speedy fact-finding hearing in New York

2014The appellant contends that his right to a speedy fact-finding hearing was violated (see Family Ct Act § 340.1 [2]; Matter of George T., 99 NY2d 307 [2002]; Matter of Frank C., 70 NY2d 408, 413-414 [1987]).

2014The appellant contends that his right to a speedy fact-finding hearing was violated (see Family Ct Act § 340.1 [2]; Matter of George T., 99 NY2d 307 [2002]; Matter of Frank C., 70 NY2d 408, 413-414 [1987]).

2025A motion based on the alleged denial of respondent's right to a speedy fact-finding hearing also would have been unsuccessful as the record establishes that respondent did not object to the first two adjournments, resulting in a delay between the initial appearance and the commencement of the fact-finding hearing of less than 60 days ( see Family Ct Act § 340.1 [2]; Matter of Joseph CC. , 234 AD2d 852, 853 [3d Dept 1996]; see also Matter of Daniel TT. , 137 AD3d at 1516 ; see generally Matter of Willie E. , 88 NY2d 205, 209-210 [1996]).

2025A motion based on the alleged denial of respondent's right to a speedy fact-finding hearing also would have been unsuccessful as the record establishes that respondent did not object to the first two adjournments, resulting in a delay between the initial appearance and the commencement of the fact-finding hearing of less than 60 days ( see Family Ct Act § 340.1 [2]; Matter of Joseph CC. , 234 AD2d 852, 853 [3d Dept 1996]; see also Matter of Daniel TT. , 137 AD3d at 1516; see generally Matter of Willie E. , 88 NY2d 205, 209-210 [1996]).

2004For example, the speedy fact-finding hearing provisions of the Family Court Act generally mandate strict compliance with the established statutory time frames. ( Matter of Randy K. , 77 NY2d 398 [1991].) Other interpretations, however, are far less clear.

2003A respondent in a juvenile delinquency proceeding has statutory rights to a speedy fact-finding hearing (see Family Ct Act § 310.2; Matter of George T., 99 NY2d 307, 311 [2002]; Matter of Randy K., 77 NY2d 398, 402 [1991]).

2013For the reasons stated in our decision on the companion appeal, the Family Court erred in dismissing the subject juvenile delinquency petition on the ground that the respondent’s right to a speedy fact-finding hearing had been violated (see Matter of David P., 106 AD3d 745 [2013] [decided herewith]; see also Family Ct Act § 340.1 [2]; Matter of Tierra H., 83 AD3d 837, 838 [2011]; Matter of Sheldon M., 48 AD3d 814, 815 [2008]; Matter of Teniqua Y., 299 AD2d 490, 491 [2002]; Matter of Iola C., 262 AD2d 558 [1999]).

2013For the reasons stated in our decision on the companion appeal, the Family Court erred in dismissing the subject juvenile delinquency petition on the ground that the respondent’s right to a speedy fact-finding hearing had been violated (see Matter of David P., 106 AD3d 745 [2013] [decided herewith]; see also Family Ct Act § 340.1 [2]; Matter of Tierra H., 83 AD3d 837, 838 [2011]; Matter of Sheldon M., 48 AD3d 814, 815 [2008]; Matter of Teniqua Y., 299 AD2d 490, 491 [2002]; Matter of Iola C., 262 AD2d 558 [1999]).

2013For the reasons stated in our decision on the companion appeal, the Family Court erred in dismissing the subject juvenile delinquency petition on the ground that the respondent’s right to a speedy fact-finding hearing had been violated (see Matter of David P., 106 AD3d 745 [2013] [decided herewith]; see also Family Ct Act § 340.1 [2]; Matter of Tierra H., 83 AD3d 837, 838 [2011]; Matter of Sheldon M., 48 AD3d 814, 815 [2008]; Matter of Teniqua Y., 299 AD2d 490, 491 [2002]; Matter of Iola C., 262 AD2d 558 [1999]).

2013For the reasons stated in our decision on the companion appeal, the Family Court erred in dismissing the subject juvenile delinquency petition on the ground that the respondent’s right to a speedy fact-finding hearing had been violated (see Matter of David P., 106 AD3d 745 [2013] [decided herewith]; see also Family Ct Act § 340.1 [2]; Matter of Tierra H., 83 AD3d 837, 838 [2011]; Matter of Sheldon M., 48 AD3d 814, 815 [2008]; Matter of Teniqua Y., 299 AD2d 490, 491 [2002]; Matter of Iola C., 262 AD2d 558 [1999]).

2013For the reasons stated in our decision on the companion appeal, the Family Court erred in dismissing the subject juvenile delinquency petition on the ground that the respondent’s right to a speedy fact-finding hearing had been violated (see Matter of David P., 106 AD3d 745 [2013] [decided herewith]; see also Family Ct Act § 340.1 [2]; Matter of Tierra H., 83 AD3d 837, 838 [2011]; Matter of Sheldon M., 48 AD3d 814, 815 [2008]; Matter of Teniqua Y., 299 AD2d 490, 491 [2002]; Matter of Iola C., 262 AD2d 558 [1999]).

2013For the reasons stated in our decision on the companion appeal, the Family Court erred in dismissing the subject juvenile delinquency petition on the ground that the respondent’s right to a speedy fact-finding hearing had been violated (see Matter of David P., 106 AD3d 745 [2013] [decided herewith]; see also Family Ct Act § 340.1 [2]; Matter of Tierra H., 83 AD3d 837, 838 [2011]; Matter of Sheldon M., 48 AD3d 814, 815 [2008]; Matter of Teniqua Y., 299 AD2d 490, 491 [2002]; Matter of Iola C., 262 AD2d 558 [1999]).

2014The appellant contends that his right to a speedy fact-finding hearing was violated (see Family Ct Act § 340.1 [2]; Matter of George T., 99 NY2d 307 [2002]; Matter of Frank C., 70 NY2d 408, 413-414 [1987]).

2014The appellant contends that his right to a speedy fact-finding hearing was violated (see Family Ct Act § 340.1 [2]; Matter of George T., 99 NY2d 307 [2002]; Matter of Frank C., 70 NY2d 408, 413-414 [1987]).

2025A motion based on the alleged denial of respondent's right to a speedy fact-finding hearing also would have been unsuccessful as the record establishes that respondent did not object to the first two adjournments, resulting in a delay between the initial appearance and the commencement of the fact-finding hearing of less than 60 days ( see Family Ct Act § 340.1 [2]; Matter of Joseph CC. , 234 AD2d 852, 853 [3d Dept 1996]; see also Matter of Daniel TT. , 137 AD3d at 1516 ; see generally Matter of Willie E. , 88 NY2d 205, 209-210 [1996]).

2025A motion based on the alleged denial of respondent's right to a speedy fact-finding hearing also would have been unsuccessful as the record establishes that respondent did not object to the first two adjournments, resulting in a delay between the initial appearance and the commencement of the fact-finding hearing of less than 60 days ( see Family Ct Act § 340.1 [2]; Matter of Joseph CC. , 234 AD2d 852, 853 [3d Dept 1996]; see also Matter of Daniel TT. , 137 AD3d at 1516; see generally Matter of Willie E. , 88 NY2d 205, 209-210 [1996]).

2004It is well settled that the dismissal of a delinquency petition without prejudice prior to the running of the applicable speedy fact-finding hearing time (statutorily 60 days from the completion of the initial appearance, if the respondent is not detained) does not preclude the presentment agency from refiling it. ( See, e.g., Matter of Robert O. , 87 NY2d 9 [1995] [dismissal for failure to complete the initial appearance within the statutorily prescribed time frame]; Matter of Willie E. , 88 NY2d 205 [1996] [dismissal of a jurisdictionally defective petition].) The law is equally clear that u

2004(See, e.g., Matter of Robert O., 87 NY2d 9 [1995] [dismissal for failure to complete the initial appearance within the statutorily prescribed time frame]; Matter of Willie E., 88 NY2d 205 [1996] [dismissal of a jurisdiction-ally defective petition].) The law is equally clear that upon the refiling of a previously dismissed petition, the completion of the initial appearance on the original petition marks the commencement of the speedy fact-finding hearing calculation on the subsequent petition.

1995As it has been noted, "[u]nlike Family Court Act § 310.2, which specifies that after a petition has been filed, the respondent is entitled to a speedy fact-finding hearing, Family Court Act 320.2 (1) [which deals with the initial appearance]” does not (Matter of Atthis D., 205 AD2d 263, 266 ; see, Matter of Jose R., 83 NY2d 388 [speedy trial requirements do not apply to the dispositional phase]).

1994Moreover, while the Family Court Act expressly provides for dismissal as a remedy for violations of a juvenile’s right to a speedy fact-finding hearing (see, Family Ct Act §§ 310.2, 332.1 [8]; see, Matter of Jose R., 83 NY2d 388, 393-394 ), there is no similar provision for release as a remedy for such violation.

2024In light of that waiver, respondent "cannot now be heard to complain" ( Matter of Ryan LL. , 119 AD3d 994 , 995 [3d Dept 2014] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 25 NY3d 904 [2015]; see Matter of Willie E. , 88 NY2d 205, 209-210 [1996]; Matter of Daniel B. , 129 AD3d 1152 , 1153 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 914 [2015]; Matter of Joseph CC. , 234 AD2d 852, 853-854 [3d Dept 1996]; see also Matter of Michael DD. , 33 AD3d at 1186 ).

2024In light of that waiver, respondent "cannot now be heard to complain" ( Matter of Ryan LL. , 119 AD3d 994 , 995 [3d Dept 2014] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 25 NY3d 904 [2015]; see Matter of Willie E. , 88 NY2d 205, 209-210 [1996]; Matter of Daniel B. , 129 AD3d 1152 , 1153 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 914 [2015]; Matter of Joseph CC. , 234 AD2d 852, 853-854 [3d Dept 1996]; see also Matter of Michael DD. , 33 AD3d at 1186 ).

2015To put it succinctly, dismissal is not mandated in the wake of an untimely initial appearance so long as respondent’s right to a speedy fact-finding hearing is not violated (see Matter of Steven S., 238 AD2d 226, 228 [1997]; Matter of Willie E., 216 AD2d 645, 647 [1995], affd 88 NY2d 205 [1996]).

2015To put it succinctly, dismissal is not mandated in the wake of an untimely initial appearance so long as respondent’s right to a speedy fact-finding hearing is not violated (see Matter of Steven S., 238 AD2d 226, 228 [1997]; Matter of Willie E., 216 AD2d 645, 647 [1995], affd 88 NY2d 205 [1996]).

2015To put it succinctly, dismissal is not mandated in the wake of an untimely initial appearance so long as respondent’s right to a speedy fact-finding hearing is not violated (see Matter of Steven S., 238 AD2d 226, 228 [1997]; Matter of Willie E., 216 AD2d 645, 647 [1995], affd 88 NY2d 205 [1996]).

2015To put it succinctly, dismissal is not mandated in the wake of an untimely initial appearance so long as respondent’s right to a speedy fact-finding hearing is not violated (see Matter of Steven S., 238 AD2d 226, 228 [1997]; Matter of Willie E., 216 AD2d 645, 647 [1995], affd 88 NY2d 205 [1996]).

2025Moreover, it is clear from the face of the record that there was good cause for the initial adjournment and special circumstances for the second — to enable petitioner to find suitable placement and to obtain the reports from the court-ordered capacity examination, respectively ( see Matter of Jamar A. , 86 NY2d 387, 391 [1995]; Matter of Frank C. , 70 NY2d 408, 414-415 [1987]; see also Family Ct Act § 322.1 [1], [2]; cf. Matter of George T. , 99 NY2d 307, 313 [2002]). [FN9] In sum, as I cannot criticize the attempts to address this terribly sad situation, I cannot justify signaling, even now,

2025Moreover, it is clear from the face of the record that there was good cause for the initial adjournment and special circumstances for the second — to enable petitioner to find suitable placement and to obtain the reports from the court-ordered capacity examination, respectively ( see Matter of Jamar A. , 86 NY2d 387, 391 [1995]; Matter of Frank C. , 70 NY2d 408, 414-415 [1987]; see also Family Ct Act § 322.1 [1], [2]; cf. Matter of George T. , 99 NY2d 307, 313 [2002]). [FN9] In sum, as I cannot criticize the attempts to address this terribly sad situation, I cannot justify signaling, even now,

2007The appellant’s contention that his right to a speedy fact-finding hearing was violated is unpreserved for appellate review as he failed to move to dismiss the petition on that basis in the Family Court (see Family Ct Act § 332.1 [8]; § 332.2 [1]; Matter of Kovan Clearance D., 288 AD2d 219, 220 [2001]; Matter of Steve B., 233 AD2d 440 [1996]; Matter of Ralph D., 163 AD2d 752, 753 [1990]).

1996Because the appellant did not move to dismiss on this ground at the Family Court, he failed to preserve the issue for appellate review (see, Family Ct Act § 1118; CPLR 5501 [a]; Matter of Ralph D., 163 AD2d 752, 753 ; Matter of Brian S., 151 AD2d 577, 578 ).

2007The appellant waived his right to challenge the adjournment of the fact-finding hearing granted on September 30, 2005, since he consented to that adjournment (see Matter of Shaheen P.J., 29 AD3d 996, 997 [2006]; Matter of Michael T., 305 AD2d 610 , 611 [2003]).

2004In any event, the appellant consented to the two adjournments, waiving the speedy fact-finding claim (see Matter of Michael T., 305 AD2d 610, 611 [2003]; Matter of Christopher Scott F., 264 AD2d 395 [1999]).