aiding and abetting instruction in California

2025(See People v. McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1118 [a defendant who is guilty of attempted murder under a direct aiding and abetting theory must have the specific intent to kill].) Rather, the attempted murder instruction required that “the person committing the act harbored express malice.” And because the attempted murder instruction did not specifically refer to the aiding and abetting instruction, the jury was not informed whether or how to apply either the instruction on aiding and abetting or the instruction regarding aiding and abetting under the natural and probable consequences doctri

2025(People v. Vindiola (Apr. 25, 2011, B220180) [nonpub. opn.].) Among other things, defendant had challenged the aiding and abetting instruction and its equally guilty language as inconsistent with authority (see, e.g., People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111 ) holding an aider and abettor must share the murderous intent of the perpetrator.

2021In 1984 the California Supreme Court held this language to be inadequate because it did not require the aider and abettor to have the “intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense.” (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561 .) The current version of the aiding and abetting instruction requires the People to prove “the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime.” (CALCRIM No. 401.) Moreover, Hayes’s jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 3.00, defining “principals,” which included natural and probable consequences lan

2021First, contrary to Blackwood’s argument, the roles of aiders/abettors and direct perpetrators are not mutually exclusive. “[A]ider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea—knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.” (Perez, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1225 .) The l

2024Thus, even if the trial court here were constrained by its prior rulings in its consideration of the grounds raised on demurrers to the third amended complaint, on review of the judgment, we are not so constrained and are free to render an opinion based on the correct rule of law.”].) In sustaining Walter III’s demurrer to this claim in the 5AC, the trial court found Joseph failed to sufficiently allege Walter III’s conduct was a substantial factor in Joseph’s harm (an issue the trial court’s order on the 3AC did not expressly consider). “ ‘[C]ausation is an essential element of an aiding and

2024(Smith, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 146; Alch, at p. 389.) “ ‘Additionally, causation is an essential element of an aiding and abetting claim, i.e., plaintiff must show that the aider and abettor provided assistance that was a substantial factor in causing the harm suffered.’ ” (American Master Lease LLC v. Idanta Partners, Ltd. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1451, 1476 (American); Navarrete v. Meyer 10 (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1286 (Navarrete) [The encouragement or assistance must be “ ‘ “ ‘a substantial factor in causing the resulting tort . . . .’ ” ’ ”].)6 2.

2022Second, under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor is guilty not only of the intended crime, but also “for any other offense that was a ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the crime aided and abetted.” ’ (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117 , quoting People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 260 (Prettyman).) This has been the law in California for over a century, since our state high court embraced the natural and probable consequences doctrine of aiding and abetting in People v. Kauffman (1907) 152 Cal. 331, 334 (Kauffman).

2022Second, under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor is guilty not only of the intended crime, but also “for any other offense that was a ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the crime aided and abetted.” ’ (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117 , quoting People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 260 (Prettyman).) This has been the law in California for over a century, since our state high court embraced the natural and probable consequences doctrine of aiding and abetting in People v. Kauffman (1907) 152 Cal. 331, 334 (Kauffman).

2022Second, under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor is guilty not only of the intended crime, but also “for any other offense that was a ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the crime aided and abetted.” ’ (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117 , quoting People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 260 (Prettyman).) This has been the law in California for over a century, since our state high court embraced the natural and probable consequences doctrine of aiding and abetting in People v. Kauffman (1907) 152 Cal. 331, 334 (Kauffman).

2022Second, under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor is guilty not only of the intended crime, but also “for any other offense that was a ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the crime aided and abetted.” ’ (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117 , quoting People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 260 (Prettyman).) This has been the law in California for over a century, since our state high court embraced the natural and probable consequences doctrine of aiding and abetting in People v. Kauffman (1907) 152 Cal. 331, 334 (Kauffman).

2017The fraud cause of action in the SAC similarly alleges Thomas violated the stock option agreements by concealing "the existence of his secret agreement with the Fund that all of his ... stock options and any proceeds thereof belonged to the Fund and its partners, not to Mr. Thomas individually." According to the SAC's aiding and abetting claim, Dennis "knew that Mr. Thomas was fraudulently concealing from *185 Applied ... the existence of his secret agreement to share the stock options" and "gave Mr. Thomas substantial assistance and encouragement" in concealing that "secret agreement." The br

2017The fraud cause of action in the SAC similarly alleges Thomas violated the stock option agreements by concealing "the existence of his secret agreement with the Fund that all of his ... stock options and any proceeds thereof belonged to the Fund and its partners, not to Mr. Thomas individually." According to the SAC's aiding and abetting claim, Dennis "knew that Mr. Thomas was fraudulently concealing from *185 Applied ... the existence of his secret agreement to share the stock options" and "gave Mr. Thomas substantial assistance and encouragement" in concealing that "secret agreement." The br

2017The fraud cause of action in the SAC similarly alleges Thomas violated the stock option agreements by concealing "the existence of his secret agreement with the Fund that all of his ... stock options and any proceeds thereof belonged to the Fund and its partners, not to Mr. Thomas individually." According to the SAC's aiding and abetting claim, Dennis "knew that Mr. Thomas was fraudulently concealing from *185 Applied ... the existence of his secret agreement to share the stock options" and "gave Mr. Thomas substantial assistance and encouragement" in concealing that "secret agreement." The br

2017The fraud cause of action in the SAC similarly alleges Thomas violated the stock option agreements by concealing "the existence of his secret agreement with the Fund that all of his ... stock options and any proceeds thereof belonged to the Fund and its partners, not to Mr. Thomas individually." According to the SAC's aiding and abetting claim, Dennis "knew that Mr. Thomas was fraudulently concealing from *185 Applied ... the existence of his secret agreement to share the stock options" and "gave Mr. Thomas substantial assistance and encouragement" in concealing that "secret agreement." The br

2011(See People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) The court also gave an aiding and abetting instruction (CALJIC 3.01) under which the jury could have found Valenzuela guilty of murder as someone who, with knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose, “[b]y act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime” (italics added).

1987One measure of the harmfulness of the ambiguity in CALJIC No. 3.01 is the standard suggested by cases following Beeman, supra. Beeman deferred resolution whether a constitutional test of harmless error applies, finding that the error in the aiding and abetting instruction was reversible in any event under the standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]. ( Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 561-563.) Later, People v. Acero (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 217, 226-227 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 565 ] and People v. Rogers, supra, applied the harmless error standard of People v. Garcia (1984) 3

2016(Schulz v. Neovi Data Corp. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 86, 97 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 810 ] [aiding and abetting claim fails for want of specific factual allegations showing substantial assistance or encouragement].) In sum, appellant had failed to demonstrate a tenable aiding and abetting claim.

2014(Schulz v. Neovi Data Corp., supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 97 .) The court held that these allegations did not sufficiently allege the defendants’ “knowledge of the alleged illegal lottery or facts showing ‘substantial assistance or encouragement.’” (Ibid.) In contrast, Wizard’s allegations sufficiently alleged the knowledge element of an aiding and abetting claim.

2021First, contrary to Blackwood’s argument, the roles of aiders/abettors and direct perpetrators are not mutually exclusive. “[A]ider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea—knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.” (Perez, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1225 .) The l

2017If he [or she] assists another, he [or she] is guilty as an aider and abettor.” (People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 423 , 113 P.3d 100 ].) “[A]ider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea— knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus— conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.”

2017The fraud cause of action in the SAC similarly alleges Thomas violated the stock option agreements by concealing "the existence of his secret agreement with the Fund that all of his ... stock options and any proceeds thereof belonged to the Fund and its partners, not to Mr. Thomas individually." According to the SAC's aiding and abetting claim, Dennis "knew that Mr. Thomas was fraudulently concealing from *185 Applied ... the existence of his secret agreement to share the stock options" and "gave Mr. Thomas substantial assistance and encouragement" in concealing that "secret agreement." The br

2017The fraud cause of action in the SAC similarly alleges Thomas violated the stock option agreements by concealing "the existence of his secret agreement with the Fund that all of his ... stock options and any proceeds thereof belonged to the Fund and its partners, not to Mr. Thomas individually." According to the SAC's aiding and abetting claim, Dennis "knew that Mr. Thomas was fraudulently concealing from *185 Applied ... the existence of his secret agreement to share the stock options" and "gave Mr. Thomas substantial assistance and encouragement" in concealing that "secret agreement." The br

2026(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 848 [“Senate Bill 1437 does not eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability for murder because a direct aider and abettor to murder must possess malice aforethought”].) The aiding and abetting instruction given at defendant’s trial was consistent with longstanding law.

2025(Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 848 [“Senate Bill 1437 does not eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability for murder because a direct aider and abettor to murder must possess malice aforethought”], citing People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118 ; People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943 , 953; People v. Carr (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 136 , 139 [“Implied malice is not imputed malice”].) Finally, although the superior court stated its intention to soon “file a written decision with the parties,” it never did so.

2025(See People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158 , 1161–1162 [concluding sua sponte duty existed where prosecution sought conviction on an aiding and abetting theory]; People v. Boyd (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557 , italics added [noting that CALJIC No. 3.01 (also an aiding and abetting instruction) “ ‘should be given sua sponte in every case in which any defendant is prosecuted as an aider and abettor’ ”]; accord, People v. Delgado (2013) 56 Cal.4th 480, 488 .) Nor did Trivino rely on aider and abettor liability or his “ ‘mere presence’ ” at the scene of the shooting as a defense.

2014The doctrine of aiding and abetting “ ‘ “snares all who intentionally contribute to the accomplishment of a crime in the net of criminal liability defined by the crime, even though the actor does not personally engage in all of the elements of the crime.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Aiding and abetting does not require participation in an agreement to commit an offense, but merely assistance in committing the offense. [Citation.]” (People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 433 .) However, “if a person in fact aids, promotes, encourages or instigates commission of a crime, the requisite intent to r

2026If narrowly circumscribed in this fashion, such an aiding and abetting claim against a bank is a reasonable exception to the case law limiting bank duties to nondepositors.” (Casey v. U.S. National Bank Association, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1152 , italics added.) The court ultimately held the pleadings were insufficient: “The second amended complaint contains no allegation the banks knew the [wrongdoers] were misappropriating funds from [the corporation], or that the money deposited by the [wrongdoers] into [fraudulent] accounts belonged to [the corporation].

2026The question is straightforward. “[S]trict[ly] appl[ying] . . . the pleading requirement for the knowledge element of the aiding and abetting claim” as we must (Casey v. U.S. National Bank Association, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1152 ), we ask whether Quiroga’s allegations establish Fidelity “ ‘actually knew [these] transactions were assisting [the Andrades] in committing [elder abuse].’ ” (Das v. Bank of America, N.A., supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 745 .) Stated another way, the allegations must show Fidelity “knew about [the Andrades’] schemes that victimized [Crist]” and “had actual knowle

2022The harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman) applies to errors based upon an invalid theory and jury instructions that omit or misstate an element of the offense.

2021Furthermore, the Attorney General argues we should apply the state standard of harmless error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , instead of the federal standard under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ], as argued by Hamilton.

2025The elements of this sort of an aiding and abetting claim are: “(1) a third party’s breach of fiduciary duties owed to plaintiff; (2) defendant’s actual knowledge of that breach of fiduciary duties; (3) substantial assistance or encouragement by defendant to the third party’s breach; and (4) defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm to plaintiff. [Citations.]” (Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 328, 343 ; accord, George v. eBay, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 620 , 641.) The second of these elements, actual knowledge, is “crucial” because even ordinary busin

2016(Id. at p. 1145; see Casey, supra, at pp. 1146-1147 ; Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 328, 343-344 [ 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 813 ] (Nasrawi).) *189 As alleged in the 5AC, the aiding and abetting claim is the final cause of action, and incorporates all the previous factual allegations.

2025(See People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158 , 1161–1162 [concluding sua sponte duty existed where prosecution sought conviction on an aiding and abetting theory]; People v. Boyd (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557 , italics added [noting that CALJIC No. 3.01 (also an aiding and abetting instruction) “ ‘should be given sua sponte in every case in which any defendant is prosecuted as an aider and abettor’ ”]; accord, People v. Delgado (2013) 56 Cal.4th 480, 488 .) Nor did Trivino rely on aider and abettor liability or his “ ‘mere presence’ ” at the scene of the shooting as a defense.

2016People v. Delgado, supra, 56 Cal.4th 480 , is instructive on the problem of finding prejudice from a failure to give aiding and abetting instructions when a defendant has been found guilty under instructions based on direct perpetrator liability: “‘[I]t is hard to imagine how an aiding and abetting instruction would have helped [the defendant], as it would have merely offered an alternative, additional means of establishing [his part in the taking of the property] without having to prove [that the defendant personally] took part in’” the taking.

2024During summation, the prosecutor advised the jury to place the aiding and abetting instruction as well as the natural and probable consequences instruction “in the middle of the table” and “right in front.” The prosecutor continued: “It’s a natural and probable consequence if you give somebody a gun, and you go tell them to kidnap somebody and it’s loaded that that person [is] going to start shooting.” Although the jury convicted Molina of conspiracy to commit murder, the necessary finding of intent to kill “does not, itself, conclusively establish that [Molina] is ineligible for [section 1172

2024(People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433 , 462–463.) A jury finding of intent to kill only addresses one element of murder and does not by itself establish any valid 3 Taylor also relies on People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257 , but that case it distinguishable because it involved first degree lying-in-wait murder, which does not require intent to kill.