ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in Tennessee

2025With respect to church property disputes, the Court stated that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did not “require dismissal of every church property dispute.” Id.

2022In COGIC, our Supreme Court provided the following definition of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine: The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, also commonly known as the “church autonomy doctrine,” Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 443 n.3, precludes civil courts in this country from adjudicating “questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law” or church polity, or the internal governance of religious organizations.

2022The COGIC Court held that “the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, where it applies, functions as a subject matter jurisdictional bar that precludes civil courts from adjudicating disputes that are ‘strictly and purely ecclesiastical’ in character and which concern ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.” Id. at 159 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1871)).

2017Compare Watson, 80 U.S. at 733 (recognizing the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in 1871) with Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188 , 132 S.Ct. 694 (stating that federal circuit courts of appeal had recognized the ministerial exception after passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).

2017We also do not share Justice Kirby’s belief that the Supreme Court's citation of Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th Cir. 2002) in footnote four of Hosanna-Tabor to illustrate the circuit split on the proper characterization of the ministerial exception in some way indicates that the Supreme Court views the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine as an affirmative defense.

2017We also do not share Justice Kirby’s belief that the Supreme Court’s citation of Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th Cir. 2002) in footnote four of Hosanna-Tabor to illustrate the circuit split on the proper characterization of the ministerial exception in some way indicates that the Supreme Court views the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine as an affirmative defense.

2017Likewise, this Court “strongly embraced the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine” just twenty years after Watson, Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 448 -49 (quoting Nance, 18 S.W. at 879), and has applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine as a subject matter jurisdictional bar precluding judicial review of ecclesiastical matters, see, e.g., Mason v. Winstead, 196 Tenn, 268, 265 S.W.2d 561, 563 (1954) (removal of a minister); Travers v. Abbey, 104 Tenn. 665 , 58 S.W. 247 , 247-48 (1900) (removal of a minister); see also Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 445 (treating the assertion of the ecclesiastical abstention

2017Likewise, this Court “strongly embraced the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine” just twenty years after Watson, Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 448 -49 (quoting Nance, 18 S.W. at 879), and has applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine as a subject matter jurisdictional bar precluding judicial review of ecclesiastical matters, see, e.g., Mason v. Winstead, 265 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tenn. 1954) (removal of a minister); Travers v. Abbey, 58 S.W. 247 , 247-48 (Tenn. 1900) (removal of a minister); see also Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 445 (treating the assertion of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine as a chal

2016The Tennessee Supreme Court cautioned, however, that courts should not apply the doctrine in an overly-broad fashion: Adopting a more expansive application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine runs the risk of placing religious institutions in a preferred position, Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir.1998), and 8 favoring religious institutions over secular institutions could give rise to Establishment Clause concerns.

2012Adopting a more expansive application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine runs the risk of placing religious institutions in a preferred position, Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir.1998), and favoring religious institutions over secular institutions could give rise to Establishment Clause concerns.

2016In civil cases, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is implicated only when the alleged improper conduct that gave rise to the lawsuit is “rooted in religious belief.” Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 657 (10th Cir. 2002); McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26 , 800 A.2d 840, 851 (2002).

2016In civil cases, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is implicated only when the alleged improper conduct that gave rise to the lawsuit is “rooted in religious belief.” Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 657 (10th Cir. 2002); McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26 , 800 A.2d 840, 851 (2002).

2022However, the High Court also noted that “the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine certainly does not apply in every legal dispute involving religious organizations and particularly, as pertinent here, that the doctrine “does not require dismissal of every church property dispute.” Id.

2022In COGIC, our Supreme Court held that “the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, where it applies, functions as a subject matter jurisdictional bar that precludes civil courts from adjudicating disputes that are ‘strictly and purely ecclesiastical’ in character and which 5 Although the September 24, 2019 response to Local Church’s complaint was styled as a response made by “Defendants,” it was submitted by the National Body’s counsel with a certificate of service to Mother Church’s counsel and with no indication given that Mother Church had joined in the response. -5- concern ‘theological contro

2017Nevertheless, the First Amendment, through the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine; “severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes.” Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 , 89 S.Ct. 601 , 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969) [hereinafter Blue Hull].

2017Nevertheless, the First Amendment, through the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine; “severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes.” Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 , 89 S.Ct. 601 , 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969) [hereinafter Blue Hull].

2017Likewise, this Court “strongly embraced the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine” just twenty years after Watson, Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 448 -49 (quoting Nance, 18 S.W. at 879), and has applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine as a subject matter jurisdictional bar precluding judicial review of ecclesiastical matters, see, e.g., Mason v. Winstead, 196 Tenn, 268, 265 S.W.2d 561, 563 (1954) (removal of a minister); Travers v. Abbey, 104 Tenn. 665 , 58 S.W. 247 , 247-48 (1900) (removal of a minister); see also Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 445 (treating the assertion of the ecclesiastical abstention

2017Likewise, this Court “strongly embraced the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine” just twenty years after Watson, Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 448 -49 (quoting Nance, 18 S.W. at 879), and has applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine as a subject matter jurisdictional bar precluding judicial review of ecclesiastical matters, see, e.g., Mason v. Winstead, 196 Tenn, 268, 265 S.W.2d 561, 563 (1954) (removal of a minister); Travers v. Abbey, 104 Tenn. 665 , 58 S.W. 247 , 247-48 (1900) (removal of a minister); see also Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 445 (treating the assertion of the ecclesiastical abstention

2017The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, explaining, correctly, that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine only precludes civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over “issues of canon law, religious doctrine, or church governance.” Id. at *7 (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710 , 96 S.Ct. 2372 ).

2017The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, explaining, correctly, that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine only precludes civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over “issues of canon law, religious doctrine, or church governance.” Id. at *7 (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710 , 96 S.Ct. 2372 ).

2017Compare Watson, 80 U.S. at 733 (recognizing the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in 1871) with Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188 , 132 S.Ct. 694 (stating that federal circuit courts of appeal had recognized the ministerial exception after passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).

2017Compare Watson, 80 U.S. at 733 (recognizing the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in 1871) with Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188 , 132 S.Ct. 694 (stating that federal circuit courts of appeal had recognized the ministerial exception after passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).

2017Unlike Justice Kirby; we do not view the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 , 50 S.Ct. 5 , 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929) as relevant to the issue of whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is a subject matter jurisdictional bar.

2017Unlike Justice Kirby; we do not view the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 , 50 S.Ct. 5 , 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929) as relevant to the issue of whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is a subject matter jurisdictional bar.

2017Specifically, civil courts are prohibited “from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice,” Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 , 99 S.Ct. 3020 (emphasis added), and when resolving such disputes, must “defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchical church organization.” Id. (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 724-25 , 96 S.Ct. 2372 ).

2017Specifically, civil courts are prohibited “from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice,” Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 , 99 S.Ct. 3020 (emphasis added), and when resolving such disputes, must “defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchical church organization.” Id. (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 724-25 , 96 S.Ct. 2372 ).

2022Forbess v. Forbess, 370 S.W.3d 347, 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) - 17 - As Local Church emphasizes in its reply brief, Local Church has focused two of its three sub-issues and much of its attention in this appeal on the applicability or inapplicability of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and related principles and to the trial court’s reliance on COGIC, 531 S.W.3d 146 , in finding that the doctrine and its principles related to church property were applicable to this case.

2017To be justiciable "a real question rather than a theoretical one must be presented and a legally protectable interest must be at stake.” West v. Schofield, 460 S.W.3d 113, 130 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Cummings v. Beeler, 189 Tenn. 151 , 223 S.W.2d 913, 915 (1949)) (emphasis in original).

2017To be justiciable "a real question rather than a theoretical one must be presented and a legally protectable interest must be at stake.” West v. Schofield, 460 S.W.3d 113, 130 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Cummings v. Beeler, 189 Tenn. 151 , 223 S.W.2d 913, 915 (1949)) (emphasis in original).

2017See Bishop & Diocese of Colo. v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 103 (Colo. 1986) (choosing to decide the applicability of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine rather than remand to the trial court); Episcopal Church in Diocese of Conn. v. Gauss, 302 Conn. 408 , 28 A.3d 302, 316-17 (2011) (resolving the issue on the record rather than remanding tp the trial court to do so). (7.

2017See Bishop & Diocese of Colo. v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 103 (Colo. 1986) (choosing to decide the applicability of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine rather than remand to the trial court); Episcopal Church in Diocese of Conn. v. Gauss, 28 A.3d 302, 316-17 (Conn. 2011) (resolving the issue on the record rather than remanding to the trial court to do so).

2017See Church of God in Christ, Inc., 774 S.W.2d at 952 .

2017See Church of God in Christ, Inc., 774 S.W.2d at 952 .

2017See Bishop & Diocese of Colo. v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 103 (Colo. 1986) (choosing to decide the applicability of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine rather than remand to the trial court); Episcopal Church in Diocese of Conn. v. Gauss, 302 Conn. 408 , 28 A.3d 302, 316-17 (2011) (resolving the issue on the record rather than remanding tp the trial court to do so). (7.

2017See Bishop & Diocese of Colo. v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 103 (Colo. 1986) (choosing to decide the applicability of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine rather than remand to the trial court); Episcopal Church in Diocese of Conn. v. Gauss, 302 Conn. 408 , 28 A.3d 302, 316-17 (2011) (resolving the issue on the record rather than remanding tp the trial court to do so). (7.

2017To be justiciable "a real question rather than a theoretical one must be presented and a legally protectable interest must be at stake.” West v. Schofield, 460 S.W.3d 113, 130 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Cummings v. Beeler, 189 Tenn. 151 , 223 S.W.2d 913, 915 (1949)) (emphasis in original).

2017To be justiciable “a real question rather than a theoretical one must be presented and a legally protectable interest must be at stake.” West v. Schofield, 460 S.W.3d 113, 130 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Cummings v. Beeler, 223 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tenn. 1949)) (emphasis in original).

2012However, the courts may adjudicate matters that involve religious institutions when “the court can resolve the dispute by applying neutral legal principles and is not required to employ or rely on religious doctrine to adjudicate the matter.” Id. (citing see Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 , 602–07 (1979); New York Annual Conference of United Methodist Church v. Fisher, 182 Conn. 272 , 438 A.2d 62, 68 (Conn. 1980) (holding that “[i]t is now well established that state judicial intervention is justified when it can be accomplished by resort -5- to neutral principles of law . . . that eschew conside

2012However, the courts may adjudicate matters that involve religious institutions when “the court can resolve the dispute by applying neutral legal principles and is not required to employ or rely on religious doctrine to adjudicate the matter.” Id. (citing see Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 , 602–07 (1979); New York Annual Conference of United Methodist Church v. Fisher, 182 Conn. 272 , 438 A.2d 62, 68 (Conn. 1980) (holding that “[i]t is now well established that state judicial intervention is justified when it can be accomplished by resort -5- to neutral principles of law . . . that eschew conside

2012However, the courts may adjudicate matters that involve religious institutions when “the court can resolve the dispute by applying neutral legal principles and is not required to employ or rely on religious doctrine to adjudicate the matter.” Id. (citing see Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 , 602–07 (1979); New York Annual Conference of United Methodist Church v. Fisher, 182 Conn. 272 , 438 A.2d 62, 68 (Conn. 1980) (holding that “[i]t is now well established that state judicial intervention is justified when it can be accomplished by resort -5- to neutral principles of law . . . that eschew conside

2010Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952); Murrell v. Bentley, 286 S.W.2d 359, 365 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954).

2010Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952); Murrell v. Bentley, 286 S.W.2d 359, 365 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954).

2010“The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood.” McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972).

2010We reiterate that, grounded in our nation’s belief in the separation of church and state and rooted in the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precludes the adjudication of disputes requiring extensive inquiry into matters of “ecclesiastical cognizance.” Id. at *5 (quoting Burgess v. Rock Creek Baptist Church, 734 F.Supp. 30, 31 (D.D.C.1990)(citing Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1976)).