vicarious liability claim in Texas

2025Grp., 227 S.W.3d at 174 (concluding that a finding that the doctor was negligent could not support a deemed finding of vicarious liability because “[g]iven that no question was submitted that was necessarily referable to the theory of vicarious liability, no deemed finding could be made based on the jury’s verdict”); Salaiz, 866 S.W.2d at 636 (“Because appellees failed to submit any element necessarily referable to respondeat superior, the court could not make a deemed finding of course and scope of employment.”).31 Pattern Jury Charge 10.1 provides the following freestanding question for 31 e

2022Control, however, was divorced from the course and scope inquiry in Painter. 561 S.W.3d at 132 (“Accordingly, we disagree with those courts of appeals that have tied the right-to-control analysis to the course-and-scope element of a vicarious-liability claim.”).

2024Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680, 686 (Tex. 2007) (noting that “[g]enerally in Texas, the doctrine of vicarious liability, or respondeat superior, makes a principal liable for the conduct of his employee or agent”); Vecellio Ins.

2018Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez , 237 S.W.3d 680 , 686 (Tex. 2007) ("[T]he doctrine of vicarious liability, or respondeat superior, makes a principal liable for the conduct of his employee or agent.").

2015See, e.g., Ctr. for Neurological Disorders, P.A. v. George, 261 S.W.3d 285, 295 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied) (“[I]f the expert report is sufficient as to the claims against Dr. Ward, arid we have held that it is[,] ... then the report is sufficient as to claims against CND that are based on Dr. Ward’s alleged negligence.” (footnote omitted)).

2015See, e.g., Ctr. for Neurological Disorders, P.A. v. George, 261 S.W.3d 285, 295 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied) (“[I]f the expert report is sufficient as to the claims against Dr. Ward, and we have held that it is[,] . . . then the report is sufficient as to claims against CND that are based on Dr. Ward’s alleged negligence.” (Footnote omitted.)).

2011See Ogletree, 262 S.W.3d at 820-21 .

2011See Ogletree, 262 S.W.3d at 320-21 .

2009Cf. Obstetrical & Gynecological Assocs., P.A. v. McCoy, 283 S.W.3d 96, 103 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. filed) (holding that a professional *274 association's objection regarding the sufficiency of an expert report's opinion on a claimant's vicarious liability claim against the association is waived when a proffered report detailing the association's doctor's conduct sufficiently implicated the association and the association did not object). [6] RGV Healthcare's first issue sustained in part, and overruled in part.

2009Cf. Obstetriml & Gynecological Assocs., P.A. v. McCoy, 283 S.W.3d 96, 103 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. filed) (holding that a professional association’s objection regarding the sufficiency of an expert report’s opinion on a claimant’s vicarious liability claim against the association is waived when a proffered report detailing the association’s doctor’s conduct sufficiently implicated the association and the association did not object). 6 RGV Healthcare’s first issue sustained in part, and overruled in part.

2021Id. at 632 (citing Gardner v. U.S. Imaging, Inc., 274 S.W.3d 669, 671-72 (Tex. 2008)(per curiam).

2015While the under- party's agents or employees is sufficient.” Gardner lying nature of the vicarious liability claim rests in v. U.S. Imaging, Inc., 274 S.W.3d 669 , 671–72 the intentional acts of Bean, which appear to be un- (Tex.2008) (per curiam).

2025Grp., 227 S.W.3d at 174 (concluding that a finding that the doctor was negligent could not support a deemed finding of vicarious liability because “[g]iven that no question was submitted that was necessarily referable to the theory of vicarious liability, no deemed finding could be made based on the jury’s verdict”); Salaiz, 866 S.W.2d at 636 (“Because appellees failed to submit any element necessarily referable to respondeat superior, the court could not make a deemed finding of course and scope of employment.”).31 Pattern Jury Charge 10.1 provides the following freestanding question for 31 e

2018See id. ; see also Laverie v. Wetherbe , 517 S.W.3d 748 , 753 (Tex. 2017) (noting that the traditional scope-of-employment analysis in respondeat-superior cases "concerns only whether the employee is discharging the duties generally assigned to her" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) ).

2018Eagle Trucking , 612 S.W.2d at 508 ("Texas Bitulithic and G & G Construction had no more than the power to direct the place sand was to be loaded and the place it was to be unloaded.

2018Eagle Trucking, 612 S.W.2d at 508 (“Texas Bitulithic and G & G Construction had no more than the power to direct the place sand was to be loaded and the place it was to be unloaded.

2011P. 26.1(b), 28.1(a); Lewis v. Funderburk, 191 S.W.3d 756, 757 (Tex.App.-Waco 2006), rev’d in part, 253 S.W.3d 204 (Tex.2008). 2 Brinkley, on the other hand, asserts that she has only ever asserted a single vicarious-liability claim and that her amended petition merely “expanded” her existing vicarious-liability theory to include the acts and omissions of Dryer.

2011App. P. 26.1(b), 28.1(a); Lewis v. Funderburk , 191 S.W.3d 756, 757 (Tex. App.--Waco 2006), rev'd in part , 253 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. 2008). (2) Brinkley, on the other hand, asserts that she has only ever asserted a single vicarious-liability claim and that her amended petition merely "expanded" her existing vicarious-liability theory to include the acts and omissions of Dryer.

2007Minyard Food Stores v. Goodman, 80 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tex.2002); Baptist Mem’l Hosp.

2007Minyard Food Stores v. Goodman , 80 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tex. 2002); Baptist Mem'l Hosp.

2016Nevertheless, the Supreme Court considered the hospital’s challenge to the sufficiency of the report with respect to the vicarious liability claim and held that because the reports were adequate to support the plaintiff’s claims against the doctors, “the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding [the plaintiff]’s reports adequate as to the claim that [the hospital] is vicariously liable for actions of the doctors.” Id. at 44 . 2 Alex was admitted to Hilltop on March 22, 2013, to begin his rehabilitation program.

2015Partnership, 401 S.W.3d at 44 (holding that because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert report adequate as to the vicarious liability claim against the hospital based on the actions of the doctors, plaintiffs suit against the hospital, including her claim that the hospital was vicariously hable for the actions of its nurses, could proceed).

2026Further, in such cases, a threshold expert report need not “mention [the defendant alleged to 2 See Methodist Hosp. v. Addison, 574 S.W.3d 490, 502 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (“A medical expert . . . may rely on the reports and opinions of others in forming his own causation opinion.”); Kelly v. Rendon, 255 S.W.3d 665, 676 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“While a nurse’s report, standing alone, is inadequate to meet the requirements of the statute as to medical causation, nothing in the health care liability statute prohibits an otherwise qualified physician

2026Further, in such cases, a threshold expert report need not “mention [the defendant alleged to 2 See Methodist Hosp. v. Addison, 574 S.W.3d 490, 502 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (“A medical expert . . . may rely on the reports and opinions of others in forming his own causation opinion.”); Kelly v. Rendon, 255 S.W.3d 665, 676 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“While a nurse’s report, standing alone, is inadequate to meet the requirements of the statute as to medical causation, nothing in the health care liability statute prohibits an otherwise qualified physician

2025A certified nonprofit health organization “may not interfere with, control, or otherwise direct a physician’s professional judgment in violation of this subchapter or any other provision of law, including board rules.” 4 This language not only prohibits interference and control, but also uses the catch-all term “otherwise” to prohibit any other means of unlawfully directing a physician. 5 The clearest prohibited interference, as the Court notes, is attempted control of a physician’s “independent medical Scheele, 120 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Tex. 2003))); id. at 914 (“But the fact that [Renaissance] ma

2025A certified nonprofit health organization “may not interfere with, control, or otherwise direct a physician’s professional judgment in violation of this subchapter or any other provision of law, including board rules.” 4 This language not only prohibits interference and control, but also uses the catch-all term “otherwise” to prohibit any other means of unlawfully directing a physician. 5 The clearest prohibited interference, as the Court notes, is attempted control of a physician’s “independent medical Scheele, 120 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Tex. 2003))); id. at 914 (“But the fact that [Renaissance] ma

2025Grp., 227 S.W.3d at 174 (concluding that a finding that the doctor was negligent could not support a deemed finding of vicarious liability because “[g]iven that no question was submitted that was necessarily referable to the theory of vicarious liability, no deemed finding could be made based on the jury’s verdict”); Salaiz, 866 S.W.2d at 636 (“Because appellees failed to submit any element necessarily referable to respondeat superior, the court could not make a deemed finding of course and scope of employment.”).31 Pattern Jury Charge 10.1 provides the following freestanding question for 31 e

2025Grp., 227 S.W.3d at 174 (concluding that a finding that the doctor was negligent could not support a deemed finding of vicarious liability because “[g]iven that no question was submitted that was necessarily referable to the theory of vicarious liability, no deemed finding could be made based on the jury’s verdict”); Salaiz, 866 S.W.2d at 636 (“Because appellees failed to submit any element necessarily referable to respondeat superior, the court could not make a deemed finding of course and scope of employment.”).31 Pattern Jury Charge 10.1 provides the following freestanding question for 31 e

2024See SSP Partners, 275 S.W.3d at 455 ; see also City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810 (providing we will reverse judgment if, among other things, a court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact).

2024See SSP Partners, 275 S.W.3d at 455 ; see also City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810 (providing - 32 - 04-23-00100-CV we will reverse judgment if, among other things, a court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact).

2024Farlow v. Harris Methodist Fort Worth Hosp., 284 S.W.3d 903, 910 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied).

2024See SSP Partners, 275 S.W.3d at 455 ; see also City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810 (providing we will reverse judgment if, among other things, a court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact).

2024See SSP Partners, 275 S.W.3d at 455 ; see also City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810 (providing - 32 - 04-23-00100-CV we will reverse judgment if, among other things, a court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact).

2023See id.

2020See id. at 708-09 & 711.

2018See id. at ___ (explaining that an employer’s right to control the injury- producing activity is not part of the vicarious liability analysis because the existence of an employer–employee relationship establishes the requisite control).

2018See id. ; see also Laverie v. Wetherbe , 517 S.W.3d 748 , 753 (Tex. 2017) (noting that the traditional scope-of-employment analysis in respondeat-superior cases "concerns only whether the employee is discharging the duties generally assigned to her" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) ).

2015See Maxwell v. Seifert, 237 S.W.3d 423, 426 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); see also Davis v. Baker, No. 03–10–00324–CV, 2010 WL 5463864 , at *2–3, 2010 Tex.App.

2012Id. at 656, 665.

2012The vicarious- liability claim did not assert that “Dr. Tesoro failed to provide proper health care treatment.” Id. at 665.