second sentence instruction in Illinois

2023IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.63A stated that the word “consent” meant a “freely given agreement to the act of [(sexual penetration) (sexual conduct)] in question.” The second sentence of the instruction, however, stated that “[l]ack of verbal or physical resistance or submission by the victim resulting from the use of force or threat of force by the defendant [or the victim’s manner of dress] shall not constitute consent.” Id. ¶ 66 At the jury instruction conference, defense counsel indicated he was not asking for IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.63, explaining that, given the way the case had gone, he did

2023IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.63A stated that the word “consent” meant a “freely given agreement to the act of [(sexual penetration) (sexual conduct)] in question.” The second sentence of the instruction, however, stated that “[l]ack of verbal or physical resistance or submission by the victim resulting from the use of force or threat of force by the defendant [or the victim’s manner of dress] shall not constitute consent.” Id. ¶ 66 At the jury instruction conference, defense counsel indicated he was not asking for IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.63, explaining that, given the way the case had gone, he did

1981(South Parkway Building Corp. v. South Center Department Store, Inc. (1958), 19 Ill.

1978The second sentence of this rule is new and sets forth as the policy of the Supreme Court that a defendant who pleads `not guilty' should be granted a trial on the merits on the date the police officers set for defendant's first court appearance." We also quote with approval the language contained in People v. Nelson, 18 Ill.

1978The second sentence of this rule is new and sets forth as the policy of the Supreme Court that a defendant who pleads ‘not guilty’ should be granted a trial on the merits on the date the police officers set for defendant’s first court appearance.” We also quote with approval the language contained in People v. Nelson, 18 Ill.

1938(People v. Auriene, 361 Ill. 440 .) The second sentence of the instruction concerning “reasonable doubt” was approved in People v. Buskievich, 330 Ill. 532, 544 , and the last sentence thereof was approved in Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1, 82 .

1938The substance of questioned instruction four was likewise approved in Spies v. People, supra, at page 251, and People v. Bell, 328 Ill. 446 .

1938(People v. Auriene, 361 Ill. 440 .) The second sentence of the instruction concerning “reasonable doubt” was approved in People v. Buskievich, 330 Ill. 532, 544 , and the last sentence thereof was approved in Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1, 82 .

1938(People v. Auriene, 361 Ill. 440 .) The second sentence of the instruction concerning “reasonable doubt” was approved in People v. Buskievich, 330 Ill. 532, 544 , and the last sentence thereof was approved in Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1, 82 .

1906A similar instruction was before this court containing the word here complained of, in the case of North Chicago Street Railroad Co. v. Fitzgibbons, 180 Ill. 466 .

1886And if the jury believe, from the evidence, that the property oecuj>ied' by the ice company,- in its present condition, has a special capacity, as an entirety, for the purpose of ice-freezing, cutting and transporting, and as an entirety is devoted to such purposes, and that the value of such tract will be depreciated and lessened by the taking of the strip in question, then the owners of the property are entitled to recover a sum equal to such depreciation in value. ” The second sentence of this instruction, which is the only part of it, that is objected to, is an almost literal copy of the l