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7 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Maringreen2 sentences2006Ed. 2d 631, 650 , 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2119-20 (1990) (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[T]here has been no showing here or elsewhere that as a general proposition the rule is so arbitrary and lacking in common sense in so many instances that it should be held violative of due process in every case"); People v. Taylor, 138 Ill. 2d 204, 217 (1990) ("To require the General Assembly to define each element of an offense, even though the common meaning of the terms themselves defines the criminal offense with sufficient certainty that ordinary people can understand what c 2006Ed. 2d 631, 650 , 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2119-20 (1990) (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[Tjhere has been no showing here or elsewhere that as a general proposition the rule is so arbitrary and lacking in common sense in so many instances that it should be held violative of due process in every case”); People v. Taylor, 138 Ill. 2d 204, 217 (1990) (“To require the General Assembly to define each element of an offense, even though the common meaning of the terms themselves defines the criminal offense with sufficient certainty that ordinary people can understand what c | 2 | 2 |
People v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2006Ed. 2d 631, 650 , 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2119-20 (1990) (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[T]here has been no showing here or elsewhere that as a general proposition the rule is so arbitrary and lacking in common sense in so many instances that it should be held violative of due process in every case"); People v. Taylor, 138 Ill. 2d 204, 217 (1990) ("To require the General Assembly to define each element of an offense, even though the common meaning of the terms themselves defines the criminal offense with sufficient certainty that ordinary people can understand what c 2006Ed. 2d 631, 650 , 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2119-20 (1990) (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[Tjhere has been no showing here or elsewhere that as a general proposition the rule is so arbitrary and lacking in common sense in so many instances that it should be held violative of due process in every case”); People v. Taylor, 138 Ill. 2d 204, 217 (1990) (“To require the General Assembly to define each element of an offense, even though the common meaning of the terms themselves defines the criminal offense with sufficient certainty that ordinary people can understand what c | 2 | 2 |
Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. American National Bankgreen1 sentence2024He cites Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), for the general proposition that a waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right, and he notes that the agreement itself does not expressly waive statutory prejudgment interest nor did the parties testify to their intent to waive statutory prejudgment interest. ¶ 73 Logue’s argument, however, does not discuss the language in section 2 that plainly allows a creditor and debtor to reach their own agreement as to prejudgment interest. 815 ILCS 205/2 (West 2022) (“In the absence of an agreement between the creditor and debtor governi | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen1 sentence2024He cites Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), for the general proposition that a waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right, and he notes that the agreement itself does not expressly waive statutory prejudgment interest nor did the parties testify to their intent to waive statutory prejudgment interest. ¶ 73 Logue’s argument, however, does not discuss the language in section 2 that plainly allows a creditor and debtor to reach their own agreement as to prejudgment interest. 815 ILCS 205/2 (West 2022) (“In the absence of an agreement between the creditor and debtor governi | 1 | 1 |
Globe Accident Insurance v. Gerischgreen1 sentence1976While it has been stated as a general proposition that a presumption cannot be based upon a presumption or an inference upon an inference (see, e.g., Globe Accident Insurance Co. v. Gerisch, 163 Ill. 625, 629 (1896)), the so-called rule is actually a corollary of established tests concerning the relevance of evidence to prove a given fact and in any event does not preclude the drawing of more than one inference from the same set of facts. | 1 | 1 |
Ohio Building Safety Vault Co. v. Industrial Boardgreen1 sentence1976See Ohio Building Safety Vault Co. v. Industrial Board, 277 Ill. 96, 109-14 (1917). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Gargani
green
1 sentence2012We quoted Kaeding for the general proposition that the doctrine of revestment applies when “ ‘the parties *** actively participate without objection in proceedings which are inconsistent with the merits of the prior judgment.’ ” Gargani, 371 Ill. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Kaeding
green
1 sentence2012App. 3d at 731 (quoting Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d at 241 ). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Dini v. Naiditch
green
2 sentences1991Although he cites several cases for the general proposition that violation of certain statutes may be held to be prima facie evidence of negligence (see, e.g., Dini v. Naiditch (1960), 20 Ill.2d 406 , 170 N.E.2d 881 ), plaintiff has provided us with no pertinent authority, and precious little in the way of argument, relative to violations of the public nuisance statute. 1991Although he cites several cases for the general proposition that violation of certain statutes may be held to be prima facie evidence of negligence (see, e.g., Dini v. Naiditch (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 406 ), plaintiff has provided us with no pertinent authority, and precious little in the way of argument, relative to violations of the public nuisance statute. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Tannenbaum
green
2 sentences1990Ed. 2d 263 , 109 S. Ct. 274 , and People v. Tannenbaum (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 177 , 415 N.E.2d 1027 , for the general proposition that error in criminal cases not raised in the trial court and preserved, if necessary, by a post-trial motion, is waived. 1990Ed. 2d 263 , 109 S. Ct. 274 , and People v. Tannenbaum (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 177 , 415 N.E.2d 1027 , for the general proposition that error in criminal cases not raised in the trial court and preserved, if necessary, by a post-trial motion, is waived. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
The PEOPLE v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1990Not discussed by either side is the case of People v. Johnson (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 399 , 231 N.E.2d 447 . 1990Not discussed by either side is the case of People v. Johnson (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 399 , 231 N.E.2d 447 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Nelson
green
1 sentence1990Ed. 2d 263 , 109 S. Ct. 274 , and People v. Tannenbaum (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 177 , 415 N.E.2d 1027 , for the general proposition that error in criminal cases not raised in the trial court and preserved, if necessary, by a post-trial motion, is waived. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.