expression of opinion violation in North Carolina

1988State v. Whittington, 318 N.C. 114 , 347 S.E. 2d 403 (1986); State v. Jackson, 306 N.C. 642 , 295 S.E. 2d 383 (1982).

1988State v. Whittington, 318 N.C. 114 , 347 S.E. 2d 403 (1986); State v. Jackson, 306 N.C. 642 , 295 S.E. 2d 383 (1982).

1988State v. Whittington, 318 N.C. 114 , 347 S.E. 2d 403 (1986); State v. Jackson, 306 N.C. 642 , 295 S.E. 2d 383 (1982).

1988State v. Whittington, 318 N.C. 114 , 347 S.E. 2d 403 (1986); State v. Jackson, 306 N.C. 642 , 295 S.E. 2d 383 (1982).

1977State v. Bailey, 280 N.C. 264 , 185 S.E. 2d 683 (1972).

1977State v. Bailey, 280 N.C. 264 , 185 S.E. 2d 683 (1972).

1973State v. Duncan, 282 N.C. 412 , 193 S.E. 2d 65 ; State v. Chance, supra. Defendant’s last assignment of error asserts that the charge of the court in summarizing the evidence for the jury was weighed in favor of the State to such a degree that it constituted an expression of opinion in violation of G.S. 1-180.

1973State v. Duncan, 282 N.C. 412 , 193 S.E. 2d 65 ; State v. Chance, supra. Defendant’s last assignment of error asserts that the charge of the court in summarizing the evidence for the jury was weighed in favor of the State to such a degree that it constituted an expression of opinion in violation of G.S. 1-180.

1973State v. Duncan, 282 N.C. 412 , 193 S.E. 2d 65 ; State v. Chance, supra. Defendant’s last assignment of error asserts that the charge of the court in summarizing the evidence for the jury was weighed in favor of the State to such a degree that it constituted an expression of opinion in violation of G.S. 1-180.

1969Chief Justice Parker in State v. Foster, 268 N.C. 480, 485 , 151 S.E. 2d 62, 66 , sets out the conditions for application of the doctrine of possession of recently stolen property as follows: “(1) That the property described in the indictment was stolen, the mere fact of finding one man’s property in another man’s possession raising no presumption that the latter stole it; (2) that the property shown to have been possessed by accused was the stolen property; and (3) that the possession was recently after the larceny, since mere possession of stolen property raises no presumption of guilt.

1969Chief Justice Parker in State v. Foster, 268 N.C. 480, 485 , 151 S.E. 2d 62, 66 , sets out the conditions for application of the doctrine of possession of recently stolen property as follows: “(1) That the property described in the indictment was stolen, the mere fact of finding one man’s property in another man’s possession raising no presumption that the latter stole it; (2) that the property shown to have been possessed by accused was the stolen property; and (3) that the possession was recently after the larceny, since mere possession of stolen property raises no presumption of guilt.

1969After stating that the agent had testified that a piece of glass had been thrown or was found in the ditch near the window, the judge stated that the agent testified that he examined the window “. . . and the glass that was found in the ditch that fit the place where the window was broken . . .” The defendants contend the judge in this quoted portion of his charge was in effect saying that the glass found in the ditch, on which fingerprints were found, fitted the place where the window was broken, and that this was an expression of opinion in violation of G.S. 1-180 and a material misstatement

1969After stating that the agent had testified that a piece of glass had been thrown or was found in the ditch near the window, the judge stated that the agent testified that he examined the window “. . . and the glass that was found in the ditch that fit the place where the window was broken . . .” The defendants contend the judge in this quoted portion of his charge was in effect saying that the glass found in the ditch, on which fingerprints were found, fitted the place where the window was broken, and that this was an expression of opinion in violation of G.S. 1-180 and a material misstatement

1968The present situation is clearly distinguishable from State v. McNeill, 231 N.C. 666 , 58 S.E. 2d 366 , and State v. McBryde, 270 N.C. 776 , 155 S.E. 2d 266 , where, in each instance, the witness was taken into custody under such circumstances that the jury observed it.

1968The present situation is clearly distinguishable from State v. McNeill, 231 N.C. 666 , 58 S.E. 2d 366 , and State v. McBryde, 270 N.C. 776 , 155 S.E. 2d 266 , where, in each instance, the witness was taken into custody under such circumstances that the jury observed it.

1968Thompson v. Davis, 223 N.C. 792 , 28 S.E. 2d 556 .

1968Thompson v. Davis, 223 N.C. 792 , 28 S.E. 2d 556 .

1968The present situation is clearly distinguishable from State v. McNeill, 231 N.C. 666 , 58 S.E. 2d 366 , and State v. McBryde, 270 N.C. 776 , 155 S.E. 2d 266 , where, in each instance, the witness was taken into custody under such circumstances that the jury observed it.

1968The present situation is clearly distinguishable from State v. McNeill, 231 N.C. 666 , 58 S.E. 2d 366 , and State v. McBryde, 270 N.C. 776 , 155 S.E. 2d 266 , where, in each instance, the witness was taken into custody under such circumstances that the jury observed it.

1965State v. Nat, 51 N.C. 114 ; People v. Cowan (Cal. 1905), 82 P. 339 .” The appellant seeks to sustain this assignment of error on the ground that the court was not justified in charging the jury with respect to interested witnesses, and, therefore, such charge was tantamount to an expression of opinion in violation of G.S. 1-180.

1965State v. Nat, 51 N.C. 114 ; People v. Cowan (Cal. 1905), 82 P. 339 .” The appellant seeks to sustain this assignment of error on the ground that the court was not justified in charging the jury with respect to interested witnesses, and, therefore, such charge was tantamount to an expression of opinion in violation of G.S. 1-180.