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7 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1907–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Griffingreen2 sentences2012In U.S. v. Griffin, the defendants argued that their rights were violated when the court prevented them from informing the jury that the witness refused to testify because the witness had waived the right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. 66 F.3d 68, 70 (5th Cir.1995). 2012The Griffin court refused to distinguish an invalid invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination from a valid one because “Qjuries are no less likely to draw improper inferences from an invalid assertion of the privilege than from a valid assertion.” Id. at 71 . | 1 | 1 |
Anison v. Ricegreen2 sentences2003Although subrogation originated as a common law equitable doctrine that had as its aim the advancement of justice and the prevention of injustice, Metmor Fin., Inc. v. Landoll Corp., 976 S.W.2d 454, 461 [8] (Mo.App.1998), “the right to invoke the doctrine of subrogation may be contractual.” Anison v. Rice, 282 S.W.2d 497, 503 (Mo.1955). 6 Subrogation based upon the common law, i.e., legal subrogation, is not an option “where it would be inconsistent with the terms of the contract.” 7 Id. at 503-04 [9]. 2003Although subrogation originated as a common law equitable doctrine that had as its aim the advancement of justice and the prevention of injustice, Metmor Fin., Inc. v. Landoll Corp., 976 S.W.2d 454, 461 [8] (Mo.App.1998), “the right to invoke the doctrine of subrogation may be contractual.” Anison v. Rice, 282 S.W.2d 497, 503 (Mo.1955). 6 Subrogation based upon the common law, i.e., legal subrogation, is not an option “where it would be inconsistent with the terms of the contract.” 7 Id. at 503-04 [9]. | 1 | 1 |
Metmor Financial, Inc. v. Landoll Corp.green1 sentence2003Although subrogation originated as a common law equitable doctrine that had as its aim the advancement of justice and the prevention of injustice, Metmor Fin., Inc. v. Landoll Corp., 976 S.W.2d 454, 461 [8] (Mo.App.1998), “the right to invoke the doctrine of subrogation may be contractual.” Anison v. Rice, 282 S.W.2d 497, 503 (Mo.1955). 6 Subrogation based upon the common law, i.e., legal subrogation, is not an option “where it would be inconsistent with the terms of the contract.” 7 Id. at 503-04 [9]. | 1 | 1 |
Collins Ex Rel. Collins v. Nelsongreen1 sentence1976Collins v. Nelson, 410 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Mo.App.1965). | 1 | 1 |
Wells v. Ashergreen2 sentences1965Williams v. Lindsey, 347 U.S. 904 , 74 S.Ct. 428 , 98 L.Ed. 1063 ; Harke v. Haase, 335 Mo. 1104, 1108-1109 , 75 S.W.2d 1001, 1002-1003 [1] [2,3]; Wells v. Asher, Mo.App., 286 S.W.2d 567, 568 [1]; and so long as the plaintiff’s evidence does not itself clearly show the cause of the accident, or if the true cause is left in doubt, he is not deprived of the right to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 1965Wells v. Asher, supra, 286 S.W.2d at 569-570 [2], Broadly speaking, the plaintiff’s evidence in this case tends to prove that while the defendant was in control of the automobile, driving along a straight and unobstructed highway at a moderate rate of speed, he not only lost control of the vehicle so that it left the highway, but fell completely out of the automobile. | 1 | 1 |
Harke v. Haasegreen2 sentences1965Williams v. Lindsey, 347 U.S. 904 , 74 S.Ct. 428 , 98 L.Ed. 1063 ; Harke v. Haase, 335 Mo. 1104, 1108-1109 , 75 S.W.2d 1001, 1002-1003 [1] [2,3]; Wells v. Asher, Mo.App., 286 S.W.2d 567, 568 [1]; and so long as the plaintiff’s evidence does not itself clearly show the cause of the accident, or if the true cause is left in doubt, he is not deprived of the right to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 1965Williams v. Lindsey, 347 U.S. 904 , 74 S.Ct. 428 , 98 L.Ed. 1063 ; Harke v. Haase, 335 Mo. 1104, 1108-1109 , 75 S.W.2d 1001, 1002-1003 [1] [2,3]; Wells v. Asher, Mo.App., 286 S.W.2d 567, 568 [1]; and so long as the plaintiff’s evidence does not itself clearly show the cause of the accident, or if the true cause is left in doubt, he is not deprived of the right to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Munn v. McKelvey
green
1 sentence2012The right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination “extends not only to answers which would in themselves support a conviction of a crime but likewise embraces those answers which would simply furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the witness.” Munn, 733 S.W.2d at 768 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Dougall v. Spokane, Portland & Seattle Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1965Williams v. Lindsey, 347 U.S. 904 , 74 S.Ct. 428 , 98 L.Ed. 1063 ; Harke v. Haase, 335 Mo. 1104, 1108-1109 , 75 S.W.2d 1001, 1002-1003 [1] [2,3]; Wells v. Asher, Mo.App., 286 S.W.2d 567, 568 [1]; and so long as the plaintiff’s evidence does not itself clearly show the cause of the accident, or if the true cause is left in doubt, he is not deprived of the right to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Codray v. Brownell
green
1 sentence1965Williams v. Lindsey, 347 U.S. 904 , 74 S.Ct. 428 , 98 L.Ed. 1063 ; Harke v. Haase, 335 Mo. 1104, 1108-1109 , 75 S.W.2d 1001, 1002-1003 [1] [2,3]; Wells v. Asher, Mo.App., 286 S.W.2d 567, 568 [1]; and so long as the plaintiff’s evidence does not itself clearly show the cause of the accident, or if the true cause is left in doubt, he is not deprived of the right to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Williams v. Lindsey
green
1 sentence1965Williams v. Lindsey, 347 U.S. 904 , 74 S.Ct. 428 , 98 L.Ed. 1063 ; Harke v. Haase, 335 Mo. 1104, 1108-1109 , 75 S.W.2d 1001, 1002-1003 [1] [2,3]; Wells v. Asher, Mo.App., 286 S.W.2d 567, 568 [1]; and so long as the plaintiff’s evidence does not itself clearly show the cause of the accident, or if the true cause is left in doubt, he is not deprived of the right to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Capen v. Garrison
green
2 sentences1955Capen v. Garrison, 193 Mo. 335 , 92 S.W. 368 , 5 L.R.A.,N.S., 838. 1955Capen v. Garrison, 193 Mo. 335 , 92 S.W. 368 , 5 L.R.A.,N.S., 838. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Hutchinson v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co.
neutral
2 sentences1907It was insisted by counsel in that cause, as is contended in the case at bar, that the deceased had the right to invoke the presumption that the train was not running in violation, of such ordinances, and the case of Hutchinson v. Railroad, 161 Mo. 246 , was cited and relied upon by counsel as maintaining that doctrine. 1907Valliant, J., speaking for the court, very clearly draws the distinction between the cases, and he thus answered the contention of the respondent in that case: “The facts in this case are very different from those in Hutchinson v. Railroad, 161 Mo. 246 , to ■which, we are referred. | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.