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7 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 1958–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fair v. Stategreen2 sentences2014The court further noted, however, that the transcript of the hearing on the motion to withdraw and the testimony at the hearing on the motion for new trial showed that “no final ruling or decision was made while in chambers.” On appeal, Wedel argues that a hearing on Reynolds’s motion to withdraw from his representation of Wedel on the eve of trial was a critical stage of the proceedings against him, and that the trial court violated his right to be present at that proceeding by deciding that motion in chambers. 3 Under both the Georgia and the federal constitutions, a criminal defendant has t 2014The court further noted, however, that the transcript of the hearing on the motion to withdraw and the testimony at the hearing on the motion for new trial showed that “no final ruling or decision was made while in chambers.” On appeal, Wedel argues that a hearing on Reynolds’s motion to withdraw from his representation of Wedel on the eve of trial was a critical stage of the proceedings against him, and that the trial court violated his right to be present at that proceeding by deciding that motion in chambers. 3 Under both the Georgia and the federal constitutions, a criminal defendant has t | 2 | 2 |
Huff v. Stategreen2 sentences2014The court further noted, however, that the transcript of the hearing on the motion to withdraw and the testimony at the hearing on the motion for new trial showed that “no final ruling or decision was made while in chambers.” On appeal, Wedel argues that a hearing on Reynolds’s motion to withdraw from his representation of Wedel on the eve of trial was a critical stage of the proceedings against him, and that the trial court violated his right to be present at that proceeding by deciding that motion in chambers. 3 Under both the Georgia and the federal constitutions, a criminal defendant has t 2014The court further noted, however, that the transcript of the hearing on the motion to withdraw and the testimony at the hearing on the motion for new trial showed that “no final ruling or decision was made while in chambers.” On appeal, Wedel argues that a hearing on Reynolds’s motion to withdraw from his representation of Wedel on the eve of trial was a critical stage of the proceedings against him, and that the trial court violated his right to be present at that proceeding by deciding that motion in chambers. 3 Under both the Georgia and the federal constitutions, a criminal defendant has t | 2 | 2 |
Kentucky v. Stincergreen2 sentences2014The court further noted, however, that the transcript of the hearing on the motion to withdraw and the testimony at the hearing on the motion for new trial showed that “no final ruling or decision was made while in chambers.” On appeal, Wedel argues that a hearing on Reynolds’s motion to withdraw from his representation of Wedel on the eve of trial was a critical stage of the proceedings against him, and that the trial court violated his right to be present at that proceeding by deciding that motion in chambers. 3 Under both the Georgia and the federal constitutions, a criminal defendant has t 2014The court further noted, however, that the transcript of the hearing on the motion to withdraw and the testimony at the hearing on the motion for new trial showed that “no final ruling or decision was made while in chambers.” On appeal, Wedel argues that a hearing on Reynolds’s motion to withdraw from his representation of Wedel on the eve of trial was a critical stage of the proceedings against him, and that the trial court violated his right to be present at that proceeding by deciding that motion in chambers. 3 Under both the Georgia and the federal constitutions, a criminal defendant has t | 2 | 2 |
Rinehart v. Woodford Flying Service, Inc.green1 sentence2014See also Brown v. State, 310 Ga. App. 285, 290 (6) (e) (ii) (712 3 Wedel does not challenge as improper the grant of Reynolds’s motion to withdraw from Wedel’s case. 9 SE2d 521 ) (2011) (defendant waived right to claim that his absence from proceedings was error where he was fully informed of the proceedings that occurred in his absence and acquiesced in those proceedings). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See also Brown v. State, 310 Ga. App. 285, 290 (6) (e) (ii) (712 3 Wedel does not challenge as improper the grant of Reynolds’s motion to withdraw from Wedel’s case. 9 SE2d 521 ) (2011) (defendant waived right to claim that his absence from proceedings was error where he was fully informed of the proceedings that occurred in his absence and acquiesced in those proceedings). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences1998Reynolds’ claim that the admission of the certificate of inspection violated his right to confrontation is foreclosed by Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 76, 81 ( 485 SE2d 486 ) (1997). 3. 1998Reynolds’ claim that the admission of the certificate of inspection violated his right to confrontation is foreclosed by Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 76, 81 ( 485 SE2d 486 ) (1997). 3. | 1 | 1 |
Commercial & Exchange Bank v. McDanielgreen2 sentences1996It appears the trial court’s ruling may have been erroneous, because Reynolds did not adequately prove that she had obtained a discharge applicable to the company’s claim (see generally Commercial & Exchange Bank v. McDaniel, 147 Ga. App. 378, 379 ( 249 SE2d 97 ) (1978) and Stegall v. Jones, 87 Ga. App. 115, 117 ( 73 SE2d 42 ) (1952)), and because the doctrine of recoupment would allow the company to pursue this counterclaim even after discharge, at least as a defense to Reynolds’ claim for damages of $5,000 per month for the remainder of the contract. 1996It appears the trial court’s ruling may have been erroneous, because Reynolds did not adequately prove that she had obtained a discharge applicable to the company’s claim (see generally Commercial & Exchange Bank v. McDaniel, 147 Ga. App. 378, 379 ( 249 SE2d 97 ) (1978) and Stegall v. Jones, 87 Ga. App. 115, 117 ( 73 SE2d 42 ) (1952)), and because the doctrine of recoupment would allow the company to pursue this counterclaim even after discharge, at least as a defense to Reynolds’ claim for damages of $5,000 per month for the remainder of the contract. | 1 | 1 |
Barnett v. Stategreen2 sentences1978The trial court did not err in overruling Reynolds’ motion to suppress the statement and testimony of GBI Agent Don Ward and all statements, polygraph examinations and interrogations made without the presence of defense counsel. (a) "No provision is made in [Criminal Code § 27-313] for pre-trial suppression of evidence deemed illegal for reasons other than unlawful search and seizur e” Barnett v. State, 123 Ga. App. 369, 370 ( 180 SE2d 921 ) (1971). (b) A Jackson-Denno hearing was properly held outside the hearing of the jury to determine the voluntariness of Reynolds’ confession, and the tran 1978The trial court did not err in overruling Reynolds’ motion to suppress the statement and testimony of GBI Agent Don Ward and all statements, polygraph examinations and interrogations made without the presence of defense counsel. (a) "No provision is made in [Criminal Code § 27-313] for pre-trial suppression of evidence deemed illegal for reasons other than unlawful search and seizur e” Barnett v. State, 123 Ga. App. 369, 370 ( 180 SE2d 921 ) (1971). (b) A Jackson-Denno hearing was properly held outside the hearing of the jury to determine the voluntariness of Reynolds’ confession, and the tran | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cook v. State
green
2 sentences2022In Cook v. State, 313 Ga. 471 ( 870 SE2d 758 ) (2022), however, the Supreme Court of Georgia eliminated the judicially created out-of-time appeal procedure in trial courts and held that a trial court is “without jurisdiction to decide [a] motion for out-of-time appeal” on the merits because there is “no legal authority for motions for out-of-time appeal in trial courts.” Id. at 506 (5). 2022In Cook v. State, 313 Ga. 471 ( 870 SE2d 758 ) (2022), however, the Supreme Court of Georgia eliminated the judicially created out-of-time appeal procedure in trial courts and held that a trial court is “without jurisdiction to decide [a] motion for out-of-time appeal” on the merits because there is “no legal authority for motions for out-of-time appeal in trial courts.” Id. at 506 (5). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Stegall v. Jones
neutral
2 sentences1996It appears the trial court’s ruling may have been erroneous, because Reynolds did not adequately prove that she had obtained a discharge applicable to the company’s claim (see generally Commercial & Exchange Bank v. McDaniel, 147 Ga. App. 378, 379 ( 249 SE2d 97 ) (1978) and Stegall v. Jones, 87 Ga. App. 115, 117 ( 73 SE2d 42 ) (1952)), and because the doctrine of recoupment would allow the company to pursue this counterclaim even after discharge, at least as a defense to Reynolds’ claim for damages of $5,000 per month for the remainder of the contract. 1996It appears the trial court’s ruling may have been erroneous, because Reynolds did not adequately prove that she had obtained a discharge applicable to the company’s claim (see generally Commercial & Exchange Bank v. McDaniel, 147 Ga. App. 378, 379 ( 249 SE2d 97 ) (1978) and Stegall v. Jones, 87 Ga. App. 115, 117 ( 73 SE2d 42 ) (1952)), and because the doctrine of recoupment would allow the company to pursue this counterclaim even after discharge, at least as a defense to Reynolds’ claim for damages of $5,000 per month for the remainder of the contract. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Willis v. Jones
green
2 sentences1958It was accordingly not error to deny the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. (b) For the same reasons, the general grounds of the motion for a new trial are without merit. (c) Applying the rule laid down in Willis v. Jones, 89 Ga. App. 824 , supra, those parts of special ground 2 of the defendant Rentz’ motion for new trial, and special ground 5 of Reynolds’ motion, which complain that the court restricted the charge that the plaintiff could not recover if he was not in the exercise of ordinary care to circumstances after the defendants’ negligence became apparent or should have b 1958It was accordingly not error to deny the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. (b) For the same reasons, the general grounds of the motion for a new trial are without merit. (c) Applying the rule laid down in Willis v. Jones, 89 Ga. App. 824 , supra, those parts of special ground 2 of the defendant Rentz' motion for new trial, and special ground 5 of Reynolds' motion, which complain that the court restricted the charge that the plaintiff could not recover if he was not in the exercise of ordinary care to circumstances after the defendants' negligence became apparent or should have b | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.