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9 Ohio opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Perrymangreen2 sentences2008See State v. Perryman (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 14 , 27-28 (finding that even though the indictment and bill of particulars failed to reference a complicity charge, an aiding and abetting instruction was proper because the defendant "presented evidence from which reasonable men could find him guilty as an aider and abettor."), vacated on other grounds Perryman v. Ohio (1978), 438 U.S. 911 . 2002State v. Perryman (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 14 , 28 , vacated in part on other grounds sub nom, Perryman v. Ohio (1978), 438 U.S. 911 , 98 S.Ct. 3136 . {¶ 46} In reaching its decision, the Perryman court impliedly found that providing the jury with an aiding and abetting instruction with respect to a charge upon which the defendant had been indicted and tried as a principal created no problems with regard to providing constitutionally sufficient notice to the defendant that he could be convicted of the charge as an aider and abettor. {¶ 47} Viewing the evidence offered in this case in a light most | 2 | 3 |
Jordan v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2008See State v. Perryman (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 14 , 27-28 (finding that even though the indictment and bill of particulars failed to reference a complicity charge, an aiding and abetting instruction was proper because the defendant "presented evidence from which reasonable men could find him guilty as an aider and abettor."), vacated on other grounds Perryman v. Ohio (1978), 438 U.S. 911 . 2002State v. Perryman (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 14 , 28 , vacated in part on other grounds sub nom, Perryman v. Ohio (1978), 438 U.S. 911 , 98 S.Ct. 3136 . {¶ 46} In reaching its decision, the Perryman court impliedly found that providing the jury with an aiding and abetting instruction with respect to a charge upon which the defendant had been indicted and tried as a principal created no problems with regard to providing constitutionally sufficient notice to the defendant that he could be convicted of the charge as an aider and abettor. {¶ 47} Viewing the evidence offered in this case in a light most | 1 | 2 |
State v. Walkergreen1 sentence2026Further, this court has upheld an aiding and abetting instruction in an instance where the defendant, as the driver of a vehicle, “did not stop or abandon the area so that [the principal actor] would not be able to shoot . . . .” State v. Walker, 2018-Ohio-5172, ¶ 49 (8th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
State of Missouri v. Pierre M. Wardgreen1 sentence2025LEXIS 1833, *3 (Oct. 11 2016) (noting that “Rosemond is limited to prosecutions for particular statutory federal offenses, is irrelevant to this case, and does not change the aiding-and-abetting standard in Michigan”); State v. Ward, 473 S.W.3d 686, 693 (Mo.App. 2015) (stating that “[n]othing in Rosemond suggests that its holding rests on any constitutional requirement or has any application to state criminal laws on accomplice liability; rather, the Court’s analysis was merely a question of federal interpretation of the federal aiding and abetting statute”). | 1 | 1 |
Village of Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co.green1 sentence2019Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Aubrey Baker Davis, Jr., A/K/A Junior Baker Davis, A/K/A Baker Davis, and Margaret Davisgreen1 sentence1984Cf. United States v. Davis, 666 F.2d 195, 200 (5th Cir.1982) (Unit B) (venue in Georgia improper because no actual possession of drugs in Georgia and no constructive possession by defendant in Georgia of drugs in Florida) 9 The aiding and abetting requirement of shared intent between the aider and abettor and the principal, sometimes referred to as the "community of unlawful intent," see, e.g., United States v. Austin, 585 F.2d 1271, 1277 (5th Cir.1978), is similar to the requirement in conspiracy cases that there be an "agreement." However, shared intent need not rise to the level of agreemen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lance C. Austingreen1 sentence1984Cf. United States v. Davis, 666 F.2d 195, 200 (5th Cir.1982) (Unit B) (venue in Georgia improper because no actual possession of drugs in Georgia and no constructive possession by defendant in Georgia of drugs in Florida) 9 The aiding and abetting requirement of shared intent between the aider and abettor and the principal, sometimes referred to as the "community of unlawful intent," see, e.g., United States v. Austin, 585 F.2d 1271, 1277 (5th Cir.1978), is similar to the requirement in conspiracy cases that there be an "agreement." However, shared intent need not rise to the level of agreemen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. John P. Cowartgreen1 sentence1984United States v. Cowart, 595 F.2d 1023, 1031 (5th Cir.1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Herring
green
2 sentences2016Aiding and Abetting Jury Instruction {¶35} In his fourth assignment of error, Reed contends that the trial court erred by giving an aiding and abetting instruction to the jury because he was only charged as a principal offender in the bill of particulars. {¶36} The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this argument in State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 251 , 762 N.E.2d 940 (2001), where it stated: R.C. 2923.03(F) states: “A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense.” Thus, a defendant charged with an offense may be convicted of that offense upon 2016Aiding and Abetting Jury Instruction {¶35} In his fourth assignment of error, Reed contends that the trial court erred by giving an aiding and abetting instruction to the jury because he was only charged as a principal offender in the bill of particulars. {¶36} The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this argument in State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 251 , 762 N.E.2d 940 (2001), where it stated: R.C. 2923.03(F) states: “A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense.” Thus, a defendant charged with an offense may be convicted of that offense upon | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Sims
green
2 sentences2013State v. Nievas, 121 Ohio App.3d 451, 456 , 700 N.E.2d 339 (8th Dist.1997); State v. Sims, 10 Ohio App.3d 56, 58 , 460 N.E.2d 672 (8th Dist.1983). {¶65} Robinson argues that the aiding and abetting instruction was not proper because the only evidence shows that Robinson provided assistance after Logan fired his gun, which he contends only evidences proof of an “accessory after the fact.” We disagree. {¶66} As recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court in Johnson, the defendant’s “‘participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship and conduct before and after the offense i 2013State v. Nievas, 121 Ohio App.3d 451, 456 , 700 N.E.2d 339 (8th Dist.1997); State v. Sims, 10 Ohio App.3d 56, 58 , 460 N.E.2d 672 (8th Dist.1983). {¶65} Robinson argues that the aiding and abetting instruction was not proper because the only evidence shows that Robinson provided assistance after Logan fired his gun, which he contends only evidences proof of an “accessory after the fact.” We disagree. {¶66} As recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court in Johnson, the defendant’s “‘participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship and conduct before and after the offense i | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Nievas
green
2 sentences2013State v. Nievas, 121 Ohio App.3d 451, 456 , 700 N.E.2d 339 (8th Dist.1997); State v. Sims, 10 Ohio App.3d 56, 58 , 460 N.E.2d 672 (8th Dist.1983). {¶65} Robinson argues that the aiding and abetting instruction was not proper because the only evidence shows that Robinson provided assistance after Logan fired his gun, which he contends only evidences proof of an “accessory after the fact.” We disagree. {¶66} As recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court in Johnson, the defendant’s “‘participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship and conduct before and after the offense i 2013State v. Nievas, 121 Ohio App.3d 451, 456 , 700 N.E.2d 339 (8th Dist.1997); State v. Sims, 10 Ohio App.3d 56, 58 , 460 N.E.2d 672 (8th Dist.1983). {¶65} Robinson argues that the aiding and abetting instruction was not proper because the only evidence shows that Robinson provided assistance after Logan fired his gun, which he contends only evidences proof of an “accessory after the fact.” We disagree. {¶66} As recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court in Johnson, the defendant’s “‘participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship and conduct before and after the offense i | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Pruett
green
2 sentences2013State v. Nievas, 121 Ohio App.3d 451, 456 , 700 N.E.2d 339 (8th Dist.1997); State v. Sims, 10 Ohio App.3d 56, 58 , 460 N.E.2d 672 (8th Dist.1983). {¶65} Robinson argues that the aiding and abetting instruction was not proper because the only evidence shows that Robinson provided assistance after Logan fired his gun, which he contends only evidences proof of an “accessory after the fact.” We disagree. {¶66} As recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court in Johnson, the defendant’s “‘participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship and conduct before and after the offense i 2013State v. Nievas, 121 Ohio App.3d 451, 456 , 700 N.E.2d 339 (8th Dist.1997); State v. Sims, 10 Ohio App.3d 56, 58 , 460 N.E.2d 672 (8th Dist.1983). {¶65} Robinson argues that the aiding and abetting instruction was not proper because the only evidence shows that Robinson provided assistance after Logan fired his gun, which he contends only evidences proof of an “accessory after the fact.” We disagree. {¶66} As recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court in Johnson, the defendant’s “‘participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship and conduct before and after the offense i | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Koontz
neutral
2 sentences2008In State v. Koontz (1979), 65 Ohio App.2d 264 , 417 N.E.2d 1272 , the court held that by amending an indictment to include aiding and abetting the same criminal conduct originally charged, the trial court did not change the name or identity of the crime charged. *Page 21 {¶ 91} As noted by appellee, because the original indictment stated the principal offense of aggravated arson, "there was no evidence that [appellant] was surprised or prejudiced by amendment to include the language to aid or abet." Moreover, we note that when the evidence adduced at trial could reasonably be found to have pro 2008In State v. Koontz (1979), 65 Ohio App.2d 264 , 417 N.E.2d 1272 , the court held that by amending an indictment to include aiding and abetting the same criminal conduct originally charged, the trial court did not change the name or identity of the crime charged. *Page 21 {¶ 91} As noted by appellee, because the original indictment stated the principal offense of aggravated arson, "there was no evidence that [appellant] was surprised or prejudiced by amendment to include the language to aid or abet." Moreover, we note that when the evidence adduced at trial could reasonably be found to have pro | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.