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7 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Moon v. BD. OF TRUSTEES MUN. FIRE & POL.green2 sentences2022On our review, we reiterated that the Dunlavey standard is occupation-focused and, in this context, required “the stress be ‘of greater magnitude than the day-to-day 37 mental stress experienced by other [police] officers.’ ” Id. at 569 (alteration in original) (quoting Dunlavey, 526 N.W.2d at 857 ). 2022On our review, we reiterated that the Dunlavey standard is occupation-focused and, in this context, required “the stress be ‘of greater magnitude than the day-to-day 37 mental stress experienced by other [police] officers.’ ” Id. at 569 (alteration in original) (quoting Dunlavey, 526 N.W.2d at 857 ). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Walshiregreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 626 (Iowa 2001) (considering whether a tip from a citizen informant was sufficiently reliable to provide reasonable suspicion to justify a stop). 5 to dispatch and Detective Dunlavey’s stop of the vehicle does not render the information stale or incapable of supporting an investigatory stop. | 1 | 1 |
Schofield v. Whitegreen2 sentences1999Prior to 1993 suicide was only compensable if the “mental condition of [the] decedent at the time of the suicidal act was such that he was motivated by an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium of frenzy, without conscious volition to produce death.” Schofield v. White, 250 Iowa 571, 581 , 95 N.W.2d 40, 46 (1959). 1999Prior to 1993 suicide was only compensable if the “mental condition of [the] decedent at the time of the suicidal act was such that he was motivated by an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium of frenzy, without conscious volition to produce death.” Schofield v. White, 250 Iowa 571, 581 , 95 N.W.2d 40, 46 (1959). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dunlavey v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences2022On our review, we reiterated that the Dunlavey standard is occupation-focused and, in this context, required “the stress be ‘of greater magnitude than the day-to-day 37 mental stress experienced by other [police] officers.’ ” Id. at 569 (alteration in original) (quoting Dunlavey, 526 N.W.2d at 857 ). 2022On our review, we reiterated that the Dunlavey standard is occupation-focused and, in this context, required “the stress be ‘of greater magnitude than the day-to-day 37 mental stress experienced by other [police] officers.’ ” Id. at 569 (alteration in original) (quoting Dunlavey, 526 N.W.2d at 857 ). | 5 | 1998–2022 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.