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7 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1954–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Department of Natural Resources v. Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc
green
2 sentences2026The following principles guide a court’s inquiry: (1) In construing a deed of conveyance[,] the first and fundamental inquiry must be the intent of the parties as expressed in the language thereof; (2) in arriving at the intent of parties as expressed in the instrument, consideration must be given to the whole [of the deed] and to each and every part of it; (3) no language in the instrument may be needlessly rejected as meaningless, but, if possible, all the -8- language of a deed must be harmonized and construed so as to make all of it meaningful; (4) the only purpose of rules of construction 2021Relying on Dep’t of Natural Resources v Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc, 472 Mich 359, 370 ; 699 NW2d 272 (2005), the trial court noted that there were exceptions to the fundamental inquiry in construing a deed as being the intent of the parties: “(1) In construing a deed of conveyance, the first and fundamental inquiry must be the intent of the parties as expressed in the language thereof; (2) in arriving at the intent of the parties as expressed in the instrument, consideration must be given to the whole of the deed and to each and every part of it; (3) no language in the instrument may be ne | 4 | 2008–2026 |
Purlo Corp. v. 3925 Woodward Avenue, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021Relying on Dep’t of Natural Resources v Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc, 472 Mich 359, 370 ; 699 NW2d 272 (2005), the trial court noted that there were exceptions to the fundamental inquiry in construing a deed as being the intent of the parties: “(1) In construing a deed of conveyance, the first and fundamental inquiry must be the intent of the parties as expressed in the language thereof; (2) in arriving at the intent of the parties as expressed in the instrument, consideration must be given to the whole of the deed and to each and every part of it; (3) no language in the instrument may be ne 2021Relying on Dep’t of Natural Resources v Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc, 472 Mich 359, 370 ; 699 NW2d 272 (2005), the trial court noted that there were exceptions to the fundamental inquiry in construing a deed as being the intent of the parties: “(1) In construing a deed of conveyance, the first and fundamental inquiry must be the intent of the parties as expressed in the language thereof; (2) in arriving at the intent of the parties as expressed in the instrument, consideration must be given to the whole of the deed and to each and every part of it; (3) no language in the instrument may be ne | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Tamara Woodring v. Phoenix Insurance Company
green
2 sentences2025To that end, we are guided by four principles: 4 Although this Court is “not strictly required to follow uncontradicted opinions from this Court decided before November 1, 1990, . . . they are nevertheless considered to be precedent and entitled to significantly greater deference than are unpublished cases.” Woodring v Phoenix Ins Co, 325 Mich App 108, 114-115 ; 923 NW2d 607 (2018) (emphasis omitted). -4- (1) In construing a deed of conveyance, the first and fundamental inquiry must be the intent of the parties as expressed in the language thereof; (2) in arriving at the intent of parties as e 2025To that end, we are guided by four principles: 4 Although this Court is “not strictly required to follow uncontradicted opinions from this Court decided before November 1, 1990, . . . they are nevertheless considered to be precedent and entitled to significantly greater deference than are unpublished cases.” Woodring v Phoenix Ins Co, 325 Mich App 108, 114-115 ; 923 NW2d 607 (2018) (emphasis omitted). -4- (1) In construing a deed of conveyance, the first and fundamental inquiry must be the intent of the parties as expressed in the language thereof; (2) in arriving at the intent of parties as e | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Webb v. Webb
neutral
1 sentence2022Peck v McClelland, 247 Mich 369, 370 ; 225 NW 514 (1929). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Peck v. McClelland
neutral
1 sentence2022Peck v McClelland, 247 Mich 369, 370 ; 225 NW 514 (1929). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Zaher v. Miotke
green
1 sentence2021“A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” West, 469 Mich at 183 . [Zaher, 300 Mich App at 139-140 .] In construing a deed, courts must be guided by four principles outlined by our Supreme Court: (1) In construing a deed of conveyance, the first and fundamental inquiry must be the intent of the parties as expressed in the language thereof; (2) in arriving at the intent of parties as expressed in the instrument, consideration must be given to the whole of | 1 | 2021–2021 |
West v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence2021“A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” West, 469 Mich at 183 . [Zaher, 300 Mich App at 139-140 .] In construing a deed, courts must be guided by four principles outlined by our Supreme Court: (1) In construing a deed of conveyance, the first and fundamental inquiry must be the intent of the parties as expressed in the language thereof; (2) in arriving at the intent of parties as expressed in the instrument, consideration must be given to the whole of | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Curran v. Maple Island Resort Ass'n
green
1 sentence1954In view of the-fact that plaintiff’s construction of the lease admittedly requires reading out the 3-year provision as meaningless, consideration ought likewise to he given to the following rules of construction: (1) In construing a deed of conveyance the first and fundamental inquiry must be the intent of the .parties as expressed in the language thereof; Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich 338 (18 Am St Rep 404); Martin v. Cook, 102 Mich 267 ; Sprunger v. Ensley, 211 Mich 103 ; (2) in arriving at the intent of parties as expressed in the instrument, consideration must be given to the whole and to ea | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Thatcher v. Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Andrew's Church
green
1 sentence1954Andrew’s Church of Ann Arbor, 37 Mich 264; Waldron v. Toledo, A. A. & G. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Paddack v. Pardee
neutral
1 sentence1954In view of the-fact that plaintiff’s construction of the lease admittedly requires reading out the 3-year provision as meaningless, consideration ought likewise to he given to the following rules of construction: (1) In construing a deed of conveyance the first and fundamental inquiry must be the intent of the .parties as expressed in the language thereof; Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich 338 (18 Am St Rep 404); Martin v. Cook, 102 Mich 267 ; Sprunger v. Ensley, 211 Mich 103 ; (2) in arriving at the intent of parties as expressed in the instrument, consideration must be given to the whole and to ea | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Ryan v. Wilson
neutral
1 sentence1954In view of the-fact that plaintiff’s construction of the lease admittedly requires reading out the 3-year provision as meaningless, consideration ought likewise to he given to the following rules of construction: (1) In construing a deed of conveyance the first and fundamental inquiry must be the intent of the .parties as expressed in the language thereof; Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich 338 (18 Am St Rep 404); Martin v. Cook, 102 Mich 267 ; Sprunger v. Ensley, 211 Mich 103 ; (2) in arriving at the intent of parties as expressed in the instrument, consideration must be given to the whole and to ea | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Bassett v. Budlong
green
1 sentence1954In view of the-fact that plaintiff’s construction of the lease admittedly requires reading out the 3-year provision as meaningless, consideration ought likewise to he given to the following rules of construction: (1) In construing a deed of conveyance the first and fundamental inquiry must be the intent of the .parties as expressed in the language thereof; Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich 338 (18 Am St Rep 404); Martin v. Cook, 102 Mich 267 ; Sprunger v. Ensley, 211 Mich 103 ; (2) in arriving at the intent of parties as expressed in the instrument, consideration must be given to the whole and to ea | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Munro v. Meech
green
1 sentence1954In view of the-fact that plaintiff’s construction of the lease admittedly requires reading out the 3-year provision as meaningless, consideration ought likewise to he given to the following rules of construction: (1) In construing a deed of conveyance the first and fundamental inquiry must be the intent of the .parties as expressed in the language thereof; Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich 338 (18 Am St Rep 404); Martin v. Cook, 102 Mich 267 ; Sprunger v. Ensley, 211 Mich 103 ; (2) in arriving at the intent of parties as expressed in the instrument, consideration must be given to the whole and to ea | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Martin v. Cook
green
1 sentence1954In view of the-fact that plaintiff’s construction of the lease admittedly requires reading out the 3-year provision as meaningless, consideration ought likewise to he given to the following rules of construction: (1) In construing a deed of conveyance the first and fundamental inquiry must be the intent of the .parties as expressed in the language thereof; Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich 338 (18 Am St Rep 404); Martin v. Cook, 102 Mich 267 ; Sprunger v. Ensley, 211 Mich 103 ; (2) in arriving at the intent of parties as expressed in the instrument, consideration must be given to the whole and to ea | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Sprunger v. Ensley
neutral
1 sentence1954In view of the-fact that plaintiff’s construction of the lease admittedly requires reading out the 3-year provision as meaningless, consideration ought likewise to he given to the following rules of construction: (1) In construing a deed of conveyance the first and fundamental inquiry must be the intent of the .parties as expressed in the language thereof; Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich 338 (18 Am St Rep 404); Martin v. Cook, 102 Mich 267 ; Sprunger v. Ensley, 211 Mich 103 ; (2) in arriving at the intent of parties as expressed in the instrument, consideration must be given to the whole and to ea | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.