alcohol test (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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alcohol test in Illinois

7 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2002 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Orthgreen
ill · 1988 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
2 sentences

2002In People v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d 326, 337-38 , 530 N.E.2d 210, 215 (1988), the Illinois Supreme Court stated that because a statutory summary suspension hearing is a civil action, not a criminal action, a defendant who requests the judicial rescission of a suspension bears the burden of providing, inter alia, prima facie evidence of an alcohol test’s unreliability.

2002In People v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d 326, 337-38 , 530 N.E.2d 210, 215 (1988), the Illinois Supreme Court stated that because a statutory summary suspension hearing is a civil action, not a criminal action, a defendant who requests the judicial rescission of a suspension bears the burden of providing, inter alia, prima facie evidence of an alcohol test’s unreliability.

22

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (4)

CaseCitedYears
Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp. green
ill · 1992
2 sentences

1999The court noted, “Under the voluntary undertaking theory of liability, the duty of care to be imposed upon a defendant is limited to the extent of its undertaking.” Frye, 153 Ill. 2d at 28 .

1999The court noted, "Under the voluntary undertaking theory of liability, the duty of care to be imposed on a defendant is limited to the extent of the undertaking." Frye , 153 Ill. 2d at 28 .

21999–1999
State v. Brooks green
wis · 1983
2 sentences

1988Unlike the Illinois statute, the Wisconsin summary suspension statute is “designed to induce persons to submit to an alcohol test to expedite securing evidence to determine whether or not a suspected person is intoxicated.” ( 113 Wis. 2d at 348 , 335 N.W.2d at 354-55 .) The vastly different purpose of the Illinois statute, to protect society rather than to convict the criminal, precludes this court’s consideration or acceptance of the reasoning in Brooks.

1988Unlike the Illinois statute, the Wisconsin summary suspension statute is “designed to induce persons to submit to an alcohol test to expedite securing evidence to determine whether or not a suspected person is intoxicated.” ( 113 Wis. 2d at 348 , 335 N.W.2d at 354-55 .) The vastly different purpose of the Illinois statute, to protect society rather than to convict the criminal, precludes this court’s consideration or acceptance of the reasoning in Brooks.

11988–1988
South Dakota v. Neville green
scotus · 1983
2 sentences

1986(South Dakota v. Neville (1983), 459 U.S. 553 , 74 L.

1986(South Dakota v. Neville (1983), 459 U.S. 553 , 74 L.

11986–1986
Rust v. Department of Motor Vehicles green
calctapp · 1968
2 sentences

1986(See Rust v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1968), 267 Cal. App. 2d 545 , 73 Cal. Rptr. 366 (driver’s license improperly suspended for refusal to take alcohol test until consultation with attorney where defendant advised at time of arrest that he had the right to an attorney beginning at that moment).) Defense counsel argued that defendant’s refusal to take the test was a result of her belief that her right to counsel under Miranda was applicable to the request for the breathalyzer test.

1986(See Rust v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1968), 267 Cal. App. 2d 545 , 73 Cal. Rptr. 366 (driver’s license improperly suspended for refusal to take alcohol test until consultation with attorney where defendant advised at time of arrest that he had the right to an attorney beginning at that moment).) Defense counsel argued that defendant’s refusal to take the test was a result of her belief that her right to counsel under Miranda was applicable to the request for the breathalyzer test.

11986–1986

Where else courts name it

OH 26 (1975–2026) CA 18 (1957–2026) PA 15 (1983–2023) MD 8 (2006–2024) IL 7 (1986–2002) TX 6 (2006–2025) NY 6 (1925–2014) GA 5 (1973–1998) OK 5 (1953–2023) WI 4 (1986–2021) CO 4 (1987–2024) MN 4 (1972–2015) FL 3 (1988–2025) HI 3 (1999–2002) MT 3 (1991–2006) ID 3 (1958–2017) MS 3 (1993–2009) TN 3 (2005–2017) VA 2 (1986–2000) CT 2 (1998–1999) MO 2 (1975–2000) AR 2 (1980–2025) VT 2 (2013–2013) NH 2 (2007–2015) KS 2 (1999–2008) LA 2 (1975–1990) ND 2 (1992–1994) DE 2 (2012–2012)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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