7 Missouri opinions name it 1 courts 1995–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bone v. Director of Revenuegreen1 sentence2024Regardless, the issue of whether the statute of limitations prevents a vicarious liability claim against Medical Group based upon the conduct of Dr. James was tried by implied consent, by being raised and thoroughly argued by the parties in their summary judgment filings where evidence relevant only to that issue was submitted without objection. “[I]ssues not raised in the pleadings are considered, in all respects, as if they had been raised by the pleadings when they are tried by implied or express consent of the parties.” Bone v. Dir. of Revenue, 404 S.W.3d 883, 886 (Mo. banc 2013). 11 Baldw | 1 | 1 |
Thatcher v. De Targreen1 sentence2024As applicable here, all actions against any “entity providing health care services . . . shall be brought within two years from the date of occurrence of the act of neglect complained of[.]” Section 516.105.1. 3 But under the judicially-created “continuing care” exception, this statute of limitations does not begin to run if “the treatment is continuing and of such nature as to charge the medical [provider] with the duty of continuing care and treatment which is essential to recovery until the relation ceases . . . .” Thatcher v. De Tar, 173 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 1943). | 1 | 1 |
Thummel v. Kinggreen1 sentence2016Thummel v. King, 570 S.W.2d 679, 687 (Mo. banc 1978) (holding that an appellant has an obligation to cite appropriate precedent to support an argument). | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Ford Motor Co.green1 sentence2011See Hill, 277 S.W.3d at 666 n. 6; see, e.g., Barekman v. City of Republic, 232 S.W.3d 675, 679 (Mo.App.2007). | 1 | 1 |
Barekman v. City of Republicgreen1 sentence2011See Hill, 277 S.W.3d at 666 n. 6; see, e.g., Barekman v. City of Republic, 232 S.W.3d 675, 679 (Mo.App.2007). | 1 | 1 |
Pollock v. Wetterau Food Distribution Groupgreen1 sentence2011See Pollock, 11 S.W.3d at 766-67 (holding that an employer was vicariously liable for a supervisor’s sexual harassment); Anderson v. Dillard’s, Inc., 109 F.Supp.2d 1116 , 1125 n. 5 (E.D.Mo.2000) (noting that both the MHRA and Title VII apply the same vicarious liability rule in cases involving sexual harassment by a supervisor). 3 Because Woods and Leeper were sexually harassed by a supervisor, rather than a eo-worker, they were not required to prove that Briscoe knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action. | 1 | 1 |
McHaffie Ex Rel. McHaffie v. Bunchgreen1 sentence1996McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822, 825 [1] (Mo.banc 1995). | 1 | 1 |
Helm v. Wismargreen1 sentence1995Helm v. Wismar, 820 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Mo. banc 1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Montgomery v. South County Radiologists, Inc.
green
1 sentence2021In Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d 191 , the Missouri Supreme Court rejected an argument by a corporate multi-physician radiology clinic that the “continuing care” exception only applies to claims against an individual treating physician: SCR strenuously argues that its services – even if continuing – are not of such a nature as to charge it with a duty of continuing care and treatment. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
green
2 sentences2020Although M.N. has indicated an alternative vicarious liability standard may apply to his claim—specifically the framework established in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)—we disagree. 2020In Faragher, which involved a claim of employment discrimination under Title VII, the U.S. Supreme Court determined under what circumstances an employer could be held vicariously liable for its supervisory employee’s harassment of a subordinate employee. 10 See 524 U.S. at 780 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Woods v. Kelley
green
1 sentence2016To resolve that question, we looked at whether the governmental entity had the power to direct and control the employee’s conduct at the time of the injury under “the traditional common law doctrine of vicarious liability.” Id. at 637 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Anderson v. Dillard's Inc.
green
1 sentence2011See Pollock, 11 S.W.3d at 766-67 (holding that an employer was vicariously liable for a supervisor’s sexual harassment); Anderson v. Dillard’s, Inc., 109 F.Supp.2d 1116 , 1125 n. 5 (E.D.Mo.2000) (noting that both the MHRA and Title VII apply the same vicarious liability rule in cases involving sexual harassment by a supervisor). 3 Because Woods and Leeper were sexually harassed by a supervisor, rather than a eo-worker, they were not required to prove that Briscoe knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.