almost identical claim in Maryland

1992Our answer once again lies in Andresen v. State, 24 Md.App. 128, 180 , 331 A.2d 78 [(1975)], cert. denied, 274 Md. 725 , aff'd, 427 U.S. 463 , 96 S.Ct. 2737 , 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976), which dealt with a remarkably similar set of facts and an almost identical claim: ‘... even if other items had been unconstitutionally seized, that frailty would not mandate the suppression of the items which were constitutionally seized.

1992Our answer once again lies in Andresen v. State, 24 Md.App. 128, 180 , 331 A.2d 78 [(1975)], cert. denied, 274 Md. 725 , aff'd, 427 U.S. 463 , 96 S.Ct. 2737 , 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976), which dealt with a remarkably similar set of facts and an almost identical claim: ‘... even if other items had been unconstitutionally seized, that frailty would not mandate the suppression of the items which were constitutionally seized.

1992If the *345 apples remaining in the barrel when it ultimately comes to rest upon the trial table are constitutionally healthy, it matters not how many constitutionally rotten ones were discarded along the way.’ See also Spease and Ross v. State, 21 Md.App. 269, 282-283 , 319 A.2d 560 , and cases cited therein.” See also Brooks v. United States, 416 F.2d 1044, 1049-1050 (5th Cir.1969); United States v. Dzialak, 441 F.2d 212, 216-217 (2d Cir.1971).

1992If the *345 apples remaining in the barrel when it ultimately comes to rest upon the trial table are constitutionally healthy, it matters not how many constitutionally rotten ones were discarded along the way.’ See also Spease and Ross v. State, 21 Md.App. 269, 282-283 , 319 A.2d 560 , and cases cited therein.” See also Brooks v. United States, 416 F.2d 1044, 1049-1050 (5th Cir.1969); United States v. Dzialak, 441 F.2d 212, 216-217 (2d Cir.1971).

1992Our answer once again lies in Andresen v. State, 24 Md.App. 128, 180 , 331 A.2d 78 [(1975)], cert. denied, 274 Md. 725 , aff'd, 427 U.S. 463 , 96 S.Ct. 2737 , 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976), which dealt with a remarkably similar set of facts and an almost identical claim: ‘... even if other items had been unconstitutionally seized, that frailty would not mandate the suppression of the items which were constitutionally seized.

1992Our answer once again lies in Andresen v. State, 24 Md.App. 128, 180 , 331 A.2d 78 [(1975)], cert. denied, 274 Md. 725 , aff'd, 427 U.S. 463 , 96 S.Ct. 2737 , 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976), which dealt with a remarkably similar set of facts and an almost identical claim: ‘... even if other items had been unconstitutionally seized, that frailty would not mandate the suppression of the items which were constitutionally seized.

1994The trial court cites Reddick v. State, 213 Md. 18, 30 , 130 A.2d 762 , cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832 , 78 S.Ct. 50 , 2 L.Ed.2d 44 (1957), for the “well established *187 principle of law that a person who has full knowledge of pending litigation and that it affects, and will determine, his rights, and, who is entitled to appear, but who makes no effort to intervene as a party, and permits a conclusion thereof without objection, such person is concluded by the proceedings as effectually as if he were named on the record.” See also Psalmist Baptist Church v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 175 Md. 7, 8-9 ,

1994The trial court cites Reddick v. State, 213 Md. 18, 30 , 130 A.2d 762 , cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832 , 78 S.Ct. 50 , 2 L.Ed.2d 44 (1957), for the “well established *187 principle of law that a person who has full knowledge of pending litigation and that it affects, and will determine, his rights, and, who is entitled to appear, but who makes no effort to intervene as a party, and permits a conclusion thereof without objection, such person is concluded by the proceedings as effectually as if he were named on the record.” See also Psalmist Baptist Church v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 175 Md. 7, 8-9 ,

1994The trial court cites Reddick v. State, 213 Md. 18, 30 , 130 A.2d 762 , cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832 , 78 S.Ct. 50 , 2 L.Ed.2d 44 (1957), for the “well established *187 principle of law that a person who has full knowledge of pending litigation and that it affects, and will determine, his rights, and, who is entitled to appear, but who makes no effort to intervene as a party, and permits a conclusion thereof without objection, such person is concluded by the proceedings as effectually as if he were named on the record.” See also Psalmist Baptist Church v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 175 Md. 7, 8-9 ,

1994The trial court cites Reddick v. State, 213 Md. 18, 30 , 130 A.2d 762 , cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832 , 78 S.Ct. 50 , 2 L.Ed.2d 44 (1957), for the “well established *187 principle of law that a person who has full knowledge of pending litigation and that it affects, and will determine, his rights, and, who is entitled to appear, but who makes no effort to intervene as a party, and permits a conclusion thereof without objection, such person is concluded by the proceedings as effectually as if he were named on the record.” See also Psalmist Baptist Church v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 175 Md. 7, 8-9 ,

1994The trial court cites Reddick v. State, 213 Md. 18, 30 , 130 A.2d 762 , cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832 , 78 S.Ct. 50 , 2 L.Ed.2d 44 (1957), for the “well established *187 principle of law that a person who has full knowledge of pending litigation and that it affects, and will determine, his rights, and, who is entitled to appear, but who makes no effort to intervene as a party, and permits a conclusion thereof without objection, such person is concluded by the proceedings as effectually as if he were named on the record.” See also Psalmist Baptist Church v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 175 Md. 7, 8-9 ,

1994The trial court cites Reddick v. State, 213 Md. 18, 30 , 130 A.2d 762 , cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832 , 78 S.Ct. 50 , 2 L.Ed.2d 44 (1957), for the “well established *187 principle of law that a person who has full knowledge of pending litigation and that it affects, and will determine, his rights, and, who is entitled to appear, but who makes no effort to intervene as a party, and permits a conclusion thereof without objection, such person is concluded by the proceedings as effectually as if he were named on the record.” See also Psalmist Baptist Church v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 175 Md. 7, 8-9 ,

1994The trial court cites Reddick v. State, 213 Md. 18, 30 , 130 A.2d 762 , cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832 , 78 S.Ct. 50 , 2 L.Ed.2d 44 (1957), for the “well established *187 principle of law that a person who has full knowledge of pending litigation and that it affects, and will determine, his rights, and, who is entitled to appear, but who makes no effort to intervene as a party, and permits a conclusion thereof without objection, such person is concluded by the proceedings as effectually as if he were named on the record.” See also Psalmist Baptist Church v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 175 Md. 7, 8-9 ,

1994The trial court cites Reddick v. State, 213 Md. 18, 30 , 130 A.2d 762 , cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832 , 78 S.Ct. 50 , 2 L.Ed.2d 44 (1957), for the “well established *187 principle of law that a person who has full knowledge of pending litigation and that it affects, and will determine, his rights, and, who is entitled to appear, but who makes no effort to intervene as a party, and permits a conclusion thereof without objection, such person is concluded by the proceedings as effectually as if he were named on the record.” See also Psalmist Baptist Church v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 175 Md. 7, 8-9 ,

1994The trial court cites Reddick v. State, 213 Md. 18, 30 , 130 A.2d 762 , cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832 , 78 S.Ct. 50 , 2 L.Ed.2d 44 (1957), for the “well established *187 principle of law that a person who has full knowledge of pending litigation and that it affects, and will determine, his rights, and, who is entitled to appear, but who makes no effort to intervene as a party, and permits a conclusion thereof without objection, such person is concluded by the proceedings as effectually as if he were named on the record.” See also Psalmist Baptist Church v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 175 Md. 7, 8-9 ,

1976An almost identical clause was at issue in Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21 Md.

1976App. 307 , 320 A. 2d 558 (1974), rev’d on other grounds, 274 Md. 307 , 334 A. 2d 526 (1975), and was deemed to be a broad arbitration provision requiring that “... all issues other than those expressly and specifically excluded must be submitted to arbitration.” 21 Md.

1976App. 307 , 320 A. 2d 558 (1974), rev’d on other grounds, 274 Md. 307 , 334 A. 2d 526 (1975), and was deemed to be a broad arbitration provision requiring that “... all issues other than those expressly and specifically excluded must be submitted to arbitration.” 21 Md.

1976App. 307 , 320 A. 2d 558 (1974), rev’d on other grounds, 274 Md. 307 , 334 A. 2d 526 (1975), and was deemed to be a broad arbitration provision requiring that “... all issues other than those expressly and specifically excluded must be submitted to arbitration.” 21 Md.

1967The same conclusion was reached in Austin v. Seattle, 30 P. 2d 646 (Wash. 1934), where an almost identical clause as that included in § 161HH was held not to have hampered the imposition of a local tax in the same area as was taxed by the State.

1939In Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151, 160 , an almost identical clause of the Constitution of 1851, article 3, section 17, was involved, and it was then said: “A practice had crept into our system of legislation, of engrafting, upon subjects of great public benefit and importance, for local or selfish purposes, foreign and often pernicious matters, and rather than endanger the main subject, or for the purpose of securing new strength for it, members were often induced to sanction and actually vote for such provisions, which if they were offered as independent subjects, would never have received their