d 18, 27 , 134 P.3d 197 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wn.2d 159, 166 , 759 P.2d 447 (1988)).

2022Bravern Residential, II, LLC v. Dep’t of Revenue, 183 Wn.

2014New Cingular asserts that it "diligently pursued its claim by seeking redress through the administrative process and then filing suit promptly after Bothell sent its summary denial." New Cingular claims that our Supreme Court's decision in Qwest Corp. v. City of Bellevue21 supports its argument: "Because the trial court shared original jurisdiction with Bothell over the tax refund claim, the trial court did not operate in an appellate capacity, and administrative exhaustion requirements did not apply." We disagree and distinguish Qwest. 21 161 Wn.2d 353 , 166 P.3d 667 (2007). -8- NO. 70810-4-1

2014Denial of the refund claim was not necessary for accrual of the cause of action for unjust enrichment." The court also stated, "The court acknowledges that its decision is an extension of the current Washington case law on equitable tolling." On August 22, 2013, the trial court certified under RAP 2.3(b)(4) "that the order denying summary judgment entered on August 2, 2013 involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion and that immediate review of the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." The City s

2013App. 140, 145 , 995 P.2d 1284 (2000) for the proposition that where a court has original jurisdiction over a dispute, the administrative exhaustion requirement does not apply." Qwest, 161 Wn.2d at 370 ~71. 3 Although the Qwest opinion mentions the proposition only in passing, Chaney explains its reasoning in detail: 3 The Court of Appeals below did not cite Qwest, but it did cite Chaney for the proposition that the superior court and hearing officer had concurrent original jurisdiction over the tax refund claim.