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7 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2019See Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 795 (Iowa 2018); Montoya v. Ulibarri, 163 P.3d 476, 484 (N.M. 2007) (Holding that the due process clause and the prohibition against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in the New Mexico Constitution protects actually innocent people, and “to ignore a claim of actual innocence would be fundamentally unfair.” Also “[i]t cannot be said that the incarceration of an innocent person advances any goal of punishment, and if a prisoner is actually innocent of the crime for which he is incarcerated, the punishment is indeed grossly out of proportion to the s 2018See Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 795 (Iowa 2018); Montoya v. Ulibarri, 163 P.3d 476, 484 (N.M. 2007) (Holding that the due process clause and the prohibition against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in the New Mexico Constitution protects actually innocent people, and “to ignore a claim of actual innocence would be fundamentally unfair.” Also “[i]t cannot be said that the incarceration of an innocent person advances any goal of - 11 No. 1-15-2994 punishment, and if a prisoner is actually innocent of the crime for which he is incarcerated, the punishment is indeed grossly out o | 3 | 3 |
McCleskey v. Zantgreen2 sentences2019This more-likely-than-not standard “ensures that petitioner’s case is truly ‘extraordinary,’ [citation] while still providing petitioner a meaningful avenue by which to avoid a manifest injustice.” Id. (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991)). ¶ 29 By contrast, a number of states, including Illinois, acknowledge freestanding claims of actual innocence. 2018This more-likely-than-not standard “ensures that petitioner’s case is truly ‘extraordinary,’ [citation] while still providing petitioner a meaningful avenue by which to avoid a manifest injustice.” Id. (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991)). ¶ 29 By contrast, a number of states, including Illinois, acknowledge freestanding claims of actual innocence. | 3 | 3 |
Jacob Lee Schmidt v. State of Iowagreen2 sentences2019See Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 795 (Iowa 2018); Montoya v. Ulibarri, 163 P.3d 476, 484 (N.M. 2007) (Holding that the due process clause and the prohibition against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in the New Mexico Constitution protects actually innocent people, and “to ignore a claim of actual innocence would be fundamentally unfair.” Also “[i]t cannot be said that the incarceration of an innocent person advances any goal of punishment, and if a prisoner is actually innocent of the crime for which he is incarcerated, the punishment is indeed grossly out of proportion to the s 2018See Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 795 (Iowa 2018); Montoya v. Ulibarri, 163 P.3d 476, 484 (N.M. 2007) (Holding that the due process clause and the prohibition against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in the New Mexico Constitution protects actually innocent people, and “to ignore a claim of actual innocence would be fundamentally unfair.” Also “[i]t cannot be said that the incarceration of an innocent person advances any goal of - 11 No. 1-15-2994 punishment, and if a prisoner is actually innocent of the crime for which he is incarcerated, the punishment is indeed grossly out o | 3 | 3 |
Montoya v. Ulibarrigreen2 sentences2019See Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 795 (Iowa 2018); Montoya v. Ulibarri, 163 P.3d 476, 484 (N.M. 2007) (Holding that the due process clause and the prohibition against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in the New Mexico Constitution protects actually innocent people, and “to ignore a claim of actual innocence would be fundamentally unfair.” Also “[i]t cannot be said that the incarceration of an innocent person advances any goal of punishment, and if a prisoner is actually innocent of the crime for which he is incarcerated, the punishment is indeed grossly out of proportion to the s 2018See Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 795 (Iowa 2018); Montoya v. Ulibarri, 163 P.3d 476, 484 (N.M. 2007) (Holding that the due process clause and the prohibition against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in the New Mexico Constitution protects actually innocent people, and “to ignore a claim of actual innocence would be fundamentally unfair.” Also “[i]t cannot be said that the incarceration of an innocent person advances any goal of - 11 No. 1-15-2994 punishment, and if a prisoner is actually innocent of the crime for which he is incarcerated, the punishment is indeed grossly out o | 3 | 3 |
Leary v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1979Ed. 57 , 82, 89 S. Ct. 1532 .) While stating and using the more-likely-than-not standard, the court, in a footnote, added: “Since we find that the §176a presumption is unconstitutional under this standard, we need not reach the question whether a criminal presumption which passes muster when so judged must also satisfy the criminal ‘reasonable doubt’ standard if proof of the crime charged or an essential element thereof depends upon its use. [Citations.]” ( 395 U.S. 6 , 36 n.64, 23 L. 1979Ed. 57 , 82, 89 S. Ct. 1532 .) While stating and using the more-likely-than-not standard, the court, in a footnote, added: “Since we find that the §176a presumption is unconstitutional under this standard, we need not reach the question whether a criminal presumption which passes muster when so judged must also satisfy the criminal ‘reasonable doubt’ standard if proof of the crime charged or an essential element thereof depends upon its use. [Citations.]” ( 395 U.S. 6 , 36 n.64, 23 L. | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Barnes v. United States
green
2 sentences1979It stated: “What has been established by the cases, however, is at least this: that if a statutory inference submitted to the jury as sufficient to support conviction satisfies the reasonable-doubt standard (that is, the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt) as well as the more-likely-than-not standard, then it clearly accords with due process.” ( 412 U.S. 837, 843 , 37 L. 1979It stated: “What has been established by the cases, however, is at least this: that if a statutory inference submitted to the jury as sufficient to support conviction satisfies the reasonable-doubt standard (that is, the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt) as well as the more-likely-than-not standard, then it clearly accords with due process.” ( 412 U.S. 837, 843 , 37 L. | 2 | 1978–1979 |
People v. Gallagher
green
2 sentences1979Va. 1975), 220 S.E.2d 682 ), or they have continued using the more-likely-than-not standard, pending resolution of the question definitively by the United States Supreme Court (United States v. Tavoularis (2d Cir. 1975), 515 F.2d 1070 ; People v. Gallagher (1979), 404 Mich. 429 , 273 N.W.2d 440 ). 1979Va. 1975), 220 S.E.2d 682 ), or they have continued using the more-likely-than-not standard, pending resolution of the question definitively by the United States Supreme Court (United States v. Tavoularis (2d Cir. 1975), 515 F.2d 1070 ; People v. Gallagher (1979), 404 Mich. 429 , 273 N.W.2d 440 ). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
People v. McClendon
green
2 sentences1979Other States have either expressly kept the more-likely-than-not standard articulated in Leary (People v. McClendon (1975), 188 Colo. 140 , 533 P.2d 923 ; Pinkerton v. Farr (W. 1979Other States have either expressly kept the more-likely-than-not standard articulated in Leary (People v. McClendon (1975), 188 Colo. 140 , 533 P.2d 923 ; Pinkerton v. Farr (W. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
United States v. Anthony Tavoularis
green
2 sentences1979Va. 1975), 220 S.E.2d 682 ), or *886 they have continued using the more-likely-than-not standard, pending resolution of the question definitively by the United States Supreme Court ( United States v. Tavoularis (2d Cir.1975), 515 F.2d 1070 ; People v. Gallagher (1979), 404 Mich. 429 , 273 N.W.2d 440 ). 1979Va. 1975), 220 S.E.2d 682 ), or they have continued using the more-likely-than-not standard, pending resolution of the question definitively by the United States Supreme Court (United States v. Tavoularis (2d Cir. 1975), 515 F.2d 1070 ; People v. Gallagher (1979), 404 Mich. 429 , 273 N.W.2d 440 ). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
People v. Davis
green
2 sentences1979App.3d 163 , 365 N.E.2d 1135 , wherein the question was raised whether a statutory presumption must meet the reasonable-doubt standard or the more-likely-than-not standard. 1979App. 3d 163 , 365 N.E.2d 1135 , wherein the question was raised whether a statutory presumption must meet the reasonable-doubt standard or the more-likely-than-not standard. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Pinkerton v. Farr
green
2 sentences1979Va. 1975), 220 S.E.2d 682 ), or *886 they have continued using the more-likely-than-not standard, pending resolution of the question definitively by the United States Supreme Court ( United States v. Tavoularis (2d Cir.1975), 515 F.2d 1070 ; People v. Gallagher (1979), 404 Mich. 429 , 273 N.W.2d 440 ). 1979Va. 1975), 220 S.E.2d 682 ), or they have continued using the more-likely-than-not standard, pending resolution of the question definitively by the United States Supreme Court (United States v. Tavoularis (2d Cir. 1975), 515 F.2d 1070 ; People v. Gallagher (1979), 404 Mich. 429 , 273 N.W.2d 440 ). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.