second element test in Georgia

2018As Stewart's attorney, McDonald owed him a duty to "exercise ordinary care, skill and diligence." Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C. , 265 Ga. 374 , 375 (2) (a), 453 S.E.2d 719 (1995) (citations omitted).

2018As Stewart's attorney, McDonald owed him a duty to "exercise ordinary care, skill and diligence." Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C. , 265 Ga. 374 , 375 (2) (a), 453 S.E.2d 719 (1995) (citations omitted).

2017(Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Id. at 828 (3) (b).

2012Because the second element of the test involves answering the question whether certain professional standards have been met, “except in clear and palpable cases (such as the expiration of a statute of limitation), expert testimony is necessary to establish the parameters of acceptable professional conduct [for an attorney], a significant deviation from which would constitute malpractice.” (Citations omitted.) Berman v. Rubin, 138 Ga. App. 849, 853 ( 227 SE2d 802 ) (1976).

2012Because the second element of the test involves answering the question whether certain professional standards have been met, “except in clear and palpable cases (such as the expiration of a statute of limitation), expert testimony is necessary to establish the parameters of acceptable professional conduct [for an attorney], a significant deviation from which would constitute malpractice.” (Citations omitted.) Berman v. Rubin, 138 Ga. App. 849, 853 ( 227 SE2d 802 ) (1976).

2004“The clearly erroneous standard of review to be applied by the superior court prevents a de novo determination of . . . whether the facts found by the ALJ are supported by any evidence.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Commr. of Ins. v. Stryker, 218 Ga. App. 716, 717 (1) ( 463 SE2d 163 ) (1995). (a) The trial court reversed the ALJ’s Final Decision, in part, because it misunderstood that the ALJ had based the second element requirement determination of compliance solely on the benefit of returning water to the basin.

2004“The clearly erroneous standard of review to be applied by the superior court prevents a de novo determination of . . . whether the facts found by the ALJ are supported by any evidence.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Commr. of Ins. v. Stryker, 218 Ga. App. 716, 717 (1) ( 463 SE2d 163 ) (1995). (a) The trial court reversed the ALJ’s Final Decision, in part, because it misunderstood that the ALJ had based the second element requirement determination of compliance solely on the benefit of returning water to the basin.

1993Where new counsel undertakes the representation of appellant after a motion for new trial is denied, ordinarily the case is remanded for an evidentiary *478 hearing and ruling by the trial court; however, “[a]s it is apparent as a matter of law that [appellant] cannot satisfy the second element of this test, we need not remand for a hearing on whether counsel was ineffective. [Cits.]” Brundage v. State, 208 Ga. App. 58, 59 (2) ( 430 SE2d 173 ) (1993).

1993Where new counsel undertakes the representation of appellant after a motion for new trial is denied, ordinarily the case is remanded for an evidentiary *478 hearing and ruling by the trial court; however, “[a]s it is apparent as a matter of law that [appellant] cannot satisfy the second element of this test, we need not remand for a hearing on whether counsel was ineffective. [Cits.]” Brundage v. State, 208 Ga. App. 58, 59 (2) ( 430 SE2d 173 ) (1993).

1993See Smith v. State, 262 Ga. 480 ( 422 SE2d 173 ); French v. State, 261 Ga. 424 ( 405 SE2d 35 ).

1993See Smith v. State, 262 Ga. 480 ( 422 SE2d 173 ); French v. State, 261 Ga. 424 ( 405 SE2d 35 ).