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7 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1936–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Cruzgreen2 sentences2008Thus, the rule against other-crimes evidence of propensity or bad character is essentially a per se application of the rule that otherwise relevant evidence is inadmissible "if its probative value is outweighed by such dangers as unfair prejudice, jury confusion, or delay." People v. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d 314, 348 (1994) (general prohibition on other-crimes evidence is an outgrowth of this rule).3 However, section 115--7.3 of the Code provides an exception to the rule against other-crimes evidence: 2 The Supreme Court did not explain how propensity evidence poses a risk of unfair surprise greater 2008Thus, the rule against other-crimes evidence of propensity or bad character is essentially a per se application of the rule that otherwise relevant evidence is inadmissible “if its probative value is outweighed by such dangers as unfair prejudice, jury confusion, or delay.” People v. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d 314, 348 (1994) (general prohibition on other-crimes evidence is an outgrowth of this rule). 3 However, section 115 — 7.3 of the Code provides an exception to the rule against other-crimes evidence: “(a) This Section applies to criminal cases in which: (1) the defendant is accused of predatory cr | 4 | 4 |
People v. Donohogreen2 sentences2008Thus, despite the general rule against other-crimes evidence of bad character or propensity, section 115 — 7.3 “enable[s] courts to admit evidence of other crimes to show [a] defendant’s propensity to commit sex offenses.” People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 176 (2003). 2008Thus, despite the general rule against other-crimes evidence of bad character or propensity, section 115-7.3 "enable[s] courts to admit evidence of other crimes to show [a] defendant's propensity to commit sex offenses." People v. Donoho, 204 Ill.2d 159, 176 , 273 Ill.Dec. 116 , 788 N.E.2d 707 (2003). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hendricksgreen2 sentences1994As an outgrowth of this principle, a general rule has developed that evidence of offenses other than those for which a defendant is being tried is inadmissible. ( People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill.2d 448, 455 , 343 N.E.2d 489 .) "The underlying rationale is that such evidence `is objectionable "not because it has no appreciable probative value, but because it has too much."`" ( People v. Romero (1977), 66 Ill.2d 325, 330 , 5 Ill.Dec. 817 , 362 N.E.2d 288 , quoting People v. Lehman (1955), 5 Ill.2d 337, 342 , 125 N.E.2d 506 ; see also People v. Hendricks (1990), 137 Ill.2d 31, 52 , 148 Ill.Dec. 1994As an outgrowth of this principle, a general rule has developed that evidence of offenses other than those for which a defendant is being tried is inadmissible. ( People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill.2d 448, 455 , 343 N.E.2d 489 .) "The underlying rationale is that such evidence `is objectionable "not because it has no appreciable probative value, but because it has too much."`" ( People v. Romero (1977), 66 Ill.2d 325, 330 , 5 Ill.Dec. 817 , 362 N.E.2d 288 , quoting People v. Lehman (1955), 5 Ill.2d 337, 342 , 125 N.E.2d 506 ; see also People v. Hendricks (1990), 137 Ill.2d 31, 52 , 148 Ill.Dec. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Holmes
green
1 sentence2008Thus, the rule against other-crimes evidence of propensity or bad character is essentially a per se application of the rule that otherwise relevant evidence is inadmissible "if its probative value is outweighed by such dangers as unfair prejudice, jury confusion, or delay." People v. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d 314, 348 (1994) (general prohibition on other-crimes evidence is an outgrowth of this rule).3 However, section 115--7.3 of the Code provides an exception to the rule against other-crimes evidence: 2 The Supreme Court did not explain how propensity evidence poses a risk of unfair surprise greater | 1 | 2008–2008 |
People v. McDonald
green
2 sentences1994As an outgrowth of this principle, a general rule has developed that evidence of offenses other than those for which a defendant is being tried is inadmissible. ( People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill.2d 448, 455 , 343 N.E.2d 489 .) "The underlying rationale is that such evidence `is objectionable "not because it has no appreciable probative value, but because it has too much."`" ( People v. Romero (1977), 66 Ill.2d 325, 330 , 5 Ill.Dec. 817 , 362 N.E.2d 288 , quoting People v. Lehman (1955), 5 Ill.2d 337, 342 , 125 N.E.2d 506 ; see also People v. Hendricks (1990), 137 Ill.2d 31, 52 , 148 Ill.Dec. 1994As an outgrowth of this principle, a general rule has developed that evidence of offenses other than those for which a defendant is being tried is inadmissible. ( People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill.2d 448, 455 , 343 N.E.2d 489 .) "The underlying rationale is that such evidence `is objectionable "not because it has no appreciable probative value, but because it has too much."`" ( People v. Romero (1977), 66 Ill.2d 325, 330 , 5 Ill.Dec. 817 , 362 N.E.2d 288 , quoting People v. Lehman (1955), 5 Ill.2d 337, 342 , 125 N.E.2d 506 ; see also People v. Hendricks (1990), 137 Ill.2d 31, 52 , 148 Ill.Dec. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Lehman
green
2 sentences1994As an outgrowth of this principle, a general rule has developed that evidence of offenses other than those for which a defendant is being tried is inadmissible. ( People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill.2d 448, 455 , 343 N.E.2d 489 .) "The underlying rationale is that such evidence `is objectionable "not because it has no appreciable probative value, but because it has too much."`" ( People v. Romero (1977), 66 Ill.2d 325, 330 , 5 Ill.Dec. 817 , 362 N.E.2d 288 , quoting People v. Lehman (1955), 5 Ill.2d 337, 342 , 125 N.E.2d 506 ; see also People v. Hendricks (1990), 137 Ill.2d 31, 52 , 148 Ill.Dec. 1994As an outgrowth of this principle, a general rule has developed that evidence of offenses other than those for which a defendant is being tried is inadmissible. ( People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill.2d 448, 455 , 343 N.E.2d 489 .) "The underlying rationale is that such evidence `is objectionable "not because it has no appreciable probative value, but because it has too much."`" ( People v. Romero (1977), 66 Ill.2d 325, 330 , 5 Ill.Dec. 817 , 362 N.E.2d 288 , quoting People v. Lehman (1955), 5 Ill.2d 337, 342 , 125 N.E.2d 506 ; see also People v. Hendricks (1990), 137 Ill.2d 31, 52 , 148 Ill.Dec. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Romero
green
2 sentences1994As an outgrowth of this principle, a general rule has developed that evidence of offenses other than those for which a defendant is being tried is inadmissible. ( People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill.2d 448, 455 , 343 N.E.2d 489 .) "The underlying rationale is that such evidence `is objectionable "not because it has no appreciable probative value, but because it has too much."`" ( People v. Romero (1977), 66 Ill.2d 325, 330 , 5 Ill.Dec. 817 , 362 N.E.2d 288 , quoting People v. Lehman (1955), 5 Ill.2d 337, 342 , 125 N.E.2d 506 ; see also People v. Hendricks (1990), 137 Ill.2d 31, 52 , 148 Ill.Dec. 1994As an outgrowth of this principle, a general rule has developed that evidence of offenses other than those for which a defendant is being tried is inadmissible. ( People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill.2d 448, 455 , 343 N.E.2d 489 .) "The underlying rationale is that such evidence `is objectionable "not because it has no appreciable probative value, but because it has too much."`" ( People v. Romero (1977), 66 Ill.2d 325, 330 , 5 Ill.Dec. 817 , 362 N.E.2d 288 , quoting People v. Lehman (1955), 5 Ill.2d 337, 342 , 125 N.E.2d 506 ; see also People v. Hendricks (1990), 137 Ill.2d 31, 52 , 148 Ill.Dec. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
United States v. Shipp
green
1 sentence1952(Harvard Law Review, Curtis, vol. 41, p. 51.) In United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 , in speaking of this rule, Mr. Justice Holmes said, “On this occasion we shall not go into the history of the notion. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
The People v. Northern Trust Co.
neutral
1 sentence1936(People v. Northern Trust Co. 324 Ill. 625 ; People v. Forman, 322 id. 223; People v. Continental Bank, 344 id. 123.) The authority of the State to levy an inheritance tax arises out of the laws of descent and devise and is an outgrowth of the principle that property rights cease upon the death of the holder. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.