ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in Texas

2022See Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 398–400; Shannon v. Mem’l Drive Presbyterian Church U.S., 476 S.W.3d 612 , 622–25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (concluding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did not apply to bar employee’s claims which arose out of the church’s purported disparagement of such employee in violation of a settlement agreement); see also Dean v. Alford, 994 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. 12 App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.).

2021Rather, the instant case involves a dispute over a religious organization’s implementation of its own policies.18 Our inquiry as to whether a party’s claims against a religious organization are barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is based on whether “the substance and nature of the plaintiff’s claims implicate ecclesiastical matters, including a church’s internal affairs, governance, or administration.” In re Diocese of Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 516 (citing Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 396-97 .).

2023In In re Godwin, we determined that statements made to congregants were “directed to church governance and maintaining harmony within the congregation” and that defamation and related tort claims were barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine because the claims “encroache[d] upon the autonomy of the church to decide matters of internal church discipline and governance.” In re Godwin, 293 S.W.3d at 749 .

2021See generally, El Pescador Church, Inc. v. Ferrero, 594 S.W.3d 645 , 657–59 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over conversion claim brought by church based on the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine); see also In re Godwin, 293 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. denied) (orig. proceeding) (concluding the trial court abused its discretion by asserting jurisdiction over former church member’s fraud claim regarding misuse of church funds where they may have been approved by the church’s finance committee and a bibli

2022MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Hinojosa Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria Appellants Monsignor Michael Heras, in appellate cause number 13-19-00412-CV, and Father John Feminelli, in appellate cause number 13-19-00413-CV, appeal the trial 2 court’s order granting appellees Diocese of Corpus Christi (Diocese) and Bishop William Michael Mulvey’s amended plea to the jurisdiction based upon the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. 1 Appellants raise three issues, which we address as one, concerning whether: (1) the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine

2022More specifically, appellants argue that under Patton, appellees are not entitled to ecclesiastical abstention doctrine protection because they failed to establish that “[(1)] such a claim flows entirely from an employment dispute between a church and its pastor so that consideration . . . in isolation from the church’s decision as to the pastor is not practical, (2) the alleged ‘publication’ is confined within the church, and (3) there are no unusual or egregious circumstances.” See Patton, 212 S.W.3d at 554 . 9 Relying principally upon In re Diocese of Lubbock I, appellants also argue that t

2013Applicable Law The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine “prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required.’ ” Patton v. Jones, 212 S.W.3d 541, 547-48 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 , 13 Wall. 679 , 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872)); see Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 397-98 ; In re Godwin, 293 S.W.3d 742, 747-48 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2009, orig. proceeding); Williams v.

2011Similarly, in Williams , the court concluded that all of the plaintiffs' claims against members of the church were precluded by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. 26 S.W.3d at 55 .

2022“The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prohibits civil courts from delving into matters of ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.’” Id. at 508–09 (quoting Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 714 (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 733 )).

2016The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine arises from the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and provides that the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over matters concerning “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or. the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.” Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713-14 , 96 S.Ct. 2372 ; see also Shannon, 476 S.W.3d at 621-22 .

2022“The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prohibits civil courts from delving into matters of ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.’” Id. at 508–09 (quoting Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 714 (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 733 )).

2021The Court left undisturbed its pronouncement in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871), that those matters implicating “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government or the conformity of the members of the church to the standards of morals required”—that is, those matters that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine covers—relate to a court’s jurisdiction to hear a case.

2022See Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 398–400; Shannon v. Mem’l Drive Presbyterian Church U.S., 476 S.W.3d 612 , 622–25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (concluding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did not apply to bar employee’s claims which arose out of the church’s purported disparagement of such employee in violation of a settlement agreement); see also Dean v. Alford, 994 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. 12 App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.).

2022See Becker v. Clardy, No. 03-10-00376-CV, 2011 WL 6756999 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 22, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applied to a defamation claim where the determination as to “[w]hether or not to ‘impose civil tort liability’ against [the defendant] . . . would require an analysis of internal church matters and doctrine”); Dean v. Alford, 994 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (recognizing that “[i]t is without dispute that the First Amendment 9 Indeed, Black’s Law Dictionary contains a definition of the term “sodomy,” o

2011See Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 398 ; see also Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602-05 , 99 S.Ct. 3020 (states may adopt neutral principles of law without running afoul of First Amendment so long as resolution of ownership entails no inquiry into religious doctrine).

2011See Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 398 ; see also Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602-05 , 99 S.Ct. 3020 (states may adopt neutral principles of law without running afoul of First Amendment so long as resolution of ownership entails no inquiry into religious doctrine).

2024See In re Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); see also Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 681 (Tex. 1996).

2006Although we recognize that the “Free Exercise Clause has never immunized clergy or churches from all causes of action alleging tortious conduct,” Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 677 (Tex. 1996),9 we find ample support for the conclusion that allegedly defamatory statements made in connection with a church’s decision to terminate a minister’s employment are protected from secular review, even if the statements do not expressly involve religious doctrine or are not made prior to the church’s decision.10 9 In Tilton, after recognizing that “religious groups may be held liable in tort for secu

2018The Texas Supreme Court has applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to tort claims brought by a church member against other church members who were not in authority positions, see Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. 2008) (concluding court lacked jurisdiction to consider church member’s assault claims against other church members), and in the context of a claim brought by a church member against her counselor and pastor for statements made in connection with the church’s ecclesiastical disciplinary process, see Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 404–05 (church membe

2013He relies on Patton , in which the Austin court of appeals stated: “Torts such as battery, false imprisonment or conversion probably would fall within the exception to church immunity set out in [Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) ] because they pose a ‘substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.’ It is also conceivable that torts such as *697 defamation, infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy might be so unusual or egregious as to fall within the Sherbert exception.” Patton, 212 S.W.3d at 554 (quoting Heard v. Johnson, 810

2021See Retta v. Mekonen, 338 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (explaining that “[t]he church’s failure to follow its bylaws on a matter of internal governance is also a matter of internal church governance and ecclesiastical concerns, and the courts may not interfere with that decision”); Dean, 994 S.W.2d at 395 (concluding that the issue of a pastor’s ouster is ecclesiastical in nature); see also Peloquin, 399 S.W.3d at 695 (“The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of [a] ‘theological contro

2015Pursuant to United States Supreme Court precedent, torts are actionable notwithstanding the Ecclesiastical Abstention doctrine only if they pose a “substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); Torralva v. Peloquin, 399 S.W.3d 690, 697 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013, pet. denied) (same holding).

2021Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 449 . –8– Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 188-89 (2012) (“According the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.”).11 The Texas Supreme Court has recently addressed the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in In re Diocese of Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding).

2021In other words, it acted consistent with its holding in Hosanna-Tabor that the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine is “not a jurisdictional bar,” but “an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4.

2022See Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 398–400; Shannon v. Mem’l Drive Presbyterian Church U.S., 476 S.W.3d 612 , 622–25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (concluding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did not apply to bar employee’s claims which arose out of the church’s purported disparagement of such employee in violation of a settlement agreement); see also Dean v. Alford, 994 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. 12 App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.).

2016The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine arises from the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and provides that the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over matters concerning “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or. the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.” Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713-14 , 96 S.Ct. 2372 ; see also Shannon, 476 S.W.3d at 621-22 .

2025When confronted with an issue that potentially implicates the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, the Texas Supreme Court held Texas courts “should use the neutral principles methodology to determine property interests when religious organizations are involved.” See -8- 04-24-00424-CV Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 607 (“Further, to reduce confusion and increase predictability in this area of the law where the issues are difficult to begin with, Texas courts must use only the neutral principles construct.”).

2018“The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine stands for the proposition that the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over matters concerning theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of a church to the standard of morals required of them.” Id. at 665 ; accord Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 605–06 (“Courts do not have jurisdiction to decide questions of an ecclesiastical or inherently religious nature, so as to those questions they must defer to decisions of appropriate ecclesiastical decision makers”); see also

2020The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine Ecclesiastical abstention arises from the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,6 and prohibits government action that “burdens the free exercise of religion.” Jennison v. Prasifka, 391 S.W.3d 660, 664-65 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.).

2019Similarly, in Jennison v. Prasifka, we applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to an Episcopal priest’s claims of slander, tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and wrongful discharge against a church parishioner because those claims were inextricably intertwined with the church’s investigation of his performance as a priest and the discipline imposed by the church for inadequate performance. 391 S.W.3d 660, 668 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.).

2015See Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause barred choir director’s claims against church and reverend under the ADA and employment law); Becker v. Clardy, No. 03-10-00376-CV, 2011 WL 6756999 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 22, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred religious teacher’s claim against a co- worker).

2006See , e.g. , Starkman v. Evans , 198 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1999); Green v. United Pentecostal Church Int'l , 899 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, pet. denied). (5) The "ecclesiastical abstention doctrine" provides a broader analysis that encompasses the "ministerial exception." The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of "theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required." Watson , 80 U.S. at 73

2013Courts applying the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine “have consistently held that civil courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to decide [a case involving an employment decision by a religious institution] if the employment decision concerns a member of the clergy or an employee in a ministerial position.” Patton, 212 S.W.3d at 547 ; see e.g., Green v. United Pentecostal Church Int’l, 899 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, writ denied).

2006See , e.g. , Starkman v. Evans , 198 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1999); Green v. United Pentecostal Church Int'l , 899 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, pet. denied). (5) The "ecclesiastical abstention doctrine" provides a broader analysis that encompasses the "ministerial exception." The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of "theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required." Watson , 80 U.S. at 73

2022See Tran, 934 S.W.2d at 743 .

2013To determine whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies or, conversely, whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, “courts must look to the ‘substance and effect of a plaintiffs complaint to determine its ecclesiastical implication, not its emblemata.” ’ Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 405 (quoting Tran, 934 S.W.2d at 743 ).

2022Applying the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to Appellees’ request for declaratory relief highlights the indistinct nature of “the line between required judicial action and forbidden judicial intrusion.” Thiagarajan, 430 S.W.3d at 595 .

2014The ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine stands for the proposition that the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over matters concerning “‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of a church to the standard of morals required of them.’” Thiagarajan v. Tadepalli, 430 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. filed) (quoting Serbian E.

2022And the ministerial exception—a subset of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine—requires courts “to stay out of employment disputes involving those holding certain important positions with churches and other religious institutions.” In re Roman Catholic Diocese of El Paso, 626 S.W.3d at 43 n.2 (quoting Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020)).

2020See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2060 (2020) 3 Appellants assert that their claims do not implicate the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine based on the following argument: Appellants’ claims implicate no theological or ecclesiastical question.

2013See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227-28 .

2011See Miranda , 133 S.W.3d at 227-28 .

2006See Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, n.53 (Tex. 1992); see also Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex., 95 S.W.3d 253, 266 (Tex. 2002). 5 Although the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over purely ecclesiastical matters involved in church-related disputes, the First Amendment does not forbid civil courts from adjudicating property rights of the church or its members, so long as such rights can be determined by the application of “neutral principles of law.” Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979); Hutchinson v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 , 396 (6th Cir. 1986); Voice

2006See Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, n.53 (Tex. 1992); see also Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex., 95 S.W.3d 253, 266 (Tex. 2002). 5 Although the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over purely ecclesiastical matters involved in church-related disputes, the First Amendment does not forbid civil courts from adjudicating property rights of the church or its members, so long as such rights can be determined by the application of “neutral principles of law.” Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979); Hutchinson v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 , 396 (6th Cir. 1986); Voice

2023In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas, Inc., 556 S.W.3d 347, 352 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, orig. proceeding).

2020In deciding whether ecclesiastical abstention applies, we look to the substance and effect of a plaintiff’s complaint to determine its “ecclesiastical implication not its emblemata.” Shannon, 476 S.W.3d at 622 ; In re Vida, No. 04- 14-00636-CV, 2015 WL 82717 , at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 7, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“[I]n deciding whether a court should refrain from exercising jurisdiction under the doctrine, courts must consider the substance and nature of the claim and the effect of a judicial resolution.” emphasis original)). “[W]hether a judicial resolution will encroach on

2022In Lacy, our sister court of appeals analyzed whether a request made pursuant to a similar statute contained in the Texas Nonprofit Corporation Code, under which the church in that case was incorporated, was barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. 132 S.W.3d at 124–26.

2015See id. at 123 .' Accordingly, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply.

2022Id.; Anderson v. Truelove, 446 S.W.3d 87, 94 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). 12 To resolve these disputes under neutral principles of law may require considering evidence such as the church’s constitution and bylaws.

2016Appellants also contend that Anderson v. Truelove, 446 S.W.3d 87 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.), supports their argument that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply.

2015Pursuant to United States Supreme Court precedent, torts are actionable notwithstanding the Ecclesiastical Abstention doctrine only if they pose a “substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); Torralva v. Peloquin, 399 S.W.3d 690, 697 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013, pet. denied) (same holding).

2015Pursuant to United States Supreme Court precedent, torts are actionable notwithstanding the Ecclesiastical Abstention doctrine only if they pose a “substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); Torralva v. Peloquin, 399 S.W.3d 690, 697 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013, pet. denied) (same holding).