aiding and abetting instruction in Kansas

2021Thus, Carvin argues that this court "should apply a super-sufficiency-like requirement before upholding a conviction in which part of the conviction is supported by insufficient evidence." But as the State points out, our Supreme Court held in State v. Betancourt, 299 Kan. 131, 137-41 , 322 P.3d 353 (2014), that giving an aiding and abetting instruction does not create alternative means of committing a crime or implicate the super- sufficiency analysis used in alternative means cases.

2021Thus, Carvin argues that this court "should apply a super-sufficiency-like requirement before upholding a conviction in which part of the conviction is supported by insufficient evidence." But as the State points out, our Supreme Court held in State v. Betancourt, 299 Kan. 131, 137-41 , 322 P.3d 353 (2014), that giving an aiding and abetting instruction does not create alternative means of committing a crime or implicate the super- sufficiency analysis used in alternative means cases.

1995He concedes, however, that “in Kansas, a defendant charged with the substantive offense may still be convicted of aiding and abetting and that the trial court does not err in instructing on aiding and abetting when the State has presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find aiding and abetting,” citing State v. Smolin, 221 Kan. 149, 152 , 557 P.2d 1241 (1976).

1994It rejected the defendant’s arguments that it was unfair to give the aiding and abetting instruction. 221 Kan. at 152 .

2020Nevertheless, this court has repeatedly held the standard aiding and abetting instruction suffices because "'[j]uries are presumed to intuit from the word 'intentionally' in the patterned instruction that proof of mere association or presence would be insufficient to convict.'" Llamas, 298 Kan. at 260 (quoting Edwards, 291 Kan. at 552 ). 9 While the standard jury instruction generally suffices, Carter highlights decisions in which this court has recommended inclusion of the additional language on mere presence.

2014But this court ultimately held that refusal to supplement the aiding and abetting instruction was not reversible error. 291 Kan. at 552 .

2020In agreeing with the defendant, the Engelhardt court explained: "if a felony- murder theory had been advanced by the State and instructed upon, it is well established that PIK Crim. 3d 54.05 [the paragraph imposing liability for crimes intentionally aided] rather than PIK Crim. 3d 54.06 [the paragraph imposing liability for reasonably foreseeable crimes committed in carrying out the intended crime] would have been the appropriate aiding and abetting instruction." 280 Kan. at 133 .

2017See Overstreet, 288 Kan. at 11-15 ; Engelhardt, 280 Kan. at 132-34 . 13 We have articulated this distinction before.

2014Supplementation of the Aiding and Abetting Instruction Williams was prosecuted as an aider and abettor, and the jury received the following aiding and abetting instruction, which conforms with PIK Crim. 3d 54.05 (responsibility for crimes of another): “A person who, either before or during its commission, intentionally aids another to commit a crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission is criminally responsible for the crime committed regardless of the extent of the defendant’s participation, if any, in the actual commission of die crime.” Williams requested that the instruction

2014Supplementation of the Aiding and Abetting Instruction Williams was prosecuted as an aider and abettor, and the jury received the following aiding and abetting instruction, which conforms with PIK Crim. 3d 54.05 (responsibility for crimes of another): “A person who, either before or during its commission, intentionally aids another to commit a crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission is criminally responsible for the crime committed regardless of the extent of the defendant’s participation, if any, in the actual commission of die crime.” Williams requested that the instruction

2007State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 638-39 , 740 P.2d 559 (1987).

2007State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 638-39 , 740 P.2d 559 (1987).

2026See K.S.A. 21-5210; State v. Gonzalez, 311 Kan. 281 , 293, 460 P.3d 348 (2020).

2021The State argues that the district court properly included an aiding and abetting instruction, as both our existing Kansas caselaw and the facts of the case supported the instruction. "'When reviewing a jury instruction issue, an appellate court follows a well- known four-step analysis, whose progression and corresponding standards of review are: (1) the court considers the issue's reviewability from both jurisdiction and preservation standpoints, employing an unlimited standard of review; (2) the court determines whether the instruction was legally appropriate, using an unlimited review; (3)

2022State v. Holt, 285 Kan. 760 , Syl. ¶ 7, 175 P.3d 239 (2008).

2022State v. Holt, 285 Kan. 760 , Syl. ¶ 7, 175 P.3d 239 (2008).

2021The State argues that the district court properly included an aiding and abetting instruction, as both our existing Kansas caselaw and the facts of the case supported the instruction. "'When reviewing a jury instruction issue, an appellate court follows a well- known four-step analysis, whose progression and corresponding standards of review are: (1) the court considers the issue's reviewability from both jurisdiction and preservation standpoints, employing an unlimited standard of review; (2) the court determines whether the instruction was legally appropriate, using an unlimited review; (3)

2021The State argues that the district court properly included an aiding and abetting instruction, as both our existing Kansas caselaw and the facts of the case supported the instruction. "'When reviewing a jury instruction issue, an appellate court follows a well- known four-step analysis, whose progression and corresponding standards of review are: (1) the court considers the issue's reviewability from both jurisdiction and preservation standpoints, employing an unlimited standard of review; (2) the court determines whether the instruction was legally appropriate, using an unlimited review; (3)

2020For instance, in State v. Hilt, 299 Kan. 176, 185-86 , 322 P.3d 367 (2014), we stated the "better practice" is to include such language and "failure to do so may imperil convictions in future similar cases." Carter asks us to convert this "better practice" into a legal requirement in cases where the defendant is charged under an aiding and abetting theory and requests the instruction.

2017There, Hilt requested a supplement to the aiding and abetting instruction that informed jurors "'[m]ere association with the principals who actually commit the crime or mere presence in the vicinity of the crime is insufficient to establish guilt as an aider or abettor.'" Hilt, 299 Kan. at 183 .

2008The State counters that the trial court followed the specific language of PIK Crim. 3d 54.05 and that “[e]rror cannot be predicated on a district court’s refusal to give a specific instruction where the instructions given cover and include the substance of the instructions refused.” State v. Pink, 270 Kan. 728, 738 , 20 P.3d 31 (2001).

2008The State counters that the trial court followed the specific language of PIK Crim. 3d 54.05 and that “[e]rror cannot be predicated on a district court’s refusal to give a specific instruction where the instructions given cover and include the substance of the instructions refused.” State v. Pink, 270 Kan. 728, 738 , 20 P.3d 31 (2001).

2000Our review of the evidence reveals that the instruction was not error and that defendant could certainly have been convicted under the aiding and abetting standard, which is as follows: “It is die rulé in diis state diat mere association with the principals who actually commit die crime or mere presence in the vicinity of the crime are themselves insufficient to establish guilt as an aider and abettor; however, when a person knowingly associates himself with die unlawful venture and participates in a way which indicates he willfully is furthering the success of the venture, such evidence of gu

2000Our review of the evidence reveals that the instruction was not error and that defendant could certainly have been convicted under the aiding and abetting standard, which is as follows: “It is die rulé in diis state diat mere association with the principals who actually commit die crime or mere presence in the vicinity of the crime are themselves insufficient to establish guilt as an aider and abettor; however, when a person knowingly associates himself with die unlawful venture and participates in a way which indicates he willfully is furthering the success of the venture, such evidence of gu

2026"The fact that [a] defendant was charged as a principal does not make an aiding and abetting instruction improper; one who counsels, aids or abets in the commission of an offense may be charged, tried and convicted as a principal." State v. Singleton, 223 Kan. 559, 562 , 575 P.2d 540 (1978).

2026"The fact that [a] defendant was charged as a principal does not make an aiding and abetting instruction improper; one who counsels, aids or abets in the commission of an offense may be charged, tried and convicted as a principal." State v. Singleton, 223 Kan. 559, 562 , 575 P.2d 540 (1978).

2024However, this Court finds that while Conwell's performance was deficient, there was not a real possibility that the jury would have returned a different verdict due to the lack of any emphasis on the issue of foreseeability and the evidence of premeditation that was presented." Lowery argues that this case is like Calhoun v. State, 56 Kan.

2024State v. Crosby, 312 Kan. 630 , 639, 479 P.3d 167 (2021). 12 Mendez contends the aiding and abetting instruction—particularly the portion regarding foreseeability—improperly lowered the State's burden of proof on the specific intent crimes with which he was charged.

2022Dupree, 304 Kan. at 392-96 .

2022It was thus proper to limit the aiding-and-abetting instruction to all counts besides felony murder. 304 Kan. at 395-96 .

2021Finally, we reject Carvin's claim that the aiding and abetting instruction given by the district court violated his constitutional rights because it "relieved the State of its burden of proof." Carvin's reliance on Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S. Ct. 2450 , 61 L.

2021Finally, we reject Carvin's claim that the aiding and abetting instruction given by the district court violated his constitutional rights because it "relieved the State of its burden of proof." Carvin's reliance on Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S. Ct. 2450 , 61 L.

2021The authority on which Hillard relies on for this point, State v. Richardson, 290 Kan. 176, 182-83 , 224 21 P.3d 553 (2010), is inapposite.

2016See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3414(3); Waggoner, 297 Kan. at 97 .