deliberate ignorance instruction in Georgia

2011“The deliberate ignorance instruction is based on the alternative to the actual knowledge requirement at common law that if a party has his suspicions aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he is deemed to have knowledge.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Perez-Castillo v. State, 257 Ga. App. 633, 634 ( 572 SE2d 657 ) (2002).

2011“The deliberate ignorance instruction is based on the alternative to the actual knowledge requirement at common law that if a party has his suspicions aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he is deemed to have knowledge.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Perez-Castillo v. State, 257 Ga. App. 633, 634 ( 572 SE2d 657 ) (2002).

2017“A [trial] court should not instruct a jury regarding deliberate ignorance ‘when the evidence only points to either actual knowledge or no knowledge on the part of the defendant.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) United States v. Schlei, 122 F3d 944, 973 (II) (D) (11th Cir. 1997), *642 citing United States v. Stone, 9 F3d 934, 937 (11th Cir. 1993). 4 The deliberate ignorance instruction is based on the alternative to the actual knowledge requirement at common law that if a party has his suspicions aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he

2010White v. State, 271 Ga. 130 (3) ( 518 SE2d 113 ) (1999). 7 “A deliberate ignorance instruction is appropriate when the facts support the inference that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in question and purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution.” Perez-Castillo v. State, 257 Ga. App. 633, 635 ( 572 SE2d 657 ) (2002) (quoting United States v. Schlei, 122 F3d 944, 973 (II) (D) (11th Cir. 1997)).

2024After the instructions were finished, Speaks objected to the “deliberate ignorance” instruction. (b) “A deliberate ignorance instruction is appropriate when the 30 facts support the inference that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in question and purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution.” Huckabee v. State, 287 Ga. 728, 734 n.7 (699 SE2d 531) (2010).

2024After the instructions were finished, Speaks objected to the “deliberate ignorance” instruction. (b) “A deliberate ignorance instruction is appropriate when the 30 facts support the inference that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in question and purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution.” Huckabee v. State, 287 Ga. 728, 734 n.7 (699 SE2d 531) (2010).

2024See Wilkins v. State, 308 Ga. 131, 139 (839 SE2d 525) (2020) (explaining that this Court will “generally deem harmless a jury instruction that indicates that a defendant could be found guilty under a theory for which there was no evidence or even argument”). (c) Because Campbell and Parrish did not object to the deliberate ignorance instruction after it was given at trial, we review this claim only for plain error.

2024See Wilkins v. State, 308 Ga. 131, 139 (839 SE2d 525) (2020) (explaining that this Court will “generally deem harmless a jury instruction that indicates that a defendant could be found guilty under a theory for which there was no evidence or even argument”). (c) Because Campbell and Parrish did not object to the deliberate ignorance instruction after it was given at trial, we review this claim only for plain error.

2024“To authorize a jury instruction, there need only be produced at trial slight evidence supporting the theory of the charge.” Gray v. State, 319 Ga. 72, 75 (901 SE2d 556) (2024) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024“To authorize a jury instruction, there need only be produced at trial slight evidence supporting the theory of the charge.” Gray v. State, 319 Ga. 72, 75 (901 SE2d 556) (2024) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2021“Generally, counsel’s silence at a juncture when a request for – or objection to – a jury instruction might have been made will be considered merely a forfeiture for which plain error review remains available.” Vasquez, 306 Ga. at 229 (2) (c).

2021Cheddersingh, 290 Ga. at 684 (2) (holding that “the failure to object is more appropriately described as a forfeiture of the right”). 13 “Generally, counsel’s silence at a juncture when a request for — or objection to — a jury instruction might have been made will be considered merely a forfeiture for which plain error review remains available.” Vasquez, 306 Ga. at 229 (2) (c).

2021See, e.g., Collins v. State, 308 Ga. 515, 519 (2) (842 SE2d 275) (2020) (reviewing claim for plain error, but not relying on affirmative waiver, where “[a]t the conclusion of the jury charge, the trial court asked, ‘Are there any objections to the charge . . . on behalf of the defense?’ Appellant’s counsel replied, ‘No, your honor’”); Guajardo v. State, 290 Ga. 172, 175-176 (3) (718 SE2d 292) (2011) (reviewing claim for plain error, but not relying on affirmative waiver, where “after the trial court recharged the jury, the trial court specifically asked counsel if there were ‘any exceptions to

2021See, e.g., Collins v. State, 308 Ga. 515, 519 (2) (842 SE2d 275) (2020) (reviewing claim for plain error, but not relying on affirmative waiver, where “[a]t the conclusion of the jury charge, the trial court asked, ‘Are there any objections to the charge . . . on behalf of the defense?’ Appellant’s counsel replied, ‘No, your honor’”); Guajardo v. State, 290 Ga. 172, 175-176 (3) (718 SE2d 292) (2011) (reviewing claim for plain error, but not relying on affirmative waiver, where “after the trial court recharged the jury, the trial court specifically asked counsel if there were ‘any exceptions to

2021And, while he did not object again after the final instructions were given, that “does not show that [Grullon] intentionally relinquished” his known rights with regard to the deliberate ignorance instruction. 13 Cheddersingh, 290 Ga. at 684 (2) (holding that “the failure to object is more appropriately described as a forfeiture of the right”).

2021Cheddersingh, 290 Ga. at 684 (2) (holding that “the failure to object is more appropriately described as a forfeiture of the right”). 13 “Generally, counsel’s silence at a juncture when a request for — or objection to — a jury instruction might have been made will be considered merely a forfeiture for which plain error review remains available.” Vasquez, 306 Ga. at 229 (2) (c).

2021See, e.g., Collins v. State, 308 Ga. 515, 519 (2) (842 SE2d 275) (2020) (reviewing claim for plain error, but not relying on affirmative waiver, where “[a]t the conclusion of the jury charge, the trial court asked, ‘Are there any objections to the charge . . . on behalf of the defense?’ Appellant’s counsel replied, ‘No, your honor’”); Guajardo v. State, 290 Ga. 172, 175-176 (3) (718 SE2d 292) (2011) (reviewing claim for plain error, but not relying on affirmative waiver, where “after the trial court recharged the jury, the trial court specifically asked counsel if there were ‘any exceptions to

2021See, e.g., Collins v. State, 308 Ga. 515, 519 (2) (842 SE2d 275) (2020) (reviewing claim for plain error, but not relying on affirmative waiver, where “[a]t the conclusion of the jury charge, the trial court asked, ‘Are there any objections to the charge . . . on behalf of the defense?’ Appellant’s counsel replied, ‘No, your honor’”); Guajardo v. State, 290 Ga. 172, 175-176 (3) (718 SE2d 292) (2011) (reviewing claim for plain error, but not relying on affirmative waiver, where “after the trial court recharged the jury, the trial court specifically asked counsel if there were ‘any exceptions to

2017“A [trial] court should not instruct a jury regarding deliberate ignorance ‘when the evidence only points to either actual knowledge or no knowledge on the part of the defendant.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) United States v. Schlei, 122 F3d 944, 973 (II) (D) (11th Cir. 1997), *642 citing United States v. Stone, 9 F3d 934, 937 (11th Cir. 1993). 4 The deliberate ignorance instruction is based on the alternative to the actual knowledge requirement at common law that if a party has his suspicions aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he

2013(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Able v. State, 312 Ga. App. 252, 258 (3) ( 718 SE2d 96 ) (2011).

2013(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Able v. State, 312 Ga. App. 252, 258 (3) ( 718 SE2d 96 ) (2011).