7 Alabama opinions name it 1 courts 1994–2004 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Coastal Ford, Inc. v. Kiddergreen2 sentences1999See Coastal Ford, Inc. v. Kidder , 694 So.2d 1285 , 1286 (Ala. 1997) (the language of an arbitration clause applying to "all claims, demands, disputes, or controversies of every kind or nature that may arise . . . concerning the vehicle" was not ambiguous and was broad enough to encompass the claims at issue); Ex parte Lorance , 669 So.2d 890 , 892-93 (Ala. 1995) (the language of the arbitration clause subjecting to arbitration "`any controversy or claim arising out of . . . this contract'" was broad enough to encompass the plaintiff's claim alleging fraud in the inducement of the contract). 1998See, Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 684 So.2d 102, 103 (Ala.1995) (discussing the rule that general principles of contract law apply to the interpretation of an arbitration provision); Coastal Ford, Inc. v. Kidder, 694 So.2d 1285, 1286 (Ala.1997) (holding that the language of an arbitration clause applying to "all claims, demands, disputes, or controversies of every kind or nature that may arise ... concerning the vehicle" was not ambiguous and was broad enough to encompass the claims at issue); Ex parte Lorance, 669 So.2d 890, 892-93 (Ala.1995) (holding that the language of | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte Lorancegreen2 sentences1999See Coastal Ford, Inc. v. Kidder , 694 So.2d 1285 , 1286 (Ala. 1997) (the language of an arbitration clause applying to "all claims, demands, disputes, or controversies of every kind or nature that may arise . . . concerning the vehicle" was not ambiguous and was broad enough to encompass the claims at issue); Ex parte Lorance , 669 So.2d 890 , 892-93 (Ala. 1995) (the language of the arbitration clause subjecting to arbitration "`any controversy or claim arising out of . . . this contract'" was broad enough to encompass the plaintiff's claim alleging fraud in the inducement of the contract). 1998See, Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 684 So.2d 102, 103 (Ala.1995) (discussing the rule that general principles of contract law apply to the interpretation of an arbitration provision); Coastal Ford, Inc. v. Kidder, 694 So.2d 1285, 1286 (Ala.1997) (holding that the language of an arbitration clause applying to "all claims, demands, disputes, or controversies of every kind or nature that may arise ... concerning the vehicle" was not ambiguous and was broad enough to encompass the claims at issue); Ex parte Lorance, 669 So.2d 890, 892-93 (Ala.1995) (holding that the language of | 1 | 2 |
Eli Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.green1 sentence1998See, also the following cases, from other jurisdictions, addressing the effect of broadly worded arbitration provisions on the scope of arbitration: Levine v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 1986 WL 8317 (No. 85 Civ. 8354, S.D.N.Y., July 22, 1986) (not reported in F.Supp.) (in which the district court enforced a similar agreement, stating that "[i]t is difficult to imagine language broader" than the phrase "any controversy"); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1114 (3d Cir.1993) (in which the Court of Appeals considered arbitration language virtu | 1 | 1 |
Rand Bond of North America, Inc. v. Saul Stone & Co.green1 sentence1998See, also the following cases, from other jurisdictions, addressing the effect of broadly worded arbitration provisions on the scope of arbitration: Levine v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 1986 WL 8317 (No. 85 Civ. 8354, S.D.N.Y., July 22, 1986) (not reported in F.Supp.) (in which the district court enforced a similar agreement, stating that "[i]t is difficult to imagine language broader" than the phrase "any controversy"); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1114 (3d Cir.1993) (in which the Court of Appeals considered arbitration language virtu | 1 | 1 |
Allied-Bruce v. Dobsongreen1 sentence1998See, Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 684 So.2d 102, 103 (Ala.1995) (discussing the rule that general principles of contract law apply to the interpretation of an arbitration provision); Coastal Ford, Inc. v. Kidder, 694 So.2d 1285, 1286 (Ala.1997) (holding that the language of an arbitration clause applying to "all claims, demands, disputes, or controversies of every kind or nature that may arise ... concerning the vehicle" was not ambiguous and was broad enough to encompass the claims at issue); Ex parte Lorance, 669 So.2d 890, 892-93 (Ala.1995) (holding that the language of | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte McKinneygreen1 sentence1998I conclude that, in the language of the arbitration clause in the policy issued to the Montalvos by Stewart Title Guaranty, these claims "[arise] out of or [relate] to [the] policy, [some] service of the Company in connection with its issuance or the breach of a policy provision or other obligation." [2] Ex parte McKinney, 515 So.2d 693, 699 (Ala. 1987) [3] The action was initially brought against only Stewart Title of Mobile and Cooper and Company. | 1 | 1 |
Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Corporationgreen2 sentences1994The arbitration provision interpreted in Mediterranean stated: "Any disputes arising hereunder or following the formation of joint venture shall be settled through binding arbitration. . . ." 708 F.2d at 1461. 1994The arbitration provision interpreted in Mediterranean stated: "Any disputes arising hereunder or following the formation of joint venture shall be settled through binding arbitration...." 708 F.2d at 1461. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Med Center Cars, Inc. v. Smith
green
1 sentence2004This Court held that the language of the arbitration clause was not broad enough to encompass claims against the nonsignatories because the agreement limited the claims that might be submitted to arbitration to those "between buyer and seller." 727 So.2d at 19 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Ex Parte Foster
green
1 sentence2003The Esters argue that a different result should be reached here because the language of the arbitration clause in Foster specifically stated that "all questions ... related to ... this arbitration clause shall be resolved by binding arbitration" (emphasis omitted), and that "[t]he clear language of the arbitration provision prima facie shows that the parties agreed to arbitrate preliminary issues of arbitrability." 758 So.2d at 518-19 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Trott v. Paciolla
green
1 sentence1998See, also the following cases, from other jurisdictions, addressing the effect of broadly worded arbitration provisions on the scope of arbitration: Levine v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 1986 WL 8317 (No. 85 Civ. 8354, S.D.N.Y., July 22, 1986) (not reported in F.Supp.) (in which the district court enforced a similar agreement, stating that "[i]t is difficult to imagine language broader" than the phrase "any controversy"); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1114 (3d Cir.1993) (in which the Court of Appeals considered arbitration language virtu | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Ex Parte Dickinson
green
1 sentence1998See, Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 684 So.2d 102, 103 (Ala.1995) (discussing the rule that general principles of contract law apply to the interpretation of an arbitration provision); Coastal Ford, Inc. v. Kidder, 694 So.2d 1285, 1286 (Ala.1997) (holding that the language of an arbitration clause applying to "all claims, demands, disputes, or controversies of every kind or nature that may arise ... concerning the vehicle" was not ambiguous and was broad enough to encompass the claims at issue); Ex parte Lorance, 669 So.2d 890, 892-93 (Ala.1995) (holding that the language of | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Levine v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
green
1 sentence1998See, also the following cases, from other jurisdictions, addressing the effect of broadly worded arbitration provisions on the scope of arbitration: Levine v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 1986 WL 8317 (No. 85 Civ. 8354, S.D.N.Y., July 22, 1986) (not reported in F.Supp.) (in which the district court enforced a similar agreement, stating that "[i]t is difficult to imagine language broader" than the phrase "any controversy"); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1114 (3d Cir.1993) (in which the Court of Appeals considered arbitration language virtu | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Belke v. Merrill Lynch
green
1 sentence1998See, also the following cases, from other jurisdictions, addressing the effect of broadly worded arbitration provisions on the scope of arbitration: Levine v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 1986 WL 8317 (No. 85 Civ. 8354, S.D.N.Y., July 22, 1986) (not reported in F.Supp.) (in which the district court enforced a similar agreement, stating that "[i]t is difficult to imagine language broader" than the phrase "any controversy"); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1114 (3d Cir.1993) (in which the Court of Appeals considered arbitration language virtu | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd
green
2 sentences1998See, also the following cases, from other jurisdictions, addressing the effect of broadly worded arbitration provisions on the scope of arbitration: Levine v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 1986 WL 8317 (No. 85 Civ. 8354, S.D.N.Y., July 22, 1986) (not reported in F.Supp.) (in which the district court enforced a similar agreement, stating that "[i]t is difficult to imagine language broader" than the phrase "any controversy"); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1114 (3d Cir.1993) (in which the Court of Appeals considered arbitration language virtu 1998See, also the following cases, from other jurisdictions, addressing the effect of broadly worded arbitration provisions on the scope of arbitration: Levine v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 1986 WL 8317 (No. 85 Civ. 8354, S.D.N.Y., July 22, 1986) (not reported in F.Supp.) (in which the district court enforced a similar agreement, stating that "[i]t is difficult to imagine language broader" than the phrase "any controversy"); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1114 (3d Cir.1993) (in which the Court of Appeals considered arbitration language virtu | 1 | 1998–1998 |
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan
green
2 sentences1997First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan , 514 U.S. 938 , 943 , 115 S.Ct. 1920 , 1923-24 , 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995). 1997First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan , 514 U.S. 938 , 943 , 115 S.Ct. 1920 , 1923-24 , 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.