benefit of Miranda warning in New York

2019Miranda warnings must be given when the elements of police " custody'" and " interrogation'" are present ( People v Kittell , 135 AD2d 1021, 1022 , quoting People v Huffman , 41 NY2d 29 , 33).

2015“Miranda warnings need not be given until both the elements of police ‘custody’ and ‘interrogation’ are present” (People v Kittell, 135 AD2d 1021, 1022 [1987]; see People v Huffman, 41 NY2d 29 , 33 [1976]; People v Valentin, 118 AD3d 823 [2014]).

2011Where, as here, a defendant in custody has made inculpatory statements without the benefit of Miranda warnings, statements made after the administration of Miranda warnings are admissible only if there is a definite, pronounced break in questioning sufficient to return the defendant to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning (see People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 130-131 [2005]; People v Chapple, 38 NY2d 112, 115 [1975]).

2006Where, as here, a defendant in custody has made inculpatory statements without the benefit of Miranda warnings, statements made after the administration of Miranda warnings are admissible only if there is a definite, pronounced break in questioning sufficient to return the defendant to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning (see People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122 [2005]; People v Bethea, 67 NY2d 364 [1986]; People v Chapple, 38 NY2d 112 [1975]).

2011Where, as here, a defendant in custody has made inculpatory statements without the benefit of Miranda warnings, statements made after the administration of Miranda warnings are admissible only if there is a definite, pronounced break in questioning sufficient to return the defendant to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning (see People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 130-131 [2005]; People v Chapple, 38 NY2d 112, 115 [1975]).

2007The hearing court properly determined that the defendant’s statements which were admitted into evidence at the trial were made after the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), after a definite and pronounced break in the interrogation sufficient to remove any taint from the initial statements made by the defendant to the police without the benefit of Miranda warnings (see People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122 [2005]; People v Jenkins, 44 AD3d 565 [2007]).

2015Relying on Rhode Island v Innis ( 446 US 291 [1980]) and People v Ferro ( 63 NY2d 316, 321-323 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]), he specifically contends that the police officers engaged in the functional equivalent of custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings when they placed him in an area near the cell phone and questioned him concerning pedigree information.

2015Relying on Rhode Island v Innis ( 446 US 291 [1980]) and People v Ferro ( 63 NY2d 316, 321-323 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]), he specifically contends that the police officers engaged in the functional equivalent of custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings when they placed him in an area near the cell phone and questioned him concerning pedigree information.

2019Although defendant was incarcerated on an unrelated offense, he was not subjected to custodial interrogation inasmuch as "[t]here was no added constraint' that would have led defendant to believe that some other restriction had been placed on him over and above that of ordinary confinement in a correctional facility' " ( People v Boyd , 159 AD3d 1358 , 1362 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1145 [2018]; see People v Ayala , 27 AD3d 1087, 1088 [4th Dept 2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 892 [2006]; see generally People v Alls , 83 NY2d 94, 100 [1993], cert denied 511 US 1090 [1994]).

2008On appeal, defendant argues that his statements should have been suppressed because they were the product of a custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings. 1 In People v Alls ( 83 NY2d 94, 100 [1993], cert denied 511 US 1090 [1994]), a divided Court of Appeals declined to adopt a per se rule that any questioning of an inmate in a correctional facility is a custodial interrogation which must be preceded by Miranda warnings; instead, the Court adopted an “added constraint” test in which all of the “circumstances of the detention and interrogation” are evaluated to determine i

2014Nevertheless, the admission of that statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the evidence of the defendant’s guilt, without reference to his pretrial statement, was overwhelming, and there was no reasonable possibility that the error in admitting the statement might have contributed to the defendant’s conviction (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]; People v Rivera, 91 AD3d at 973 ; People v Tavares-Nunez, 87 AD3d 1171, 1175 [2011]; People v Johnson, 277 AD2d 702, 706 [2000]).

2012Nevertheless, the admission of that statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in light of the defendant’s own admissions during his testimony at trial (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]; People v Graham, 48 AD3d 265, 266 [2008]; People v Reid, 34 AD3d 1273, 1273 [2006]).

2023The defendant contends that the Supreme Court should have suppressed his statements to law enforcement officials as the product of custodial interrogation conducted without the benefit of Miranda warnings ( see Miranda v Arizona , 384 US 436 ).

2019The defendant's contention that one of his statements to police should have been suppressed as the product of custodial interrogation conducted without the benefit of Miranda warnings ( see Miranda v Arizona , 384 US 436 ) is academic, as that statement was suppressed after a pretrial hearing and was not used at trial ( see People v Pierre , 159 AD3d 723 , 724).

2006Where, as here, a defendant in custody has made inculpatory statements without the benefit of Miranda warnings, statements made after the administration of Miranda warnings are admissible only if there is a definite, pronounced break in questioning sufficient to return the defendant to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning (see People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122 [2005]; People v Bethea, 67 NY2d 364 [1986]; People v Chapple, 38 NY2d 112 [1975]).

1990Defendant argues that his initial statement at the precinct should have been suppressed, since it was the result of custodial interrogation, without the benefit of Miranda warnings, and that the written confession, soon thereafter, made after issuance of the warnings, should be suppressed as a product of the "continuous chain of events” (People v Chapple, 38 NY2d 112, 114 ; People v Bethea, 67 NY2d 364 ).

2023Consequently, since the initial statements were made prior to the administration of Miranda [*3]warnings, such statements should have been suppressed ( see People v Rivera , 91 AD3d 972, 973 ).

2014The defendant correctly contends that his statement made to a detective without the benefit of Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), and after he had been arrested and subjected to express questioning, should have been suppressed (see People v Rivera, 91 AD3d 972, 972 [2012]; People v Robinson, 38 AD3d 572, 573 [2007]; People v Guerrier, 291 AD2d 506, 507 [2002]).

2019Although defendant was incarcerated on an unrelated offense, he was not subjected to custodial interrogation inasmuch as "[t]here was no added constraint' that would have led defendant to believe that some other restriction had been placed on him over and above that of ordinary confinement in a correctional facility' " ( People v Boyd , 159 AD3d 1358 , 1362 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1145 [2018]; see People v Ayala , 27 AD3d 1087, 1088 [4th Dept 2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 892 [2006]; see generally People v Alls , 83 NY2d 94, 100 [1993], cert denied 511 US 1090 [1994]).

2008On appeal, defendant argues that his statements should have been suppressed because they were the product of a custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings. 1 In People v Alls ( 83 NY2d 94, 100 [1993], cert denied 511 US 1090 [1994]), a divided Court of Appeals declined to adopt a per se rule that any questioning of an inmate in a correctional facility is a custodial interrogation which must be preceded by Miranda warnings; instead, the Court adopted an “added constraint” test in which all of the “circumstances of the detention and interrogation” are evaluated to determine i

2012The defendant correctly contends that his statement made at the scene of the crime, which was made without the benefit of Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), and after he had been handcuffed and subject to express questioning, should have been suppressed (see People v O’Connor, 6 AD3d 738, 739-740 [2004]; People v Hardy, 5 AD3d 792, 793 [2004]; People v Rifkin, 289 AD 2d 262, 263 [2001]; People v Soto, 183 AD2d 926, 927 [1992]).

2006Here, considering, inter alia, the relatively brief time differential between the Miranda violation and the subsequent statements, the fact that the defendant remained continuously in the presence of the detective who elicited both sets of statements, and the fact that the statements were all made in the same location, we cannot conclude that there was a definite pronounced break between the statements that preceded the Miranda warnings and the additional statements made by the defendant immediately after he was advised of his rights (see People v Bethea, supra; People v Chapple, supra; People

2009Accordingly, we conclude that Family Court properly suppressed respondent’s statements as resulting from custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings (see Family Ct Act § 305.2 [7]; Matter of Robert P., 177 AD2d at 858 ; People v Alaire, 148 AD2d 731, 734-735 [1989]).

1999Even assuming, arguendo, that warnings were required for the first statement, we conclude that the later statement is not subject to suppression under the “cat-out-of-the-bag” theory because there was no evidence adduced at the Huntley hearing that the later statement was tainted by the earlier one (see, People v Tanner, 30 NY2d 102, 105-106 ; People v O'Hanlon, 252 AD2d 670 , lv denied 92 NY2d 951 ; People v Alaire, 148 AD2d 731, 737-738 ).

2008Notably, the United States Supreme Court has left open the question of whether the bare fact of an inmate’s custody requires Miranda warnings every time an inmate is knowingly interrogated by law enforcement officials (see Illinois v Perkins, 496 US 292, 299 [1990] [Miranda warnings not required where inmate is unaware he is speaking with undercover officer posing as inmate because there is no danger of coercion]; see also Bradley v Ohio, 497 US 1011, 1011-1012 [1990] [Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari; urging review of issue of what constitutes custody in prison setting for p

1993Mathis v United States ( 391 US 1 ) — Supreme Court precedent on point — controls here and mandates suppression.

2022Initially, inasmuch as the court, following a suppression hearing, denied that part of defendant's motion in its entirety while simultaneously finding that defendant was in custody on an unrelated charge at the time of the interview that produced the subject statement, the record demonstrates that "the unarticulated predicate for the . . . court's evidentiary ruling" was that the statement was not the product of police interrogation ( People v Nicholson , 26 NY3d 813, 817 [2016]).

2022Defendant's contention does not survive his guilty plea because defendant has not "demonstrate[d] that the plea bargaining process was infected by [the] allegedly ineffective assistance or that [he] entered the plea because of [his] attorney['s] allegedly poor performance" ( People v Jackson , 202 AD3d 1447, 1449 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 951 [2022] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Coleman , 178 AD3d 1377 , 1378 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 35 NY3d 1026 [2020]).

2019Although defendant was incarcerated on an unrelated offense, he was not subjected to custodial interrogation inasmuch as "[t]here was no added constraint' that would have led defendant to believe that some other restriction had been placed on him over and above that of ordinary confinement in a correctional facility' " ( People v Boyd , 159 AD3d 1358 , 1362 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1145 [2018]; see People v Ayala , 27 AD3d 1087, 1088 [4th Dept 2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 892 [2006]; see generally People v Alls , 83 NY2d 94, 100 [1993], cert denied 511 US 1090 [1994]).