ten-day notice requirement in Florida

1998See Griffin, 639 So.2d at 968 .

1998See Griffin, 639 So.2d at 968 .

2009Looney v. State, 803 So.2d 656, 671 (Fla.2001) (citation omitted). [8] Our conclusion that the evidence at issue was not similar fact evidence subject to section 90.404(2) renders moot Victorino's arguments that the State failed to comply with the ten-day notice requirement pursuant to section 90.404(2)(c)(1) and that the trial court erroneously introduced this evidence pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a). [9] In State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla.1973), we explained the HAC aggravator as follows: It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious mea

2009In State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla.1973), we explained the HAC aggravator as follows: It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others.

2009Looney v. State, 803 So.2d 656, 671 (Fla.2001) (citation omitted). [8] Our conclusion that the evidence at issue was not similar fact evidence subject to section 90.404(2) renders moot Victorino's arguments that the State failed to comply with the ten-day notice requirement pursuant to section 90.404(2)(c)(1) and that the trial court erroneously introduced this evidence pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a). [9] In State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla.1973), we explained the HAC aggravator as follows: It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious mea

2000See also Thompson v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 130 Fla. 652, 178 So. 413 (1938); Lauren, Inc. v. Marc & Melfa, Inc., 446 So.2d 1138 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So.2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)(contract which gave employer the right to terminate *716 employee upon "written notice" held to be sufficient as against a claim of lack of mutuality); Bossert v. Palm Beach County Comprehensive Community Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 404 So.2d 1138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)(two weeks notice of the right to terminate was sufficient consideration so as to avoid a claim of lack of mutuality)

2000See also Thompson v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 130 Fla. 652, 178 So. 413 (1938); Lauren, Inc. v. Marc & Melfa, Inc., 446 So.2d 1138 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So.2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)(contract which gave employer the right to terminate *716 employee upon "written notice" held to be sufficient as against a claim of lack of mutuality); Bossert v. Palm Beach County Comprehensive Community Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 404 So.2d 1138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)(two weeks notice of the right to terminate was sufficient consideration so as to avoid a claim of lack of mutuality)

1992Reviewing the applicable case law, the Fifth District agreed with the landowner's contention that "notwithstanding the existence and validity of the ten-day notice requirement under the special act and ordinance, petitioner also (has) a right to common law certiorari review of the board decision, to which the ten-day notice deadline would not apply." 596 So.2d at 493 . [3] Returning to the statute in question, I note that the very title of section 163.3215 reads, "Standing to enforce local comprehensive plans through development orders." There can exist no serious dispute that the landowner wh

1987See DeThome v. Beck, 280 So.2d 448, 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).