Dunlap claim in Idaho

2022Hall, 163 Idaho at 831, 419 P.3d at 1129 (quoting Raley v. Ylst, 444 F.3d 1085, 1095 (9th Cir. 2006)).

2022Hall, 163 Idaho at 831, 419 P.3d at 1129 (quoting Raley v. Ylst, 444 F.3d 1085, 1095 (9th Cir. 2006)).

2015See Fields, 503 F.3d at 776 ; Miller v. Francis, 269 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir.2001) (when the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is founded upon a claim that counsel failed to strike a biased juror, the defendant must show that the juror was actually biased against him); Goeders v. Hundley, 59 F.3d 73, 75 (8th Cir.1995) (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 , 102 S.Ct. 940, 944-45 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 84-85 (1981)) (“To maintain a claim that a biased juror prejudiced him, however, [the defendant] must show that the juror was actually biased against him.”).

2015See Fields, 503 F.3d at 776; Miller v. Francis, 269 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 2001) (when the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is founded upon a claim that counsel failed to strike a biased juror, the defendant must show that the juror was actually biased against him); Goeders v. Hundley, 59 F.3d 73, 75 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1981)) (“To maintain a claim that a biased juror prejudiced him, however, [the defendant] must show that the juror was actually biased against him.”).

2015See Fields, 503 F.3d at 776 ; Miller v. Francis, 269 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir.2001) (when the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is founded upon a claim that counsel failed to strike a biased juror, the defendant must show that the juror was actually biased against him); Goeders v. Hundley, 59 F.3d 73, 75 (8th Cir.1995) (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 , 102 S.Ct. 940, 944-45 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 84-85 (1981)) (“To maintain a claim that a biased juror prejudiced him, however, [the defendant] must show that the juror was actually biased against him.”).

2015See Fields, 503 F.3d at 776; Miller v. Francis, 269 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 2001) (when the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is founded upon a claim that counsel failed to strike a biased juror, the defendant must show that the juror was actually biased against him); Goeders v. Hundley, 59 F.3d 73, 75 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1981)) (“To maintain a claim that a biased juror prejudiced him, however, [the defendant] must show that the juror was actually biased against him.”).

2015See Fields, 503 F.3d at 776; Miller v. Francis, 269 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 2001) (when the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is founded upon a claim that counsel failed to strike a biased juror, the defendant must show that the juror was actually biased against him); Goeders v. Hundley, 59 F.3d 73, 75 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1981)) (“To maintain a claim that a biased juror prejudiced him, however, [the defendant] must show that the juror was actually biased against him.”).

2015There is not a reasonable probability that had trial counsel asked additional questions or moved to strike the seated jurors the result would have been different because the “[r]eplacement of one unbiased juror with another unbiased juror should not alter the outcome.” Fields, 503 F.3d at 776.

2015See Fields, 503 F.3d at 776 ; Miller v. Francis, 269 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir.2001) (when the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is founded upon a claim that counsel failed to strike a biased juror, the defendant must show that the juror was actually biased against him); Goeders v. Hundley, 59 F.3d 73, 75 (8th Cir.1995) (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 , 102 S.Ct. 940, 944-45 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 84-85 (1981)) (“To maintain a claim that a biased juror prejudiced him, however, [the defendant] must show that the juror was actually biased against him.”).

2015See Fields, 503 F.3d at 776; Miller v. Francis, 269 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 2001) (when the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is founded upon a claim that counsel failed to strike a biased juror, the defendant must show that the juror was actually biased against him); Goeders v. Hundley, 59 F.3d 73, 75 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1981)) (“To maintain a claim that a biased juror prejudiced him, however, [the defendant] must show that the juror was actually biased against him.”).

2013The general rule is that “both parties are given wide latitude in making their arguments to the jury and discussing the evidence and inferences to be made therefrom.” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720 , 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009) (citing State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 504 , 616 P.2d 1034, 1040 (1980)).

2013The general rule is that “both parties are given wide latitude in making their arguments to the jury and discussing the evidence and inferences to be made therefrom.” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720 , 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009) (citing State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 504 , 616 P.2d 1034, 1040 (1980)).

2013This requires the defendant to demonstrate that there was an error and, upon that showing, the burden shifts to the State to 36 demonstrate “to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that the . . . violation did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.” 150 Idaho 209, 227 , 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). a) Denial of Dunlap’s motion to exclude jurors for cause Dunlap contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying Dunlap’s motions to strike two potential jurors for cause.

2013This requires the defendant to demonstrate that there was an error and, upon that showing, the burden shifts to the State to 36 demonstrate “to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that the . . . violation did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.” 150 Idaho 209, 227 , 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). a) Denial of Dunlap’s motion to exclude jurors for cause Dunlap contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying Dunlap’s motions to strike two potential jurors for cause.

2013“The decision to excuse potential jurors is within the discretion of the trial court.” State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 506 , 988 P.2d 1170, 1180 (1999) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 , 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).

2013“The decision to excuse potential jurors is within the discretion of the trial court.” State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 506 , 988 P.2d 1170, 1180 (1999) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 , 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).

2013In State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 100 , 967 P.2d 702, 714 (1998), this Court quoted its earlier decision in State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 395 , 648 P.2d 203, 207 (1982): “It is thus incumbent upon the trial court to inquire into the needs of the defendant and the circumstances of the case, and then make a determination of whether an adequate defense will be available to the defendant without the requested expert or investigative aid.” Judge Harding’s earlier expressions of concern relating to the costs of Dunlap’s defense were made in the course of performance of his duties as a trial judge.

2013In State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 100 , 967 P.2d 702, 714 (1998), this Court quoted its earlier decision in State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 395 , 648 P.2d 203, 207 (1982): “It is thus incumbent upon the trial court to inquire into the needs of the defendant and the circumstances of the case, and then make a determination of whether an adequate defense will be available to the defendant without the requested expert or investigative aid.” Judge Harding’s earlier expressions of concern relating to the costs of Dunlap’s defense were made in the course of performance of his duties as a trial judge.

2013“The decision to excuse potential jurors is within the discretion of the trial court.” State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 506 , 988 P.2d 1170, 1180 (1999) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 , 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).

2013“The decision to excuse potential jurors is within the discretion of the trial court.” State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 506 , 988 P.2d 1170, 1180 (1999) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 , 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).

2013In State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 100 , 967 P.2d 702, 714 (1998), this Court quoted its earlier decision in State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 395 , 648 P.2d 203, 207 (1982): “It is thus incumbent upon the trial court to inquire into the needs of the defendant and the circumstances of the case, and then make a determination of whether an adequate defense will be available to the defendant without the requested expert or investigative aid.” Judge Harding’s earlier expressions of concern relating to the costs of Dunlap’s defense were made in the course of performance of his duties as a trial judge.

2013In State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 100 , 967 P.2d 702, 714 (1998), this Court quoted its earlier decision in State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 395 , 648 P.2d 203, 207 (1982): “It is thus incumbent upon the trial court to inquire into the needs of the defendant and the circumstances of the case, and then make a determination of whether an adequate defense will be available to the defendant without the requested expert or investigative aid.” Judge Harding’s earlier expressions of concern relating to the costs of Dunlap’s defense were made in the course of performance of his duties as a trial judge.

2015This Court repeated the factual and procedural background of this case most recently in State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 357–58, 313 P.3d 1, 13–14 (2013) (Dunlap V), as follows: On October 16, 1991, Dunlap entered and robbed the Security State Bank in Soda Springs, Idaho.

2015This Court repeated the factual and procedural background of this case most recently in State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 357–58, 313 P.3d 1, 13–14 (2013) (Dunlap V), as follows: On October 16, 1991, Dunlap entered and robbed the Security State Bank in Soda Springs, Idaho.

2013The general rule is that “both parties are given wide latitude in making their arguments to the jury and discussing the evidence and inferences to be made therefrom.” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720 , 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009) (citing State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 504 , 616 P.2d 1034, 1040 (1980)).

2013The general rule is that “both parties are given wide latitude in making their arguments to the jury and discussing the evidence and inferences to be made therefrom.” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720 , 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009) (citing State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 504 , 616 P.2d 1034, 1040 (1980)).

2013In Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 , 125 S.Ct. 2007 , 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005), the Supreme Court considered whether shackling a defendant during the penalty phase of a capital case violated the Constitution and held “that the Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during the penalty phase, as it forbids their use during the guilt phase, unless that use is ‘justified by an essential state interest’ — such as the interest in courtroom security — specific to the defendant on trial.” Id. at 624 , 125 S.Ct. at 2009, 161 L.Ed.2d at 959 (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-569 , 106

2013In Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005), the Supreme Court considered whether shackling a defendant 42 during the penalty phase of a capital case violated the Constitution and held “that the Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during the penalty phase, as it forbids their use during the guilt phase, unless that use is ‘justified by an essential state interest’—such as the interest in courtroom security—specific to the defendant on trial.” Id. at 624 (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 , 568–569 (1986)).