noninnocent party doctrine in Michigan

1996Id. at 557 .

1989Goss v Richmond, 146 Mich App 610 ; 381 NW2d 776 (1985); Barrett v Campbell, 131 Mich App 552 ; 345 NW2d 614 (1983), lv den 419 Mich 877 (1984); Dahn v Sheets, 104 Mich App 584, 591 ; 305 NW2d 547 (1981), lv den 412 Mich 928 (1982).

1996See Morton v Roth, 189 Mich 198, 202 ; 155 NW 459 (1915). 3 Our Supreme Court first recognized the noninnocent party doctrine in the context of dramshop liability in Brooks v Cook, 44 Mich 617 ; 7 NW 216 (1880).

1996See Morton v Roth, 189 Mich 198, 202 ; 155 NW 459 (1915). 3 Our Supreme Court first recognized the noninnocent party doctrine in the context of dramshop liability in Brooks v Cook, 44 Mich 617 ; 7 NW 216 (1880).

1989We hold that comparative negligence has not replaced the noninnocent party doctrine as a defense in a dramshop action, and we decline to apply the noninnocent party doctrine differently when the plaintiff is a minor._ II The section of the Liquor Control Act governing dramshop actions at the time this case was filed provides in part: A wife, husband, child, parent, guardian, or other person injured in person, property, means of support, or otherwise, by a visibly intoxicated person by reason of the unlawful selling, giving, or furnishing of intoxicating liquor to the person, if the sale is pro

1989We hold that comparative negligence has not replaced the noninnocent party doctrine as a defense in a dramshop action, and we decline to apply the noninnocent party doctrine differently when the plaintiff is a minor._ II The section of the Liquor Control Act governing dramshop actions at the time this case was filed provides in part: A wife, husband, child, parent, guardian, or other person injured in person, property, means of support, or otherwise, by a visibly intoxicated person by reason of the unlawful selling, giving, or furnishing of intoxicating liquor to the person, if the sale is pro

1991Jackson v PKM Corp, 430 Mich 262, 267-268 ; 422 NW2d 657 (1988); Waranica v Cheers Good Time Saloons, Inc, 186 Mich App 398, 400 ; 464 NW2d 902 (1990).

1991Jackson v PKM Corp, 430 Mich 262, 267-268 ; 422 NW2d 657 (1988); Waranica v Cheers Good Time Saloons, Inc, 186 Mich App 398, 400 ; 464 NW2d 902 (1990).

1991Pollard v Village of Ovid, 180 Mich App 1 ; 446 NW2d 574 (1989).

1991Pollard v Village of Ovid, 180 Mich App 1 ; 446 NW2d 574 (1989).

1989Dahn v Sheets, supra. The Legislature’s silence in its 1986 act subsequent to Dahn provides some support for the conclusion that the Legislature intended that the noninnocent party doctrine apply equally to minor plaintiffs.

1989Dahn v Sheets, supra. The Legislature’s silence in its 1986 act subsequent to Dahn provides some support for the conclusion that the Legislature intended that the noninnocent party doctrine apply equally to minor plaintiffs.[ 4 ] Ante, p 357.

1989Malone v Lambrecht, 305 Mich 58, 61-62 ; 8 NW2d 910 (1943); Kangas v Suchorski, 372 Mich 396, 399 ; 126 NW2d 803 (1964). [2] Appellant urges us to reevaluate this interpretation and exercise our authority to reshape the common law by replacing the noninnocent party doctrine with principles of comparative fault.

1989Malone v Lambrecht, 305 Mich 58, 61-62 ; 8 NW2d 910 (1943); Kangas v Suchorski, 372 Mich 396, 399 ; 126 NW2d 803 (1964). 2 Appellant urges us to reevaluate this interpretation and exercise our authority to reshape the common law by replacing the noninnocent party doctrine with principles of comparative fault.

1989Malone v Lambrecht, 305 Mich 58, 61-62 ; 8 NW2d 910 (1943); Kangas v Suchorski, 372 Mich 396, 399 ; 126 NW2d 803 (1964). [2] Appellant urges us to reevaluate this interpretation and exercise our authority to reshape the common law by replacing the noninnocent party doctrine with principles of comparative fault.

1989Malone v Lambrecht, 305 Mich 58, 61-62 ; 8 NW2d 910 (1943); Kangas v Suchorski, 372 Mich 396, 399 ; 126 NW2d 803 (1964). 2 Appellant urges us to reevaluate this interpretation and exercise our authority to reshape the common law by replacing the noninnocent party doctrine with principles of comparative fault.

1989Citing Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638 ; 275 NW2d 511 (1979), where this Court abandoned the common-law doctrine of contributory negligence and adopted comparative negligence, appellant argues that the noninnocent party doctrine is of common-law, not legislative, origin, and is therefore subject to change by the judiciary.

1989Citing Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638 ; 275 NW2d 511 (1979), where this Court abandoned the common-law doctrine of contributory negligence and adopted comparative negligence, appellant argues that the noninnocent party doctrine is of common-law, not legislative, origin, and is therefore subject to change by the judiciary.

1989The Legislature's silence in its 1986 act subsequent to Dahn provides some support for the conclusion that the Legislature intended that the noninnocent party doctrine apply equally to minor plaintiffs. [17] See Longstreth, 423 Mich 697 (a minor plaintiff was not considered competent to handle the effects of intoxication); see also Congini v Portersville Valve Co, 504 Pa 157, 160-162; 470 A2d 515 (1983). [18] See Longstreth, 423 Mich 696 (recognizing that concluding an underage plaintiff may recover for injury inflicted upon himself after consuming alcohol furnished by his host gives the plain

1989The Legislature's silence in its 1986 act subsequent to Dahn provides some support for the conclusion that the Legislature intended that the noninnocent party doctrine apply equally to minor plaintiffs. [17] See Longstreth, 423 Mich 697 (a minor plaintiff was not considered competent to handle the effects of intoxication); see also Congini v Portersville Valve Co, 504 Pa 157, 160-162; 470 A2d 515 (1983). [18] See Longstreth, 423 Mich 696 (recognizing that concluding an underage plaintiff may recover for injury inflicted upon himself after consuming alcohol furnished by his host gives the plain

1989However, keeping in mind that the object of statutory construction is "to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature,” Browder v Int'l Fidelity Ins Co, 413 Mich 603, 611 ; 321 NW2d 668 (1982), we decline to disturb our long-settled judicial interpretation of the Legislature’s intent.

1989However, keeping in mind that the object of statutory construction is "to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature,” Browder v Int'l Fidelity Ins Co, 413 Mich 603, 611 ; 321 NW2d 668 (1982), we decline to disturb our long-settled judicial interpretation of the Legislature’s intent.

1989Goss v Richmond, 146 Mich App 610 ; 381 NW2d 776 (1985); Barrett v Campbell, 131 Mich App 552 ; 345 NW2d 614 (1983), lv den 419 Mich 877 (1984); Dahn v Sheets, 104 Mich App 584, 591 ; 305 NW2d 547 (1981), lv den 412 Mich 928 (1982).

1989Goss v Richmond, 146 Mich App 610 ; 381 NW2d 776 (1985); Barrett v Campbell, 131 Mich App 552 ; 345 NW2d 614 (1983), lv den 419 Mich 877 (1984); Dahn v Sheets, 104 Mich App 584, 591 ; 305 NW2d 547 (1981), lv den 412 Mich 928 (1982).

1989Malone v Lambrecht, 305 Mich 58, 61-62 ; 8 NW2d 910 (1943); Kangas v Suchorski, 372 Mich 396, 399 ; 126 NW2d 803 (1964). 2 Appellant urges us to reevaluate this interpretation and exercise our authority to reshape the common law by replacing the noninnocent party doctrine with principles of comparative fault.

1989Malone v Lambrecht, 305 Mich 58, 61-62 ; 8 NW2d 910 (1943); Kangas v Suchorski, 372 Mich 396, 399 ; 126 NW2d 803 (1964). 2 Appellant urges us to reevaluate this interpretation and exercise our authority to reshape the common law by replacing the noninnocent party doctrine with principles of comparative fault.

1989The Legislature's silence in its 1986 act subsequent to Dahn provides some support for the conclusion that the Legislature intended that the noninnocent party doctrine apply equally to minor plaintiffs. [17] See Longstreth, 423 Mich 697 (a minor plaintiff was not considered competent to handle the effects of intoxication); see also Congini v Portersville Valve Co, 504 Pa 157, 160-162; 470 A2d 515 (1983). [18] See Longstreth, 423 Mich 696 (recognizing that concluding an underage plaintiff may recover for injury inflicted upon himself after consuming alcohol furnished by his host gives the plain

1989The Legislature's silence in its 1986 act subsequent to Dahn provides some support for the conclusion that the Legislature intended that the noninnocent party doctrine apply equally to minor plaintiffs. [17] See Longstreth, 423 Mich 697 (a minor plaintiff was not considered competent to handle the effects of intoxication); see also Congini v Portersville Valve Co, 504 Pa 157, 160-162; 470 A2d 515 (1983). [18] See Longstreth, 423 Mich 696 (recognizing that concluding an underage plaintiff may recover for injury inflicted upon himself after consuming alcohol furnished by his host gives the plain

1989The Legislature amended the Liquor Control Act several times between the time Malone was decided and the events of this case, 4 modifying the language of § 22 in 1958, 1961, 1972, and 1980. 5 In none of these efforts to revise the scope of the dramshop cause of action did the Legislature undertake to limit or preclude the noninnocent party doctrine, despite this Court’s reaffirmance that the noninnocent party doctrine was a complete defense to a dramshop action in Malone, McDaniel v Crapo, 326 Mich 555, 558 ; 40 NW2d 724 (1950), and Kangas, supra. 6 Instead, the language defining who may bring

1989The Legislature amended the Liquor Control Act several times between the time Malone was decided and the events of this case, 4 modifying the language of § 22 in 1958, 1961, 1972, and 1980. 5 In none of these efforts to revise the scope of the dramshop cause of action did the Legislature undertake to limit or preclude the noninnocent party doctrine, despite this Court’s reaffirmance that the noninnocent party doctrine was a complete defense to a dramshop action in Malone, McDaniel v Crapo, 326 Mich 555, 558 ; 40 NW2d 724 (1950), and Kangas, supra. 6 Instead, the language defining who may bring

1989This Court has said that an adult who purchased liquor for a minor cannot recover for "consequences for which he was directly and actively responsible” 37 and that an adult who matched coins with and purchased liquor for another adult he knew was intoxicated is not "an innocent person entitled to recover under the act.” 38 Neither rationale can appropriately be applied where a minor furnishes liquor to the driver because the Legislature, in barring in § 33 sale or furnishing of alcoholic beverages to minors, indicated that they are as a matter of law deemed to be so "innocent” regarding alcoho

1989The Legislature's silence in its 1986 act subsequent to Dahn provides some support for the conclusion that the Legislature intended that the noninnocent party doctrine apply equally to minor plaintiffs. [17] See Longstreth, 423 Mich 697 (a minor plaintiff was not considered competent to handle the effects of intoxication); see also Congini v Portersville Valve Co, 504 Pa 157, 160-162; 470 A2d 515 (1983). [18] See Longstreth, 423 Mich 696 (recognizing that concluding an underage plaintiff may recover for injury inflicted upon himself after consuming alcohol furnished by his host gives the plain

1989See Longstreth, 423 Mich 697 (a minor plaintiff was not considered competent to handle the effects of intoxication); see also Congini v Portersville Valve Co, 504 Pa 157, 160-162; 470 A2d 515 (1983).

1989The Legislature's silence in its 1986 act subsequent to Dahn provides some support for the conclusion that the Legislature intended that the noninnocent party doctrine apply equally to minor plaintiffs. [17] See Longstreth, 423 Mich 697 (a minor plaintiff was not considered competent to handle the effects of intoxication); see also Congini v Portersville Valve Co, 504 Pa 157, 160-162; 470 A2d 515 (1983). [18] See Longstreth, 423 Mich 696 (recognizing that concluding an underage plaintiff may recover for injury inflicted upon himself after consuming alcohol furnished by his host gives the plain

1989The Legislature's silence in its 1986 act subsequent to Dahn provides some support for the conclusion that the Legislature intended that the noninnocent party doctrine apply equally to minor plaintiffs. [17] See Longstreth, 423 Mich 697 (a minor plaintiff was not considered competent to handle the effects of intoxication); see also Congini v Portersville Valve Co, 504 Pa 157, 160-162; 470 A2d 515 (1983). [18] See Longstreth, 423 Mich 696 (recognizing that concluding an underage plaintiff may recover for injury inflicted upon himself after consuming alcohol furnished by his host gives the plain

1989Heikkala v Isaacson, supra. Similarly, if the two drinkers meet and drink side by side at the bar and each pays his own bill, the result should it seems be the same, neither drinker having furnished liquor to the other. 25 An adult passenger who furnishes liquor to the driver is barred, however, under the noninnocent party doctrine from maintaining a dramshop action even if he does not drink and is not himself intoxicated.