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19 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates, P.A.green2 sentences2020Therefore, "[a] court must look to the language of the arbitration clause to establish its boundaries[,]" and "may not rewrite a contract to broaden the scope of arbitration." Hirsch, 215 N.J. at 188 (first citing then quoting Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 132 ). 2020Therefore, "[a] court must look to the language of the arbitration clause to establish its boundaries [,]" and A-2532-18T2 9 "may not rewrite a contract to broaden the scope of arbitration." Hirsch, 215 N.J. at 188 (quoting Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001)). | 5 | 8 |
Patricia Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P. (072314)green2 sentences2026To reflect a mutual assent to arbitrate, the terms must be "sufficiently clear to place a[n] [individual] on notice that [they are] waiving a constitutional or statutory right . . . ." Atalese, 219 N.J. at 443 . "[A]lthough a waiver-of-rights provision need not 'list every imaginable statute by name to effectuate a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights,' employees should at least know that they have 'agree[d] to arbitrate all statutory claims arising out of the employment relationship or its termination.'" Id. at 447 (second alteration in original) (quoting Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 135 ). 2026To reflect a mutual assent to arbitrate, the terms must be "sufficiently clear to place a[n] [individual] on notice that [they are] waiving a constitutional or statutory right . . . ." Atalese, 219 N.J. at 443 . "[A]lthough a waiver-of-rights provision need not 'list every imaginable statute by name to effectuate a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights,' employees should at least know that they have 'agree[d] to arbitrate all statutory claims arising out of the employment relationship or its termination.'" Id. at 447 (second alteration in original) (quoting Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 135 ). | 3 | 4 |
Michael E. Hirsch v. Amper Financial Services, LLC (070751)green2 sentences2021The present matter implicates the second inquiry, which requires the court to examine "the language of the arbitration clause to establish its boundaries." Ibid. 2021"A court must look to the language of the arbitration clause to establish its boundaries." Hirsch, 215 N.J. at 188 ; In re Arb. | 1 | 7 |
Griffin v. BURLINGTON VOLKSWAGENgreen1 sentence2021In that regard, "[c]ourts have generally read the terms 'arising out of' or 'relating to' [in] a contract as indicative of an 'extremely broad' agreement to arbitrate any dispute relating in any way to the contract." Griffin v. Burlington Volkswagen, Inc., 411 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., Inc.green1 sentence2020Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 135 ; see also Kernahan, 236 N.J. at 321 (citations omitted) ("A basic tenet of contract interpretation is that contract terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning."); Roach v. BM Motoring, LLC, 228 N.J. 163, 174 (2017) (citation omitted) (holding courts must determine the parties' intentions when construing the language of the arbitration clause). | 1 | 1 |
Tahisha Roach v. Bm Motoring, Llc(077125)green1 sentence2020Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 135 ; see also Kernahan, 236 N.J. at 321 (citations omitted) ("A basic tenet of contract interpretation is that contract terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning."); Roach v. BM Motoring, LLC, 228 N.J. 163, 174 (2017) (citation omitted) (holding courts must determine the parties' intentions when construing the language of the arbitration clause). | 1 | 1 |
Steigerwalt v. Terminix International Co.green1 sentence2019Other interpretive principles need be employed only if the Agreement's plain meaning cannot be determined." Steigerwalt v. Terminix Int'l Co., 246 F. App'x 798, 801 (3d Cir. 2007). | 1 | 1 |
Altshul Stern & Co., Inc. v. Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd. And Mitsui & Co., Ltd.green2 sentences1994See, e.g., Altshul Stern & Co. v. Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd., 385 F. 2d 158 (2d Cir.1967), in which the court held that tort claims arising out of or related to a breach of contract were arbitrable under an arbitration provision covering "any dispute or difference arising out of or relating to this contract," observing that the plaintiff could not "avoid the language of the arbitration clause by casting its complaint in tort." [ Id. at 159 ] Numerous other cases may be found in which tort claims have been submitted to arbitration under broad form arbitration clauses *406 governed by the FAA. 1994See, e.g., Altshul Stern & Co. v. Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd., 385 F. 2d 158 (2d Cir.1967), in which the court held that tort claims arising out of or related to a breach of contract were arbitrable under an arbitration provision covering "any dispute or difference arising out of or relating to this contract," observing that the plaintiff could not "avoid the language of the arbitration clause by casting its complaint in tort." [ Id. at 159 ] Numerous other cases may be found in which tort claims have been submitted to arbitration under broad form arbitration clauses *406 governed by the FAA. | 1 | 1 |
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Parsons & Whittemore Contractors Corp.green2 sentences1986See Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Parsons & Whitemore Contractors Corp., 48 N.Y.2d 127, 132 , 397 N.E.2d 380, 383 , 421 N.Y.S. 2d 869 , 872-73 (Ct.App.1979) (“It may be that Fidelity could not be compelled to participate in that arbitration ... or ... that fidelity could not force its way into the arbitration proceedings ____ Those issues, however, are not before us”; cf. dissent of Cooke, C.J.: “The incorporation of the subcontract and the language of the arbitration clause necessarily require that fidelity be a party____”). 1986See Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Parsons & Whitemore Contractors Corp., 48 N.Y.2d 127, 132 , 397 N.E.2d 380, 383 , 421 N.Y.S. 2d 869 , 872-73 (Ct.App.1979) (“It may be that Fidelity could not be compelled to participate in that arbitration ... or ... that fidelity could not force its way into the arbitration proceedings ____ Those issues, however, are not before us”; cf. dissent of Cooke, C.J.: “The incorporation of the subcontract and the language of the arbitration clause necessarily require that fidelity be a party____”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc.
green
1 sentence2021Courts are to "look to the language of the arbitration clause to establish its boundaries." Ibid. (citing Garfinkel, 168 N.J at 132). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Bor. of Stone Harbor v. Wildwood Loc. 59, Pba
green
1 sentence2020In Stone Harbor, a union sought to arbitrate "a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement" between the union and the municipality in order to determine "the propriety of [a police officer's] discharge[.]" 164 N.J. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Derfuss v. NJ Mfrs. Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences2010Id. at 134 , 666 A. 2d 599 . 2010Id. at 134 , 666 A. 2d 599 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, Inc.
green
2 sentences2009Co., Inc., 385 N.J.Super. 324 , 897 A. 2d 373 (App.Div.2006), cert. denied, 188 N.J. 353 , 907 A. 2d 1013 (2006) and Jansen v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 342 N.J.Super. 254 , 776 A. 2d 816 (App.Div.2001), cert. denied, 170 N.J. 205 , 785 A. 2d 434 (2001). 2009Co., Inc., 385 N.J.Super. 324 , 897 A. 2d 373 (App.Div.2006), cert. denied, 188 N.J. 353 , 907 A. 2d 1013 (2006) and Jansen v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 342 N.J.Super. 254 , 776 A. 2d 816 (App.Div.2001), cert. denied, 170 N.J. 205 , 785 A. 2d 434 (2001). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Jansen v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.
green
2 sentences2009Co., Inc., 385 N.J.Super. 324 , 897 A. 2d 373 (App.Div.2006), cert. denied, 188 N.J. 353 , 907 A. 2d 1013 (2006) and Jansen v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 342 N.J.Super. 254 , 776 A. 2d 816 (App.Div.2001), cert. denied, 170 N.J. 205 , 785 A. 2d 434 (2001). 2009Co., Inc., 385 N.J.Super. 324 , 897 A. 2d 373 (App.Div.2006), cert. denied, 188 N.J. 353 , 907 A. 2d 1013 (2006) and Jansen v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 342 N.J.Super. 254 , 776 A. 2d 816 (App.Div.2001), cert. denied, 170 N.J. 205 , 785 A. 2d 434 (2001). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Lederman v. PRUDENTIAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, INC.
neutral
2 sentences2009Co., Inc., 385 N.J.Super. 324 , 897 A. 2d 373 (App.Div.2006), cert. denied, 188 N.J. 353 , 907 A. 2d 1013 (2006) and Jansen v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 342 N.J.Super. 254 , 776 A. 2d 816 (App.Div.2001), cert. denied, 170 N.J. 205 , 785 A. 2d 434 (2001). 2009Co., Inc., 385 N.J.Super. 324 , 897 A. 2d 373 (App.Div.2006), cert. denied, 188 N.J. 353 , 907 A. 2d 1013 (2006) and Jansen v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 342 N.J.Super. 254 , 776 A. 2d 816 (App.Div.2001), cert. denied, 170 N.J. 205 , 785 A. 2d 434 (2001). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Quigley v. KPMG PEAT MARWICK, LIP
green
2 sentences2001Quigley, supra, 330 N.J.Super. at 271 , 749 A. 2d 405 . 2001Quigley, supra, 330 N.J.Super. at 271 , 749 A. 2d 405 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Bocelli v. Hanover Metro Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences1998In Bocelli, supra, 219 N.J.Super. 6 , 529 A.2d 997 , plaintiff sustained serious injuries when he was allegedly cut off by a hit-and-run driver, causing his father’s pick-up truck that he was driving to work to veer off the road and strike a bridge abutment. 1998In Bocelli, supra, 219 N.J.Super. 6 , 529 A.2d 997 , plaintiff sustained serious injuries when he was allegedly cut off by a hit-and-run driver, causing his father’s pick-up truck that he was driving to work to veer off the road and strike a bridge abutment. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Ohio Casualty Insurance v. Benson
green
2 sentences1998Thus, our construction of the scope of arbitration clauses is consistent with the policy of favoring commercial arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive method for settling disputes. [ 87 N.J. at 199 , 432 A.2d 905 .] Other courts have applied Benson’s more pragmatic approach to the extent permitted by the language of the arbitration clause or the issues in dispute. 1998Thus, our construction of the scope of arbitration clauses is consistent with the policy of favoring commercial arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive method for settling disputes. [ 87 N.J. at 199 , 432 A.2d 905 .] Other courts have applied Benson’s more pragmatic approach to the extent permitted by the language of the arbitration clause or the issues in dispute. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Deborah J. Swenson v. Management Recruiters International, Inc. David Marth, State of Minnesota, Amicus Curiae/appellant
green
1 sentence1994See e.g., Perry v. Thomas, supra , (conversion and civil conspiracy to commit conversion submitted to arbitration); Swenson v. Management Recruiters Intern., Inc., 858 F. 2d 1304 (8th Cir.1988) (invasion of privacy and conversion of mail held arbitrable); Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 714 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1989) (negligence, common law fraud, civil conspiracy to commit fraud and claims under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act held arbitrable); McMahon v. RMS Electronics, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (defamation claims held arbitrable). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
green
1 sentence1994See e.g., Perry v. Thomas, supra , (conversion and civil conspiracy to commit conversion submitted to arbitration); Swenson v. Management Recruiters Intern., Inc., 858 F. 2d 1304 (8th Cir.1988) (invasion of privacy and conversion of mail held arbitrable); Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 714 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1989) (negligence, common law fraud, civil conspiracy to commit fraud and claims under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act held arbitrable); McMahon v. RMS Electronics, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (defamation claims held arbitrable). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
McMahon v. RMS Electronics, Inc.
green
1 sentence1994See e.g., Perry v. Thomas, supra , (conversion and civil conspiracy to commit conversion submitted to arbitration); Swenson v. Management Recruiters Intern., Inc., 858 F. 2d 1304 (8th Cir.1988) (invasion of privacy and conversion of mail held arbitrable); Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 714 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1989) (negligence, common law fraud, civil conspiracy to commit fraud and claims under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act held arbitrable); McMahon v. RMS Electronics, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (defamation claims held arbitrable). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.