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7 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1986–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Reaves-Bey v. Karrgreen1 sentence2006We determined that appellant had alleged “a distinct claim of negligence apart from the assault claim,” and “ha[d] done more than merely recharacterize her assault claim as one grounded in negligence,” Id. at 703, 704 . | 1 | 1 |
Watts v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2002In the absence of harm, the error cannot be “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.” See Woodall v. United States, 684 A.2d 1258, 1262 (D.C.1996) (quoting Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709 (D.C.1976) (en banc)). | 1 | 1 |
Woodall v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2002In the absence of harm, the error cannot be “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.” See Woodall v. United States, 684 A.2d 1258, 1262 (D.C.1996) (quoting Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709 (D.C.1976) (en banc)). | 1 | 1 |
Wood v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2000There is no evidence in this case to support a withdrawal instruction or an assault instruction, and a finding otherwise “would undertake an unwise and impermissible bizarre reconstruction of the evidence.” West, supra, 499 A.2d at 865 (citing Wood v. United States, 472 A.2d 408, 410 (D.C.1984)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bollenbach v. United States
green
2 sentences2007The jury asked specifically what constitutes an assault in the context of the court’s initial instruction explaining that “[a] person acting in the heat of passion caused by an assault does not necessarily lose his/her claim of self-defense by using greater force than would seem necessary to a calm mind.” (Emphasis added.) The jury’s question was clear, and it was central to their consideration of appellant’s claim that he acted in self-defense. 5 Therefore, the trial court was required to respond to the question “with concrete accuracy.” Bollenbach, supra, 326 U.S. at 612-13 , 66 S.Ct. 402 . 2007The jury asked specifically what constitutes an assault in the context of the court’s initial instruction explaining that “[a] person acting in the heat of passion caused by an assault does not necessarily lose his/her claim of self-defense by using greater force than would seem necessary to a calm mind.” (Emphasis added.) The jury’s question was clear, and it was central to their consideration of appellant’s claim that he acted in self-defense. 5 Therefore, the trial court was required to respond to the question “with concrete accuracy.” Bollenbach, supra, 326 U.S. at 612-13 , 66 S.Ct. 402 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Mullin v. Washington Free Weekly, Inc.
green
1 sentence2004Nor is this case controlled by Mullin v. Wash. Free Weekly, Inc., 785 A.2d 296 (D.C.2001), cited by appellees for the proposition that if a tort claim is intertwined with a claim for which a statute of limitations is specifically provided, here the assault claim, then the entire claim will be controlled by the specified statute of limitations. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
District of Columbia v. Downs
green
1 sentence1994In District of Columbia v. Downs, 357 A.2d 857 (D.C.1976), an officer shot and killed an unarmed man in the man’s apartment. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Hensley v. Eckerhart
green
2 sentences1986Therefore, the two claims do not arise out of the same set of facts, and, consequently, fees cannot be awarded based upon Allen’s success on the unrelated assault claim. 4 Having concluded that Allen was the prevailing party as to Officer Reed but not the District of Columbia, we reverse the order in part and remand for determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 , 103 S.Ct. 1933 , 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). 1986Therefore, the two claims do not arise out of the same set of facts, and, consequently, fees cannot be awarded based upon Allen’s success on the unrelated assault claim. 4 Having concluded that Allen was the prevailing party as to Officer Reed but not the District of Columbia, we reverse the order in part and remand for determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 , 103 S.Ct. 1933 , 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Beatrice Milwe v. Alfred E. Cavuoto
green
1 sentence1986However, we conclude that by our holding that Allen is entitled to fees based upon his success on the assault claim which arose out of the same facts as his constitutional claim, we will “further the congressional goal of encouraging suits to vindicate constitutional rights without undermining the long standard judicial policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions.” Maher v. Gagne, supra, 448 U.S. at 132 , 100 S.Ct. at 2576 ; Milwe v. Cavuoto, supra, 653 F.2d at 84 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Maher v. Gagne
green
2 sentences1986However, we conclude that by our holding that Allen is entitled to fees based upon his success on the assault claim which arose out of the same facts as his constitutional claim, we will “further the congressional goal of encouraging suits to vindicate constitutional rights without undermining the long standard judicial policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions.” Maher v. Gagne, supra, 448 U.S. at 132 , 100 S.Ct. at 2576 ; Milwe v. Cavuoto, supra, 653 F.2d at 84 . 1986However, we conclude that by our holding that Allen is entitled to fees based upon his success on the assault claim which arose out of the same facts as his constitutional claim, we will “further the congressional goal of encouraging suits to vindicate constitutional rights without undermining the long standard judicial policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions.” Maher v. Gagne, supra, 448 U.S. at 132 , 100 S.Ct. at 2576 ; Milwe v. Cavuoto, supra, 653 F.2d at 84 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.