judge-made doctrine in California

2026(See Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363 , 370–371 [stating general proposition that equitable tolling “is a judge-made doctrine” that operates independently of the statute of limitations]; Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 751 [cause of action for professional negligence does not accrue until the plaintiff suffered actual loss or damage from the allegedly negligent conduct].) 7 Appellant’s verified complaint in this matter sets forth the facts related to the underlying lawsuit in paragraphs 6 through 30.

2023“Equitable tolling is a judge-made doctrine ‘which operates independently of the literal wording of the Code of Civil Procedure’ to suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.” (Lantzy, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 370 .) Equitable tolling only stops the statute of limitations from running during the event justifying the tolling.

2015Equitable tolling is sparingly applied; it is a judge-made doctrine that suspends or extends a statute of limitations otherwise applicable “occasionally and in special situations . . . .” (Addison v. State of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313, 316 (Addison).) Whether the doctrine of equitable tolling should be applied involves a balancing of the competing interests of preventing the assertion of stale claims and allowing good faith litigants their day in court.

2003Equitable tolling is a judge-made doctrine "which operates independently of the literal wording of the Code of Civil Procedure" to suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness. ( Addison v. State of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313, 318-319 , 146 Cal.Rptr. 224 , 578 P.2d 941 ( Addison ); see also Bollinger v. National Fire his.

2009(People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 472 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 ].) Thus, we cannot abrogate the first degree felony-murder rule because it “is a creature of statute. . . . [T]his court does not sit as a super-legislature with the power to judicially abrogate a statute merely because it is unwise or outdated. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 463.) We do, however, possess the authority to abrogate the second degree felony-murder doctrine because “ ‘the second degree felony-murder rule remains, as it has been since 1872, a judge-made doctrine without any express basis in the Penal Code.’

2009(People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 472 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 ].) Thus, we cannot abrogate the first degree felony-murder rule because it “is a creature of statute. . . . [T]his court does not sit as a super-legislature with the power to judicially abrogate a statute merely because it is unwise or outdated. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 463.) We do, however, possess the authority to abrogate the second degree felony-murder doctrine because “ ‘the second degree felony-murder rule remains, as it has been since 1872, a judge-made doctrine without any express basis in the Penal Code.’

2009(People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 472 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 ].) Thus, we cannot abrogate the first degree felony-murder rule because it “is a creature of statute. . . . [T]his court does not sit as a super-legislature with the power to judicially abrogate a statute merely because it is unwise or outdated. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 463.) We do, however, possess the authority to abrogate the second degree felony-murder doctrine because “ ‘the second degree felony-murder rule remains, as it has been since 1872, a judge-made doctrine without any express basis in the Penal Code.’

2004(Maj. opn., ante, 17 Cal. Rptr.3d at p. 617 , 95 P.3d at p. 883 .) But unlike first degree felony murder, which is codified in section 189 ( People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 472 , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 ), "the second degree felony-murder rule remains, as it has been since 1872, a judge-made doctrine without any express basis in the Penal Code" ( id. at p. 472, fn. 19, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 ; see also maj. opn., ante, at p. 611, 95 P.3d at p. 878 ).

1989Code, § 192, par. 2), we reach the same conclusion as to the first degree felony-murder rule only by piling inference on inference; and the second degree felony-murder rule remains, as it has been since 1872, a judge-made doctrine without any express basis in the Penal Code (see People v. Phillips (1966) . . . 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 ], and cases cited).

1989Code, § 192, par. 2), we reach the same conclusion as to the first degree felony-murder rule only by piling inference on inference; and the second degree felony-murder rule remains, as it has been since 1872, a judge-made doctrine without any express basis in the Penal Code (see People v. Phillips (1966) . . . 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 ], and cases cited).

2015I, § 8, cl. 3.) The commerce clause reflects “ ‘the Constitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres.’ ” (Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 422 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 ], quoting Healy v. Beer Institute (1989) 491 U.S. 324, 335-336 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 275 , 109 S.Ct. 2491 ] (Healy).) Though the commerce clause imposes no express constraints “on ‘the several States,’ ” the United States Supreme Cour

2015I, § 8, cl. 3.) The commerce clause reflects “ ‘the Constitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres.’ ” (Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 422 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 ], quoting Healy v. Beer Institute (1989) 491 U.S. 324, 335-336 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 275 , 109 S.Ct. 2491 ] (Healy).) Though the commerce clause imposes no express constraints “on ‘the several States,’ ” the United States Supreme Cour

2015(Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B).) “However, measures may specify performance standards which would mitigate the significant effect of the project and which may be accomplished in more than one specified way.” (Ibid.) Although “[t]here is not a single, all-encompassing statement of the judge-made exception to the general rule prohibiting the deferral of the formulation of mitigation measures” (POET, LLC v. State Air Resources Bd. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 681, 735 ), we summarize the principles that apply here. “[W]hen, for practical reasons, mitigation measures cannot be fully formulated

2014(Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B).) “However, measures may specify performance standards which would mitigate the significant effect of the project and which may be accomplished in more than one specified way.” (Ibid.) Although “[t]here is not a single, all-encompassing statement of the judge-made exception to the general rule prohibiting the deferral of the formulation of mitigation measures” (POET, LLC v. State Air Resources Bd. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 681, 735 ), we summarize the principles that apply here. “[W]hen, for practical reasons, mitigation measures cannot be fully formulated

1980(People v. Green (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 524, 527 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 84 ].) The transcript shows that the trial judge made inquiry and listened to appellant’s complaints.

1980(People v. Green (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 524, 527 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 84 ].) The transcript shows that the trial judge made inquiry and listened to appellant’s complaints.

1979In the instant case, where defendant admitted the violation of probation, where he was represented by counsel at the time of sentence, and where he “does not suggest any facts which would have in any way affected the disposition of the case had the trial judge made this inquiry,” (People v. Rocha (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 656, 663 [ 279 P.2d 836 ]) it was not reversible error for the judge to omit arraignment for judgment (see People v. Wademan (1918) 38 Cal.App. 116, 137 [ 175 P. 791 ]) or inquiry of the defendant as to whether there was any legal cause why judgment should not be pronounced (Peop

1979In the instant case, where defendant admitted the violation of probation, where he was represented by counsel at the time of sentence, and where he “does not suggest any facts which would have in any way affected the disposition of the case had the trial judge made this inquiry,” (People v. Rocha (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 656, 663 [ 279 P.2d 836 ]) it was not reversible error for the judge to omit arraignment for judgment (see People v. Wademan (1918) 38 Cal.App. 116, 137 [ 175 P. 791 ]) or inquiry of the defendant as to whether there was any legal cause why judgment should not be pronounced (Peop

2015Campbell has forfeited his argument he was entitled to equitable relief Campbell contends he was entitled to relief notwithstanding his failure to timely file a section 473 motion pursuant to the equitable tolling doctrine (see In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, 911 [“‘[e]quitable tolling is a judge-made doctrine “which operates independently of the literal wording of the Code of Civil Procedure” to suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure 5 fundamental practicality and fairness’”]) or under the court’s inherent equitable power to set aside an orde

2013(Gordon v. Law Offices of Aguierre & Meyer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 972 , 979–980.) We next consider whether equitable tolling extended the period in which plaintiff could bring his fraud causes of action. ―‗Equitable tolling is a judge-made doctrine ―which operates independently of the literal wording of the Code of Civil Procedure‖ to suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness. [Citations.]‖ (In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, 911 .) Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that this doctrine applies.

2020(Hansen, at p. 919, fn. 3.) 25 law]; In re Miller (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 960, 979 [California Supreme Court’s decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 , which limited the circumstances under which an aider and abettor to a murder under the felony-murder doctrine may be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, applied retroactively under Mutch because the decisions “did not create new law; they simply stated what section 190.2, subdivision (d) [defining special circumstance murder] has always meant”].) In finding Daniels r

2017(Id. at p. 403 (dis. opn. of Burke, J.).) The majority rejected the dissent’s view and explained Mutch was entitled to rely on Daniels without need of resorting to an analysis of whether the decision was “retroactive.” (Mutch, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 394 .) In the majority’s view, Daniels “did not overturn a judge-made rule of common law” and “did not change any . . . evidentiary or procedural rules . . . .” (Id. at pp. 394-395.) Rather, Daniels simply “recognized a statutory rule . . . to which courts had not previously given appropriate effect” (id. at p. 394); in other words, “‘what [Mutch] d

2022As a consequence, the tolled interval, no matter when it took place, is tacked onto the end of the limitations period, thus extending the deadline for suit by the entire length of time during which the tolling event previously occurred.” (Id. at pp. 370–371.) “[T]he party invoking equitable tolling bears the burden of proving its applicability.” (Long v. Forty Niners Football Co., LLC (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 550, 555, 21 . citing In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, 912 .) Because Kingspan presented evidence demonstrating the limitation period on Bee Sweet’s cause of action fo

2022(See, e.g., Marcario v. County of Orange (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 397, 407-409 .) The three requisite elements for equitable tolling are “ ‘[(1)] timely notice, and [(2)] lack of prejudice, to the defendant, and [(3)] reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff.’ ” (Saint Francis, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 724.) When, as here, “a claim is time-barred on its face, the plaintiff” bears the burden of “specifically plead[ing] facts that would support equitable tolling.” (Long v. Forty Niners Football Co., LLC, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 555 .) Wells fails to meet her burden of estab

2020(Hansen, at p. 919, fn. 3.) 25 law]; In re Miller (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 960, 979 [California Supreme Court’s decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 , which limited the circumstances under which an aider and abettor to a murder under the felony-murder doctrine may be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, applied retroactively under Mutch because the decisions “did not create new law; they simply stated what section 190.2, subdivision (d) [defining special circumstance murder] has always meant”].) In finding Daniels r

2020(Hansen, at p. 919, fn. 3.) 25 law]; In re Miller (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 960, 979 [California Supreme Court’s decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 , which limited the circumstances under which an aider and abettor to a murder under the felony-murder doctrine may be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, applied retroactively under Mutch because the decisions “did not create new law; they simply stated what section 190.2, subdivision (d) [defining special circumstance murder] has always meant”].) In finding Daniels r

2015I, § 8, cl. 3.) The commerce clause reflects “ ‘the Constitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres.’ ” (Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 422 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 ], quoting Healy v. Beer Institute (1989) 491 U.S. 324, 335-336 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 275 , 109 S.Ct. 2491 ] (Healy).) Though the commerce clause imposes no express constraints “on ‘the several States,’ ” the United States Supreme Cour

2015I, § 8, cl. 3.) The commerce clause reflects “ ‘the Constitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres.’ ” (Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 422 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 ], quoting Healy v. Beer Institute (1989) 491 U.S. 324, 335-336 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 275 , 109 S.Ct. 2491 ] (Healy).) Though the commerce clause imposes no express constraints “on ‘the several States,’ ” the United States Supreme Cour

2015I, § 8, cl. 3.) The commerce clause reflects “ ‘the Constitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres.’ ” (Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 422 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 ], quoting Healy v. Beer Institute (1989) 491 U.S. 324, 335-336 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 275 , 109 S.Ct. 2491 ] (Healy).) Though the commerce clause imposes no express constraints “on ‘the several States,’ ” the United States Supreme Cour

2015I, § 8, cl. 3.) The commerce clause reflects “ ‘the Constitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres.’ ” (Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 422 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 ], quoting Healy v. Beer Institute (1989) 491 U.S. 324, 335-336 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 275 , 109 S.Ct. 2491 ] (Healy).) Though the commerce clause imposes no express constraints “on ‘the several States,’ ” the United States Supreme Cour

2015I, § 8, cl. 3.) The commerce clause reflects “ ‘the Constitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres.’ ” (Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 422 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 ], quoting Healy v. Beer Institute (1989) 491 U.S. 324, 335-336 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 275 , 109 S.Ct. 2491 ] (Healy).) Though the commerce clause imposes no express constraints “on ‘the several States,’ ” the United States Supreme Cour

2015I, § 8, cl. 3.) The commerce clause reflects “ ‘the Constitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres.’ ” (Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 422 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 ], quoting Healy v. Beer Institute (1989) 491 U.S. 324, 335-336 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 275 , 109 S.Ct. 2491 ] (Healy).) Though the commerce clause imposes no express constraints “on ‘the several States,’ ” the United States Supreme Cour

2013Courts have recognized that “there are circumstances in which some aspects of mitigation may appropriately be deferred.” (San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center v. County of Merced (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 645, 670 ; 1 Kostka & Zischke, supra, § 14.12, p. 696-697.) The regulation governing the contents of EIR‟s also acknowledges the existence of the exception: “However, measures may specify performance standards which would mitigate the significant effect of the project and which may be accomplished in more than one specified way.” (Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B).) There is not a single, all-e

2013Courts have recognized that “there are circumstances in which some aspects of mitigation may appropriately be deferred.” (San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center v. County of Merced (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 645, 670 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 663 ]; 1 Kostka & Zischke, supra, § 14.12, pp. 697-698 (rev. 3/13).) The regulation governing the contents of EIR’s also acknowledges the existence of the exception: “However, measures may specify performance standards which would mitigate the significant effect of the project and which may be accomplished in more than one specified way.” (Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1

2009Nearly 45 years ago, this court acknowledged that “[t]he felony-murder rule has been criticized on the grounds that in almost all cases in which it is applied it is unnecessary and that it erodes the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability. [Citations.] Although it is the law in this state [citation], it should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve.” (People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 783 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ], fn. omitted.) We have described the felony-murder rule as “ ‘a “highly artificial concept” ’ ” that this cou

2009Nearly 45 years ago, this court acknowledged that “[t]he felony-murder rule has been criticized on the grounds that in almost all cases in which it is applied it is unnecessary and that it erodes the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability. [Citations.] Although it is the law in this state [citation], it should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve.” (People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 783 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ], fn. omitted.) We have described the felony-murder rule as “ ‘a “highly artificial concept” ’ ” that this cou

1994This doctrine arises not from any statute enacted by the Legislature but rather from the common law made by the courts. "[T]he second degree felony-murder rule remains, as it has been since 1872, a judge-made doctrine without any express" — or implied — "basis in the Penal Code...." ( People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 472, fn. 19 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.); accord, id. at p. 490 (conc. opn. of Kaus, J.) [ semble ]; People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 829, fn. 3 [ 201 Cal. Rptr. 319 , 678 P.2d 894 ].) [1] Contrary to the majority's assertion (maj. opn., ante, at p. 308), the rule doe

1994This doctrine arises not from any statute enacted by the Legislature but rather from the common law made by the courts. "[T]he second degree felony-murder rule remains, as it has been since 1872, a judge-made doctrine without any express" — or implied — "basis in the Penal Code...." ( People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 472, fn. 19 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.); accord, id. at p. 490 (conc. opn. of Kaus, J.) [ semble ]; People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 829, fn. 3 [ 201 Cal. Rptr. 319 , 678 P.2d 894 ].) [1] Contrary to the majority's assertion (maj. opn., ante, at p. 308), the rule doe

2026(See Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363 , 370–371 [stating general proposition that equitable tolling “is a judge-made doctrine” that operates independently of the statute of limitations]; Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 751 [cause of action for professional negligence does not accrue until the plaintiff suffered actual loss or damage from the allegedly negligent conduct].) 7 Appellant’s verified complaint in this matter sets forth the facts related to the underlying lawsuit in paragraphs 6 through 30.