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7 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State of Maine v. Rayshaun Mooregreen2 sentences2025State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49 , ¶ 10 n.2, 89 A.3d 1077 ; see State v. Moore, 2023 ME 18, ¶¶ 19-20 , 290 A.3d 533 (declining to analyze a Maine constitutional claim where the defendant failed to adequately raise the issue before the trial court or on appeal). 8See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) (“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 729, 735-37 (1980) (holding that a defendant lacked standing under the Fourth Amendment to suppress documents unlawfully seized 2024See State v. Moore, 2023 ME 18, ¶¶ 19-20 , 290 A.3d 533 (declining to analyze Maine Constitutional claim where defendant failed to adequately raise the issue in the trial court or on appeal). | 2 | 2 |
Alderman v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49 , ¶ 10 n.2, 89 A.3d 1077 ; see State v. Moore, 2023 ME 18, ¶¶ 19-20 , 290 A.3d 533 (declining to analyze a Maine constitutional claim where the defendant failed to adequately raise the issue before the trial court or on appeal). 8See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) (“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 729, 735-37 (1980) (holding that a defendant lacked standing under the Fourth Amendment to suppress documents unlawfully seized | 1 | 1 |
Rakas v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2025State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49 , ¶ 10 n.2, 89 A.3d 1077 ; see State v. Moore, 2023 ME 18, ¶¶ 19-20 , 290 A.3d 533 (declining to analyze a Maine constitutional claim where the defendant failed to adequately raise the issue before the trial court or on appeal). 8See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) (“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 729, 735-37 (1980) (holding that a defendant lacked standing under the Fourth Amendment to suppress documents unlawfully seized 2025State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49 , ¶ 10 n.2, 89 A.3d 1077 ; see State v. Moore, 2023 ME 18, ¶¶ 19-20 , 290 A.3d 533 (declining to analyze a Maine constitutional claim where the defendant failed to adequately raise the issue before the trial court or on appeal). 8See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) (“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 729, 735-37 (1980) (holding that a defendant lacked standing under the Fourth Amendment to suppress documents unlawfully seized | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Paynergreen1 sentence2025State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49 , ¶ 10 n.2, 89 A.3d 1077 ; see State v. Moore, 2023 ME 18, ¶¶ 19-20 , 290 A.3d 533 (declining to analyze a Maine constitutional claim where the defendant failed to adequately raise the issue before the trial court or on appeal). 8See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) (“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 729, 735-37 (1980) (holding that a defendant lacked standing under the Fourth Amendment to suppress documents unlawfully seized | 1 | 1 |
State of Maine v. Paul Lovettgreen2 sentences2025State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49 , ¶ 10 n.2, 89 A.3d 1077 ; see State v. Moore, 2023 ME 18, ¶¶ 19-20 , 290 A.3d 533 (declining to analyze a Maine constitutional claim where the defendant failed to adequately raise the issue before the trial court or on appeal). 8See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) (“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 729, 735-37 (1980) (holding that a defendant lacked standing under the Fourth Amendment to suppress documents unlawfully seized 2025State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49 , ¶ 10 n.2, 89 A.3d 1077 ; see State v. Moore, 2023 ME 18, ¶¶ 19-20 , 290 A.3d 533 (declining to analyze a Maine constitutional claim where the defendant failed to adequately raise the issue before the trial court or on appeal). 8See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) (“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 729, 735-37 (1980) (holding that a defendant lacked standing under the Fourth Amendment to suppress documents unlawfully seized | 1 | 1 |
State v. Huntergreen2 sentences2008See State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d 797, 803 (Me.1982) (stating that the Maine Constitutional principle of separation of powers prohibits the extension of judicial power to modify a criminal sentence). [¶ 33] Our decision in State v, Flemming, 409 A.2d 220 (Me.1979), further supports such a harmonious construction of the statutes. 2008See State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d 797, 803 (Me. 1982) (stating that the Maine Constitutional principle of separation of powers prohibits the extension of judicial power to modify a criminal sentence). [¶33] Our decision in State v. Flemming, 409 A.2d 220 (Me.1979), further supports such a harmonious construction of the statutes. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Flemminggreen2 sentences2008See State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d 797, 803 (Me.1982) (stating that the Maine Constitutional principle of separation of powers prohibits the extension of judicial power to modify a criminal sentence). [¶ 33] Our decision in State v, Flemming, 409 A.2d 220 (Me.1979), further supports such a harmonious construction of the statutes. 2008See State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d 797, 803 (Me. 1982) (stating that the Maine Constitutional principle of separation of powers prohibits the extension of judicial power to modify a criminal sentence). [¶33] Our decision in State v. Flemming, 409 A.2d 220 (Me.1979), further supports such a harmonious construction of the statutes. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. McKechnie
green
2 sentences2009Moreover, notwithstanding the court's determination that the defendant was not in custody, "if evidence obtained during custodial interrogation is not testimonial, neither the Miranda decision nor the Maine Constitutional privilege is implicated." State v. McKechnie, 1997 ME 40 , <JI 7, 690 A.2d 976, 978 . 2009Moreover, notwithstanding the court's determination that the defendant was not in custody, "if evidence obtained during custodial interrogation is not testimonial, neither the Miranda decision nor the Maine Constitutional privilege is implicated." State v. McKechnie, 1997 ME 40 , <JI 7, 690 A.2d 976, 978 . | 2 | 2009–2022 |
State of Maine v. Spencer T. Glover
green
2 sentences2025State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49 , ¶ 10 n.2, 89 A.3d 1077 ; see State v. Moore, 2023 ME 18, ¶¶ 19-20 , 290 A.3d 533 (declining to analyze a Maine constitutional claim where the defendant failed to adequately raise the issue before the trial court or on appeal). 8See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) (“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 729, 735-37 (1980) (holding that a defendant lacked standing under the Fourth Amendment to suppress documents unlawfully seized 2025State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49 , ¶ 10 n.2, 89 A.3d 1077 ; see State v. Moore, 2023 ME 18, ¶¶ 19-20 , 290 A.3d 533 (declining to analyze a Maine constitutional claim where the defendant failed to adequately raise the issue before the trial court or on appeal). 8See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) (“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 729, 735-37 (1980) (holding that a defendant lacked standing under the Fourth Amendment to suppress documents unlawfully seized | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Eastman
green
2 sentences2009"Field sobriety test results are generally considered to be physical or non-testimonial evidence." State v. Eastman, 1997 ME 39 , <JI 10, 691 A.2d 179, 182 . 2009"Field sobriety test results are generally considered to be physical or non-testimonial evidence." State v. Eastman, 1997 ME 39 , <JI 10, 691 A.2d 179, 182 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Pennsylvania v. Muniz
green
2 sentences1997The Miranda warnings, required in the presumptively coercive environment created by custodial interrogation, are meant to serve the same purpose. 1 Thus, if evidence obtained during custodial interrogation is not testimonial, neither the Miranda decision nor the Maine Constitutional privilege is implicated. [¶ 8] In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 , 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990), the United States Supreme Court was called on to decide “whether various incriminating utterances of a drunk-driving suspect, made while performing a series of sobriety tests, constitute testimonial resp 1997The Miranda warnings, required in the presumptively coercive environment created by custodial interrogation, are meant to serve the same purpose. 1 Thus, if evidence obtained during custodial interrogation is not testimonial, neither the Miranda decision nor the Maine Constitutional privilege is implicated. [¶ 8] In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 , 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990), the United States Supreme Court was called on to decide “whether various incriminating utterances of a drunk-driving suspect, made while performing a series of sobriety tests, constitute testimonial resp | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Doe v. United States
green
2 sentences1997The Court held: “ ‘[I]n order to be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information.’ ” Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 , 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2643 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 , 108 S.Ct. 2341, 2347 , 101 L.Ed.2d 184 (1988)). 1997The Court held: “ ‘[I]n order to be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information.’ ” Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 , 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2643 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 , 108 S.Ct. 2341, 2347 , 101 L.Ed.2d 184 (1988)). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Collins
green
2 sentences1984Although we are free to accord a defendant greater protection under state law than required by the United States Constitution, we are not confronted in this case with the use for impeachment of a statement obtained in violation of a Maine constitutional rule as was the statement in State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620 (Me.1972). 1984Although we are free to accord a defendant greater protection under state law than required by the United States Constitution, we are not confronted in this case with the use for impeachment of a statement obtained in violation of a Maine constitutional rule as was the statement in State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620 (Me.1972). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1984Rather, the statement was found by the trial court to have been voluntary, but obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 1984Rather, the statement was found by the trial court to have been voluntary, but obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.