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7 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1974–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Adder v. Holman & Moody, Inc.green2 sentences2017“A release is the giving up or abandoning of a claim or right to the person against whom the claim exists or the right is to be exercised.” Adder v. Holman & Moody, Inc., 288 N.C. 484, 492 , 219 S.E.2d 190, 195 (1975). 2017“A release is the giving up or abandoning of a claim or right to the person against whom the claim exists or the right is to be exercised.” Adder v. Holman & Moody, Inc., 288 N.C. 484, 492 , 219 S.E.2d 190, 195 (1975). | 3 | 3 |
Financial Services of Raleigh, Inc. v. Barefootgreen2 sentences2016Servs. of Raleigh, Inc. v. Barefoot, 163 N.C. 2015App. 387, 392 , 594 S.E.2d 37, 41 (2004) (quotations and citation omitted); Adder v. Holman & Moody, Inc., 288 N.C. 484, 492 , 219 S.E.2d 190, 195 (1975) (“A release is the giving up or abandoning of a claim or right to the person against whom the claim exists or the right is to be exercised.”). {31} “Releases are contractual in nature and their interpretation is governed by the same rules governing interpretation of contracts.” Chemimetals Processing, Inc. v. Schrimsher, 140 N.C. | 2 | 2 |
O & M INDUSTRIES v. Smith Engineering Co.green2 sentences2018In addition, it seems to us that a decision to provide a claimant whose property has been taken for a public purpose with a statutory *860 inverse condemnation remedy while depriving a claimant who has suffered the same injury for a non-public purpose of the right to utilize that statutory remedy seems inconsistent with the likely legislative intent. "[W]hen the Act is considered as a whole in the light of the evils sought to be eliminated, the remedies intended to be applied, and the objective to be attained," a decision to construe N.C.G.S. § 40A-51 so as to limit plaintiffs' statutory inver 2018In addition, it seems to us that a decision to provide a claimant whose property has been taken for a public purpose with a statutory *860 inverse condemnation remedy while depriving a claimant who has suffered the same injury for a non-public purpose of the right to utilize that statutory remedy seems inconsistent with the likely legislative intent. "[W]hen the Act is considered as a whole in the light of the evils sought to be eliminated, the remedies intended to be applied, and the objective to be attained," a decision to construe N.C.G.S. § 40A-51 so as to limit plaintiffs' statutory inver | 1 | 1 |
Chemimetals Processing, Inc. v. Schrimshergreen2 sentences2015App. 135, 138 , 535 S.E.2d 594, 596 (2000) (citation omitted); Fin Servs. 2015App. 387, 392 , 594 S.E.2d 37, 41 (2004) (quotations and citation omitted); Adder v. Holman & Moody, Inc., 288 N.C. 484, 492 , 219 S.E.2d 190, 195 (1975) (“A release is the giving up or abandoning of a claim or right to the person against whom the claim exists or the right is to be exercised.”). {31} “Releases are contractual in nature and their interpretation is governed by the same rules governing interpretation of contracts.” Chemimetals Processing, Inc. v. Schrimsher, 140 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Puckett v. Sellars
green
2 sentences2018In addition, it seems to us that a decision to provide a claimant whose property has been taken for a public purpose with a statutory *860 inverse condemnation remedy while depriving a claimant who has suffered the same injury for a non-public purpose of the right to utilize that statutory remedy seems inconsistent with the likely legislative intent. "[W]hen the Act is considered as a whole in the light of the evils sought to be eliminated, the remedies intended to be applied, and the objective to be attained," a decision to construe N.C.G.S. § 40A-51 so as to limit plaintiffs' statutory inver 2018In addition, it seems to us that a decision to provide a claimant whose property has been taken for a public purpose with a statutory *860 inverse condemnation remedy while depriving a claimant who has suffered the same injury for a non-public purpose of the right to utilize that statutory remedy seems inconsistent with the likely legislative intent. "[W]hen the Act is considered as a whole in the light of the evils sought to be eliminated, the remedies intended to be applied, and the objective to be attained," a decision to construe N.C.G.S. § 40A-51 so as to limit plaintiffs' statutory inver | 1 | 2018–2018 |
N. C. Monroe Construction Co. v. Coan
green
1 sentence2014App. 731, 737 , 228 S.E.2d 497, 501 , disc. review denied, 291 N.C. 323 , 230 S.E.2d 676 (1976)), disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 666 , 467 S.E.2d 738 (1996). “[A] claim is not discharged [by accord and satisfaction by use of instrument] when the claimant, if an organization, proves that (i) within a reasonable time before the tender, the claimant sent a conspicuous statement to the person against whom the claim is asserted that communications concerning disputed debts, including an instrument tendered as full satisfaction of a debt, are to be sent to a designated person, office, or place, and ( | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Wrenn v. Byrd
green
1 sentence2014App. 731, 737 , 228 S.E.2d 497, 501 , disc. review denied, 291 N.C. 323 , 230 S.E.2d 676 (1976)), disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 666 , 467 S.E.2d 738 (1996). “[A] claim is not discharged [by accord and satisfaction by use of instrument] when the claimant, if an organization, proves that (i) within a reasonable time before the tender, the claimant sent a conspicuous statement to the person against whom the claim is asserted that communications concerning disputed debts, including an instrument tendered as full satisfaction of a debt, are to be sent to a designated person, office, or place, and ( | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Poole v. Miller
green
1 sentence2014App. 731, 737 , 228 S.E.2d 497, 501 , disc. review denied, 291 N.C. 323 , 230 S.E.2d 676 (1976)), disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 666 , 467 S.E.2d 738 (1996). “[A] claim is not discharged [by accord and satisfaction by use of instrument] when the claimant, if an organization, proves that (i) within a reasonable time before the tender, the claimant sent a conspicuous statement to the person against whom the claim is asserted that communications concerning disputed debts, including an instrument tendered as full satisfaction of a debt, are to be sent to a designated person, office, or place, and ( | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Mazzucco v. NORTH CAROLINA BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS
green
2 sentences2014App. 731, 737 , 228 S.E.2d 497, 501 , disc. review denied, 291 N.C. 323 , 230 S.E.2d 676 (1976)), disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 666 , 467 S.E.2d 738 (1996). “[A] claim is not discharged [by accord and satisfaction by use of instrument] when the claimant, if an organization, proves that (i) within a reasonable time before the tender, the claimant sent a conspicuous statement to the person against whom the claim is asserted that communications concerning disputed debts, including an instrument tendered as full satisfaction of a debt, are to be sent to a designated person, office, or place, and ( 2014App. 731, 737 , 228 S.E.2d 497, 501 , disc. review denied, 291 N.C. 323 , 230 S.E.2d 676 (1976)), disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 666 , 467 S.E.2d 738 (1996). “[A] claim is not discharged [by accord and satisfaction by use of instrument] when the claimant, if an organization, proves that (i) within a reasonable time before the tender, the claimant sent a conspicuous statement to the person against whom the claim is asserted that communications concerning disputed debts, including an instrument tendered as full satisfaction of a debt, are to be sent to a designated person, office, or place, and ( | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Mooney v. . Mull
green
2 sentences1974Mooney v. Mull, 216 N.C. 410 , 5 S.E. 2d 122 ; Byrd, Malicious Prosecution in North Carolina, 47 N.C. 1974Mooney v. Mull, 216 N.C. 410 , 5 S.E. 2d 122 ; Byrd, Malicious Prosecution in North Carolina, 47 N.C. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.