Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
13 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1999–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Curry v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2024See Vance v. Ball State University, supra, 570 U.S. 448–49. ‘‘[Although] the reasonableness of an employer’s response to . . . harassment is at issue under both standards, the plaintiff must clear a higher hurdle under the negligence standard [applicable to harassment by coworkers], where she bears the bur- den of establishing her employer’s negligence, than 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11 0 Conn. 1 ,0 13 O’Reggio v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities under the vicarious liability standard [applicable to harassment by supervisors], where the burden shifts to the employer to prove 2024See Vance v. Ball State University, supra, 570 U.S. 448–49. ‘‘[Although] the reasonableness of an employer’s response to . . . harassment is at issue under both standards, the plaintiff must clear a higher hurdle under the negligence standard [applicable to harassment by coworkers], where she bears the bur- den of establishing her employer’s negligence, than under the vicarious liability standard [applicable to harassment by supervisors], where the burden shifts to the employer to prove its own reasonableness and the plaintiff’s negligence.’’ Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654, 660 (D | 2 | 2 |
Pinkerton v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2017In fact, he did place his penis ... into her vagina briefly." 3 See Pinkerton v. United States , 328 U.S. 640 , 647-48, 66 S.Ct. 1180 , 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). 4 In the petitioner's direct appeal, our Supreme Court commented on this aspect of the court's instructions as follows: "During the charging conference, the [petitioner], the state and the trial court discussed that, specifically as to count eight, the [petitioner] was charged and could be found liable as a principal, as an accessory, or under the Pinkerton doctrine of vicarious liability. ... 2017In fact, he did place his penis ... into her vagina briefly." 3 See Pinkerton v. United States , 328 U.S. 640 , 647-48, 66 S.Ct. 1180 , 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). 4 In the petitioner's direct appeal, our Supreme Court commented on this aspect of the court's instructions as follows: "During the charging conference, the [petitioner], the state and the trial court discussed that, specifically as to count eight, the [petitioner] was charged and could be found liable as a principal, as an accessory, or under the Pinkerton doctrine of vicarious liability. ... | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Franklin Delano Gipsongreen1 sentence2006That is, one with which you all agree.” 17 The defendant argued before the trial court that this court’s decision in State v. Coltherst, 263 Conn. 478 , 820 A.2d 1024 (2003), “does not support *608 the proposition that the court can instruct a lack of unanimity on those three different forms of liability.” The trial court, however, agreed with the state’s position that its charge was proper in light of this court’s decision in State v. Correa, supra, 241 Conn. 322 , and ruled that the instruction would remain as read because “coconspirator liability is a vicarious liability principle just like | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Alvarez v. New Haven Register, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001In Alvarez v. New Haven Register, Inc ., 249 Conn. 709 , 735 A.2d 306 (1999), the court recognized "that [a master and a servant] are both undoubtedly tortfeasors, and that the injured plaintiff may look for reparation from either the agent or the principal". 2001The court further held that "aside from the relationship between the parties creating the doctrine of vicarious liability, the principal is not a tortfeasor in the true sense of the word because he is not independently liable based upon his own independent actionable fault." Id., 720-21 . | 3 | 2001–2001 |
Shafer v. Suburban Newspapers of Greater St. Louis, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1215 , 120 S. Ct. 2219 , 147 L. 2024Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1215 , 120 S. Ct. 2219 , 147 L. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Sinclair v. Ward
neutral
2 sentences2024Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1215 , 120 S. Ct. 2219 , 147 L. 2024Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1215 , 120 S. Ct. 2219 , 147 L. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
District of Columbia v. Curry
green
2 sentences2024Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1215 , 120 S. Ct. 2219 , 147 L. 2024Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1215 , 120 S. Ct. 2219 , 147 L. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Walton
green
2 sentences2012“Pursuant to the Pinkerton doctrine of vicarious liability, articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Pinkerton . . . and expressly adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32 , 630 A.2d 990 (1993), a conspirator may be held liable for criminal offenses committed by a coconspirator that are within the scope of the conspiracy, are in furtherance of it, and are reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of the conspiracy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. LaFountain, 127 Conn. App. 819, 827 , 16 A.3d 761 , cert. denied, 301 Conn. 921 , 22 A 2012“Pursuant to the Pinkerton doctrine of vicarious liability, articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Pinkerton . . . and expressly adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32 , 630 A.2d 990 (1993), a conspirator may be held liable for criminal offenses committed by a coconspirator that are within the scope of the conspiracy, are in furtherance of it, and are reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of the conspiracy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. LaFountain, 127 Conn. App. 819, 827 , 16 A.3d 761 , cert. denied, 301 Conn. 921 , 22 A | 2 | 2011–2012 |
State v. Coltherst
green
2 sentences2006That is, one with which you all agree.” 17 The defendant argued before the trial court that this court’s decision in State v. Coltherst, 263 Conn. 478 , 820 A.2d 1024 (2003), “does not support *608 the proposition that the court can instruct a lack of unanimity on those three different forms of liability.” The trial court, however, agreed with the state’s position that its charge was proper in light of this court’s decision in State v. Correa, supra, 241 Conn. 322 , and ruled that the instruction would remain as read because “coconspirator liability is a vicarious liability principle just like 2006That is, one with which you all agree.” 17 The defendant argued before the trial court that this court’s decision in State v. Coltherst, 263 Conn. 478 , 820 A.2d 1024 (2003), “does not support *608 the proposition that the court can instruct a lack of unanimity on those three different forms of liability.” The trial court, however, agreed with the state’s position that its charge was proper in light of this court’s decision in State v. Correa, supra, 241 Conn. 322 , and ruled that the instruction would remain as read because “coconspirator liability is a vicarious liability principle just like | 2 | 2006–2011 |
State v. Hampton
green
1 sentence2016In Hampton, the parties, during a charging conference, discussed with the trial court that, on count eight of the information, the defendant ‘‘could be found liable as a principal, as an accessory, or under the Pinkerton doctrine of vicarious liability.’’ Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. LaFountain
neutral
2 sentences2012“Pursuant to the Pinkerton doctrine of vicarious liability, articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Pinkerton . . . and expressly adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32 , 630 A.2d 990 (1993), a conspirator may be held liable for criminal offenses committed by a coconspirator that are within the scope of the conspiracy, are in furtherance of it, and are reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of the conspiracy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. LaFountain, 127 Conn. App. 819, 827 , 16 A.3d 761 , cert. denied, 301 Conn. 921 , 22 A 2012“Pursuant to the Pinkerton doctrine of vicarious liability, articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Pinkerton . . . and expressly adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32 , 630 A.2d 990 (1993), a conspirator may be held liable for criminal offenses committed by a coconspirator that are within the scope of the conspiracy, are in furtherance of it, and are reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of the conspiracy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. LaFountain, 127 Conn. App. 819, 827 , 16 A.3d 761 , cert. denied, 301 Conn. 921 , 22 A | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. LaFountain
green
2 sentences2012“Pursuant to the Pinkerton doctrine of vicarious liability, articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Pinkerton . . . and expressly adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32 , 630 A.2d 990 (1993), a conspirator may be held liable for criminal offenses committed by a coconspirator that are within the scope of the conspiracy, are in furtherance of it, and are reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of the conspiracy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. LaFountain, 127 Conn. App. 819, 827 , 16 A.3d 761 , cert. denied, 301 Conn. 921 , 22 A 2012“Pursuant to the Pinkerton doctrine of vicarious liability, articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Pinkerton . . . and expressly adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32 , 630 A.2d 990 (1993), a conspirator may be held liable for criminal offenses committed by a coconspirator that are within the scope of the conspiracy, are in furtherance of it, and are reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of the conspiracy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. LaFountain, 127 Conn. App. 819, 827 , 16 A.3d 761 , cert. denied, 301 Conn. 921 , 22 A | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Holmes
green
2 sentences2011Section 53a-59 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when ... (5) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of the discharge of a firearm.” “Assault in the first degree is a specific intent crime.” State v. Holmes, 75 Conn. App. 721, 736 , 817 A.2d 689 , cert, denied, 264 Conn. 903 , 823 A.2d 1222 (2003). 2011Section 53a-59 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when ... (5) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of the discharge of a firearm.” “Assault in the first degree is a specific intent crime.” State v. Holmes, 75 Conn. App. 721, 736 , 817 A.2d 689 , cert, denied, 264 Conn. 903 , 823 A.2d 1222 (2003). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Widlak
green
1 sentence2011Section 53a-59 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when ... (5) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of the discharge of a firearm.” “Assault in the first degree is a specific intent crime.” State v. Holmes, 75 Conn. App. 721, 736 , 817 A.2d 689 , cert, denied, 264 Conn. 903 , 823 A.2d 1222 (2003). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Holmes
green
1 sentence2011Section 53a-59 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when ... (5) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of the discharge of a firearm.” “Assault in the first degree is a specific intent crime.” State v. Holmes, 75 Conn. App. 721, 736 , 817 A.2d 689 , cert, denied, 264 Conn. 903 , 823 A.2d 1222 (2003). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Martinez
green
2 sentences2011Accordingly, for the defendant to be convicted of the crime of assault in the first degree under the Pinkerton doctrine of vicarious liability, the state was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the crime of assault in the first degree was committed by the defendant’s coconspirator, Bodamer. 3 See State v. Martinez, 278 Conn. 598, 618 , 900 A.2d 485 (2006) (“under the Pinkerton doctrine, a conspirator may be found guilty of a crime that he or she did not commit if the state can establish that a *828 coconspirator did commit the crime” [internal quotation marks omitted]). 2011Accordingly, for the defendant to be convicted of the crime of assault in the first degree under the Pinkerton doctrine of vicarious liability, the state was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the crime of assault in the first degree was committed by the defendant’s coconspirator, Bodamer. 3 See State v. Martinez, 278 Conn. 598, 618 , 900 A.2d 485 (2006) (“under the Pinkerton doctrine, a conspirator may be found guilty of a crime that he or she did not commit if the state can establish that a *828 coconspirator did commit the crime” [internal quotation marks omitted]). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Tucker
green
2 sentences2006That is, one with which you all agree.” 17 The defendant argued before the trial court that this court’s decision in State v. Coltherst, 263 Conn. 478 , 820 A.2d 1024 (2003), “does not support *608 the proposition that the court can instruct a lack of unanimity on those three different forms of liability.” The trial court, however, agreed with the state’s position that its charge was proper in light of this court’s decision in State v. Correa, supra, 241 Conn. 322 , and ruled that the instruction would remain as read because “coconspirator liability is a vicarious liability principle just like 2006That is, one with which you all agree.” 17 The defendant argued before the trial court that this court’s decision in State v. Coltherst, 263 Conn. 478 , 820 A.2d 1024 (2003), “does not support *608 the proposition that the court can instruct a lack of unanimity on those three different forms of liability.” The trial court, however, agreed with the state’s position that its charge was proper in light of this court’s decision in State v. Correa, supra, 241 Conn. 322 , and ruled that the instruction would remain as read because “coconspirator liability is a vicarious liability principle just like | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Correa
green
1 sentence2006That is, one with which you all agree.” 17 The defendant argued before the trial court that this court’s decision in State v. Coltherst, 263 Conn. 478 , 820 A.2d 1024 (2003), “does not support *608 the proposition that the court can instruct a lack of unanimity on those three different forms of liability.” The trial court, however, agreed with the state’s position that its charge was proper in light of this court’s decision in State v. Correa, supra, 241 Conn. 322 , and ruled that the instruction would remain as read because “coconspirator liability is a vicarious liability principle just like | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. Charles Lidge Bolts and Joe Dee Hicks
green
1 sentence2006That is, one with which you all agree.” 17 The defendant argued before the trial court that this court’s decision in State v. Coltherst, 263 Conn. 478 , 820 A.2d 1024 (2003), “does not support *608 the proposition that the court can instruct a lack of unanimity on those three different forms of liability.” The trial court, however, agreed with the state’s position that its charge was proper in light of this court’s decision in State v. Correa, supra, 241 Conn. 322 , and ruled that the instruction would remain as read because “coconspirator liability is a vicarious liability principle just like | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Porebski v. United States
green
1 sentence2006Hicks v. United States, 434 U.S. 930 , 98 S. Ct. 417 , 54 L. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Hicks v. United States
green
1 sentence2006Hicks v. United States, 434 U.S. 930 , 98 S. Ct. 417 , 54 L. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia
green
1 sentence1999Defendant cites Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia , 71 Conn. 369 , 379 (1899) for the proposition that there is no vicarious liability for punitive or exemplary damages at common law. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Elias v. Unisys Corp.
green
2 sentences1999Elias v. Unisys Corp., 410 Mass. 479, 481 , 573 N.E.2d 946 (1991); Theophelis v. Lansing General Hospital, supra, 488-89. 1999Elias v. Unisys Corp., 410 Mass. 479, 481 , 573 N.E.2d 946 (1991); Theophelis v. Lansing General Hospital, supra, 488-89. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.