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7 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Vuegreen1 sentence2026State v. Vue, 606 N.W.2d 719, 723 (Minn. App. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jarosgreen1 sentence2026After closing arguments, the district court instructed the jury that the State offered the expert’s testimony “for the limited purpose of describing” commonalities among domestic abuse victims and that “[t]he admission of this testimony 28 does not mean that … Kingsbury suffered the domestic abuse” as that is a “fact question[] for the jury to decide.” Fravel argues that the prosecutor committed plain error by eliciting expert testimony on sexual abuse in domestic violence relationships because the prosecutor did not proffer this testimony during the pretrial hearing regarding the admissibilit | 1 | 1 |
State v. Morgangreen1 sentence2026After closing arguments, the district court instructed the jury that the State offered the expert’s testimony “for the limited purpose of describing” commonalities among domestic abuse victims and that “[t]he admission of this testimony 28 does not mean that … Kingsbury suffered the domestic abuse” as that is a “fact question[] for the jury to decide.” Fravel argues that the prosecutor committed plain error by eliciting expert testimony on sexual abuse in domestic violence relationships because the prosecutor did not proffer this testimony during the pretrial hearing regarding the admissibilit | 1 | 1 |
State v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2026After closing arguments, the district court instructed the jury that the State offered the expert’s testimony “for the limited purpose of describing” commonalities among domestic abuse victims and that “[t]he admission of this testimony 28 does not mean that … Kingsbury suffered the domestic abuse” as that is a “fact question[] for the jury to decide.” Fravel argues that the prosecutor committed plain error by eliciting expert testimony on sexual abuse in domestic violence relationships because the prosecutor did not proffer this testimony during the pretrial hearing regarding the admissibilit | 1 | 1 |
State v. Walshgreen1 sentence2024In determining whether a prosecutor committed plain error in a closing argument, we consider “the closing argument as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” State v. Walsh, 495 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn. 1993). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hardygreen1 sentence1994See also State v. Hardy, 354 N.W.2d 21, 24-25 (Minn.1984) (“even a limited elicitation, for nonhearsay purposes, of general testimony that a tip had been received that led to defendant’s prints being compared with the latent print would have been unjustified in this case because the potential of the evidence being used for an improper purpose outweighed its very limited probative value”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cermakgreen1 sentence1994In this case our review of the record convinces us that the prosecutor committed plain error (a) in eliciting the hearsay evidence about the tip, (b) in eliciting the drug courier profile evidence, and (c) in her closing argument, and that the cumulative effect of these errors was that defendant was deprived of a fair trial. (a) We have said a number of times that “a police officer testifying in a criminal case may not, under the guise of explaining how [the] investigation focused on defendant, relate hearsay statements of others.” State v. Cermak, 365 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Minn.1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ramey
green
2 sentences2016Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302 . 2015Id. | 2 | 2015–2016 |
Rairdon v. State
green
2 sentences2014Id. at 322-23 . 2014Id. at 322-23 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Underwood
green
1 sentence1983In State v. Underwood, 281 N.W.2d 337 (Minn.1979), we reversed an aggravated assault conviction because the prosecutor improperly and over defense objection cross-examined the defendant about the fact that the gun he used was unregistered and the fact that it was a gross misdemeanor to possess it without a permit. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.