as-applied equal protection challenge in Colorado

2025“To establish a reasonable distinction between two statutes for purposes of equal protection, the statutory classifications of crimes must be ‘based on differences that are real in fact and reasonably related to the general purposes of criminal legislation.’” People v. Brockelman, 862 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Colo. App. 1993) (quoting People v. Mumaugh, 644 P.2d 299, 301 (Colo. 1982)).

2024“To establish a reasonable distinction between two statutes for purposes of equal protection, the statutory classifications of crimes must be ‘based on differences that are real in fact and reasonably related to the general purposes of criminal legislation.’” People v. Brockelman, 28 862 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Colo. App. 1993) (quoting People v. Mumaugh, 644 P.2d 299, 301 (Colo. 1982)). 3.

2025“To establish a reasonable distinction between two statutes for purposes of equal protection, the statutory classifications of crimes must be ‘based on differences that are real in fact and reasonably related to the general purposes of criminal legislation.’” People v. Brockelman, 862 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Colo. App. 1993) (quoting People v. Mumaugh, 644 P.2d 299, 301 (Colo. 1982)).

2024“To establish a reasonable distinction between two statutes for purposes of equal protection, the statutory classifications of crimes must be ‘based on differences that are real in fact and reasonably related to the general purposes of criminal legislation.’” People v. Brockelman, 28 862 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Colo. App. 1993) (quoting People v. Mumaugh, 644 P.2d 299, 301 (Colo. 1982)). 3.

2020See Maloy, ¶ 35, ___ P.3d at ___ (ruling in favor of the defendant’s as-applied equal protection challenge to a section of SOLSA for the first time in a reported case); see also Sabell, ¶ 45, 452 P.3d at 100 (rejecting an as-applied constitutional challenge to SOLSA because the division was not persuaded to depart from the numerous decisions of previous divisions of this court affirming the constitutionality of SOLSA); People v. Oglethorpe, 87 P.3d 129, 133 (Colo. App. 2003) (holding that SOLSA was not unconstitutional as applied to the defendant); cf. People in Interest of T.B., 2019 COA 89,

2020See Maloy, ¶ 35, ___ P.3d at ___ (ruling in favor of the defendant’s as-applied equal protection challenge to a section of SOLSA for the first time in a reported case); see also Sabell, ¶ 45, 452 P.3d at 100 (rejecting an as-applied constitutional challenge to SOLSA because the division was not persuaded to depart from the numerous decisions of previous divisions of this court affirming the constitutionality of SOLSA); People v. Oglethorpe, 87 P.3d 129, 133 (Colo. App. 2003) (holding that SOLSA was not unconstitutional as applied to the defendant); cf. People in Interest of T.B., 2019 COA 89,

2025When evaluating an as-applied equal protection challenge, we consider whether, under the circumstances of the case, “the relevant statutes, or specific subsections of the statutes, punish identical conduct, and whether a reasonable distinction can be drawn between the conduct punished by the two statutes.” People v. Trujillo, 2015 COA 22, ¶ 21 .

2024But “the fact that a single act may give rise to more than one criminal violation does not, by itself, create an equal protection problem.” People v. Madril, 746 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Colo. 1987). ¶ 59 When evaluating an as-applied equal protection challenge, we consider whether, under the circumstances of the case, “the relevant statutes, or specific subsections of the statutes, punish identical conduct, and whether a reasonable distinction can be drawn between the conduct punished by the two statutes.” People v. Trujillo, 2015 COA 22, ¶ 21 , 369 P.3d 693, 697 .

2020Rather, in considering an as-applied equal protection challenge, “we consider whether — under the specific circumstances under which [the defendant] acted — the relevant statutes, or specific subsections of the statutes, punish identical conduct, and whether a reasonable distinction can be drawn between the conduct punished by the two statutes.” People v. Trujillo, 2015 COA 22, ¶ 21 (citing Onesimo Romero, 746 P.2d at 538-39 ).3 A reasonable 3 Citing Campbell v. People, 73 P.3d 11 (Colo. 2003), the People argue that we are limited to comparing the statutory elements of the relevant offenses in

2015See Onesimo Romero, 746 P.2d at 538-39 (examining the conduct of the defendant that formed the basis of the counts in an as-applied equal protection challenge). ¶22 In this case, Trujillo’s charged conduct was using the resident’s debit card, without her permission, to purchase food, clothing, and other items. ¶ 23 The two statutes provide, in pertinent part, as follows: [[Image here]] •¶ 24 Identity theft is a class 4 felony, with a presumptive range of two to six .years imprisonment. §§ 18~1.3-401(l)(a)(V)(A), 18-5902(2), C.R.S.2014.

2024But “the fact that a single act may give rise to more than one criminal violation does not, by itself, create an equal protection problem.” People v. Madril, 746 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Colo. 1987). ¶ 59 When evaluating an as-applied equal protection challenge, we consider whether, under the circumstances of the case, “the relevant statutes, or specific subsections of the statutes, punish identical conduct, and whether a reasonable distinction can be drawn between the conduct punished by the two statutes.” People v. Trujillo, 2015 COA 22, ¶ 21 , 369 P.3d 693, 697 .

2020But we agree with Maloy that an as-applied challenge, in contrast to 7 distinction is one that is “real in fact and reasonably related to the general purposes of criminal legislation.” People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69, 74 (Colo. 1981). b.