13 California opinions name it 3 courts 1939–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co.green2 sentences1961An instruction bearing a similar fault was criticized and held to be reversible error in Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682 [ 268 P.2d 1041 ], The Supreme Court, Chief Justice Gibson speaking, said at pages 691-692: "The instructions given, however, were erroneous in that, while they purported to state all the conditions under which res ipsa loquitur would be applicable, they did not inform the jury that plaintiffs must show that the instrumentality which caused the damage was not mishandled or its condition otherwise changed after control was relinquished by the person against whom t 1961An instruction bearing a similar fault was criticized and held to be reversible error in Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682 [ 268 P.2d 1041 ], The Supreme Court, Chief Justice Gibson speaking, said at pages 691-692: "The instructions given, however, were erroneous in that, while they purported to state all the conditions under which res ipsa loquitur would be applicable, they did not inform the jury that plaintiffs must show that the instrumentality which caused the damage was not mishandled or its condition otherwise changed after control was relinquished by the person against whom t | 2 | 3 |
Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co.green2 sentences1967(Hidden v. Malinoff, 174 Cal.App.2d 845, 850 [345 P.2d 499]; Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 42 Cal.2d 158, 162 [ 265 P.2d 904 ].) Assumption of risk is only an issue where there is evidence that the nature and magnitude of the risk undertaken are fully known and appreciated by the person against whom the doctrine is asserted. 1967(Hidden v. Malinoff, 174 Cal.App.2d 845, 850 [345 P.2d 499]; Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 42 Cal.2d 158, 162 [ 265 P.2d 904 ].) Assumption of risk is only an issue where there is evidence that the nature and magnitude of the risk undertaken are fully known and appreciated by the person against whom the doctrine is asserted. | 2 | 2 |
Hidden v. Malinoffgreen2 sentences1967(Hidden v. Malinoff, 174 Cal.App.2d 845, 850 [345 P.2d 499]; Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 42 Cal.2d 158, 162 [ 265 P.2d 904 ].) Assumption of risk is only an issue where there is evidence that the nature and magnitude of the risk undertaken are fully known and appreciated by the person against whom the doctrine is asserted. 1967(Hidden v. Malinoff, 174 Cal.App.2d 845, 850 [345 P.2d 499]; Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 42 Cal.2d 158, 162 [ 265 P.2d 904 ].) Assumption of risk is only an issue where there is evidence that the nature and magnitude of the risk undertaken are fully known and appreciated by the person against whom the doctrine is asserted. | 2 | 2 |
O'BANION v. Borbagreen2 sentences1966(O'Banion v. Borba, 32 Cal.2d 145, 150 [ 195 P.2d 10 ].) Thus an actual, open, and notorious use of an underground conduit, hostile and adverse to the title of the person against whom the claim is made, under claim of right, continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period of five years (Civ. 1959(O’Banion v. Borba, 32 Cal.2d 145, 150 [ 195 P.2d 10 ].) Thus an actual, open, and notorious use of an underground conduit, hostile and adverse to the title of the person against whom the claim is made, under claim of right, continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period of five years (Civ, Code, §1007) will ripen into an easement by prescription. | 2 | 2 |
Szczotka v. Idelsongreen2 sentences1974Plaintiff’s theory is simple: It is a bona fide purchaser, because its branch manager, Geyer, did not know the certificates were stolen—there never was any question that the certificates were genuine—and the rule is well-established that “mere suspicion of infirmities does not preclude the transferee from occupying the position of holder in due course.” (Szczotka v. Idelson 228 Cal.App.2d 399, 405 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 466 ].) Simplicity, apparently, does not defeat the claim of a bona fide purchaser; the standard is not what a reasonable man would do under the circumstances. 1974Plaintiff’s theory is simple: It is a bona fide purchaser, because its branch manager, Geyer, did not know the certificates were stolen—there never was any question that the certificates were genuine—and the rule is well-established that “mere suspicion of infirmities does not preclude the transferee from occupying the position of holder in due course.” (Szczotka v. Idelson 228 Cal.App.2d 399, 405 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 466 ].) Simplicity, apparently, does not defeat the claim of a bona fide purchaser; the standard is not what a reasonable man would do under the circumstances. | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Harmongreen2 sentences1966Thereafter the city filed points and authorities “pertaining to statutes of limitation and prescriptive issues raised by the facts of the case,” one sentence thereof being as follows: “Thus an actual, open, and notorious use of an underground conduit, hostile and adverse to the title of the person against whom the claim is made, under claim of right, continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period of five years will ripen into an easement by prescription.” The city cited Jones v. Harmon, 175 Cal.App.2d 869, 875 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 192 ], 1966Thereafter the city filed points and authorities “pertaining to statutes of limitation and prescriptive issues raised by the facts of the case,” one sentence thereof being as follows: “Thus an actual, open, and notorious use of an underground conduit, hostile and adverse to the title of the person against whom the claim is made, under claim of right, continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period of five years will ripen into an easement by prescription.” The city cited Jones v. Harmon, 175 Cal.App.2d 869, 875 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 192 ], | 1 | 1 |
Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Saving Associationgreen2 sentences1960It is fundamental that an order or judgment is only res judicata as to the person against whom the doctrine is asserted where such person was a party to the action in which the order or judgment was made (Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 810-811 [ 122 P.2d 892 ] ; Grable v. Citizens Nat. 1960It is fundamental that an order or judgment is only res judicata as to the person against whom the doctrine is asserted where such person was a party to the action in which the order or judgment was made (Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 810-811 [ 122 P.2d 892 ] ; Grable v. Citizens Nat. | 1 | 1 |
Hails v. Martzgreen2 sentences1959(Adams v. Estate of Smith, 88 Cal.App.2d 910 [ 199 P.2d 730 ]; Hahn v. Curtis, 73 Cal.App.2d 382, 389 [ 166 P.2d 611 ]; Hails v. Martz, 28 Cal.2d 775, 778 [ 172 P.2d 52 ]; see generally: Cook, Legal Analysis in the Law of Prescriptive Easements, 15 So.Cal.L.Rev. 44.) As stated in Lindsay v. King, 138 Cal.App.2d 333, 340 [ 292 P.2d 23 ]: ‘‘There can be no doubt, of course, that acquisition of a title by prescription requires that there be an invasion of the rights of the owner of the servient estate, because, without such invasion, the owner of the servient estate has no cause of action, and so 1959(Adams v. Estate of Smith, 88 Cal.App.2d 910 [ 199 P.2d 730 ]; Hahn v. Curtis, 73 Cal.App.2d 382, 389 [ 166 P.2d 611 ]; Hails v. Martz, 28 Cal.2d 775, 778 [ 172 P.2d 52 ]; see generally: Cook, Legal Analysis in the Law of Prescriptive Easements, 15 So.Cal.L.Rev. 44.) As stated in Lindsay v. King, 138 Cal.App.2d 333, 340 [ 292 P.2d 23 ]: ‘‘There can be no doubt, of course, that acquisition of a title by prescription requires that there be an invasion of the rights of the owner of the servient estate, because, without such invasion, the owner of the servient estate has no cause of action, and so | 1 | 1 |
Lindsay v. Kinggreen2 sentences1959(Adams v. Estate of Smith, 88 Cal.App.2d 910 [ 199 P.2d 730 ]; Hahn v. Curtis, 73 Cal.App.2d 382, 389 [ 166 P.2d 611 ]; Hails v. Martz, 28 Cal.2d 775, 778 [ 172 P.2d 52 ]; see generally: Cook, Legal Analysis in the Law of Prescriptive Easements, 15 So.Cal.L.Rev. 44.) As stated in Lindsay v. King, 138 Cal.App.2d 333, 340 [ 292 P.2d 23 ]: ‘‘There can be no doubt, of course, that acquisition of a title by prescription requires that there be an invasion of the rights of the owner of the servient estate, because, without such invasion, the owner of the servient estate has no cause of action, and so 1959(Adams v. Estate of Smith, 88 Cal.App.2d 910 [ 199 P.2d 730 ]; Hahn v. Curtis, 73 Cal.App.2d 382, 389 [ 166 P.2d 611 ]; Hails v. Martz, 28 Cal.2d 775, 778 [ 172 P.2d 52 ]; see generally: Cook, Legal Analysis in the Law of Prescriptive Easements, 15 So.Cal.L.Rev. 44.) As stated in Lindsay v. King, 138 Cal.App.2d 333, 340 [ 292 P.2d 23 ]: ‘‘There can be no doubt, of course, that acquisition of a title by prescription requires that there be an invasion of the rights of the owner of the servient estate, because, without such invasion, the owner of the servient estate has no cause of action, and so | 1 | 1 |
Hahn v. Curtisgreen2 sentences1959(Adams v. Estate of Smith, 88 Cal.App.2d 910 [ 199 P.2d 730 ]; Hahn v. Curtis, 73 Cal.App.2d 382, 389 [ 166 P.2d 611 ]; Hails v. Martz, 28 Cal.2d 775, 778 [ 172 P.2d 52 ]; see generally: Cook, Legal Analysis in the Law of Prescriptive Easements, 15 So.Cal.L.Rev. 44.) As stated in Lindsay v. King, 138 Cal.App.2d 333, 340 [ 292 P.2d 23 ]: ‘‘There can be no doubt, of course, that acquisition of a title by prescription requires that there be an invasion of the rights of the owner of the servient estate, because, without such invasion, the owner of the servient estate has no cause of action, and so 1959(Adams v. Estate of Smith, 88 Cal.App.2d 910 [ 199 P.2d 730 ]; Hahn v. Curtis, 73 Cal.App.2d 382, 389 [ 166 P.2d 611 ]; Hails v. Martz, 28 Cal.2d 775, 778 [ 172 P.2d 52 ]; see generally: Cook, Legal Analysis in the Law of Prescriptive Easements, 15 So.Cal.L.Rev. 44.) As stated in Lindsay v. King, 138 Cal.App.2d 333, 340 [ 292 P.2d 23 ]: ‘‘There can be no doubt, of course, that acquisition of a title by prescription requires that there be an invasion of the rights of the owner of the servient estate, because, without such invasion, the owner of the servient estate has no cause of action, and so | 1 | 1 |
Honea v. City Dairy, Inc.green2 sentences1958(Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal.2d 190, 195 [7] [ 293 P.2d 26 ] ; Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 691 [10] [ 268 P.2d 1041 ]; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 458 [2] [ 150 P.2d 436 ].) The rule is accurately stated by Mr. Chief Justice Gibson in Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., supra, as follows: “The instructions given, however, were erroneous in that, while they purported to state all the conditions under which res ipsa loquitur would be applicable, they did not inform the jury that plaintiffs must show that the instrumentality which caused the damage w 1958(Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal.2d 190, 195 [7] [ 293 P.2d 26 ] ; Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 691 [10] [ 268 P.2d 1041 ]; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 458 [2] [ 150 P.2d 436 ].) The rule is accurately stated by Mr. Chief Justice Gibson in Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., supra, as follows: “The instructions given, however, were erroneous in that, while they purported to state all the conditions under which res ipsa loquitur would be applicable, they did not inform the jury that plaintiffs must show that the instrumentality which caused the damage w | 1 | 1 |
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.green2 sentences1958(Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal.2d 190, 195 [7] [ 293 P.2d 26 ] ; Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 691 [10] [ 268 P.2d 1041 ]; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 458 [2] [ 150 P.2d 436 ].) The rule is accurately stated by Mr. Chief Justice Gibson in Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., supra, as follows: “The instructions given, however, were erroneous in that, while they purported to state all the conditions under which res ipsa loquitur would be applicable, they did not inform the jury that plaintiffs must show that the instrumentality which caused the damage w 1958(Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal.2d 190, 195 [7] [ 293 P.2d 26 ] ; Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 691 [10] [ 268 P.2d 1041 ]; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 458 [2] [ 150 P.2d 436 ].) The rule is accurately stated by Mr. Chief Justice Gibson in Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., supra, as follows: “The instructions given, however, were erroneous in that, while they purported to state all the conditions under which res ipsa loquitur would be applicable, they did not inform the jury that plaintiffs must show that the instrumentality which caused the damage w | 1 | 1 |
Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd.green2 sentences1958(Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal.2d 190, 195 [7] [ 293 P.2d 26 ] ; Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 691 [10] [ 268 P.2d 1041 ]; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 458 [2] [ 150 P.2d 436 ].) The rule is accurately stated by Mr. Chief Justice Gibson in Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., supra, as follows: “The instructions given, however, were erroneous in that, while they purported to state all the conditions under which res ipsa loquitur would be applicable, they did not inform the jury that plaintiffs must show that the instrumentality which caused the damage w 1958(Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal.2d 190, 195 [7] [ 293 P.2d 26 ] ; Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 691 [10] [ 268 P.2d 1041 ]; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 458 [2] [ 150 P.2d 436 ].) The rule is accurately stated by Mr. Chief Justice Gibson in Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., supra, as follows: “The instructions given, however, were erroneous in that, while they purported to state all the conditions under which res ipsa loquitur would be applicable, they did not inform the jury that plaintiffs must show that the instrumentality which caused the damage w | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Van Buren Plaza, LLC
neutral
2 sentences2002C.D.Cal. 1996) 200 B.R. 384, 386 .) In 1992, however, the Legislature enacted California Uniform Commercial Code section 3311, which provides in pertinent part: “(a) If a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (1) that person in good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the claim, (2) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, and (3) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, the following subdivisions apply. “(b) Unless subdivision (c) applies, the claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is a 2002(Cf. Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 592, 597 , 234 P.2d 16 and In re Van Buren Plaza (Bkrtcy.C.D.Cal.1996) 200 B.R. 384, 386 .) In 1992, however, the Legislature enacted California Uniform Commercial Code section 3311, which provides in pertinent part: "(a) If a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (1) that person in good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the claim, (2) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, and (3) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, the following subdivisi | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Hook v. Point Montara Fire Protection District
green
2 sentences1967(Hidden v. Malinoff, supra; Hook v. Point Montara Fire etc. Dist., 213 Cal.App.2d 96 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 560 ].) Instructing on the doctrine of assumption of risk where there is no evidence that plaintiff had actual knowledge of the specific danger involved constitutes prejudicial error. 1967(Hidden v. Malinoff, supra; Hook v. Point Montara Fire etc. Dist., 213 Cal.App.2d 96 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 560 ].) Instructing on the doctrine of assumption of risk where there is no evidence that plaintiff had actual knowledge of the specific danger involved constitutes prejudicial error. | 2 | 1967–1967 |
Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc.
green
2 sentences1966(O'Banion v. Borba, 32 Cal.2d 145, 150 [ 195 P.2d 10 ].) Thus an actual, open, and notorious use of an underground conduit, hostile and adverse to the title of the person against whom the claim is made, under claim of right, continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period of five years (Civ. 1959(O’Banion v. Borba, 32 Cal.2d 145, 150 [ 195 P.2d 10 ].) Thus an actual, open, and notorious use of an underground conduit, hostile and adverse to the title of the person against whom the claim is made, under claim of right, continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period of five years (Civ, Code, §1007) will ripen into an easement by prescription. | 2 | 1959–1966 |
Bellows v. Bellows
green
1 sentence2022(Bellows v. Bellows (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 505, 510 .) Section 3311 provides, in relevant part: “(a) If a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (1) that person in good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the 9 claim, (2) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, and (3) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, the following subdivisions apply. [¶] (b) [T]he claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is asserted proves that the instrument or an accompanying written communication contained a co | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences2002(Cf. Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 592, 597 , 234 P.2d 16 and In re Van Buren Plaza (Bkrtcy.C.D.Cal.1996) 200 B.R. 384, 386 .) In 1992, however, the Legislature enacted California Uniform Commercial Code section 3311, which provides in pertinent part: "(a) If a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (1) that person in good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the claim, (2) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, and (3) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, the following subdivisi 2002(Cf. Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 592, 597 , 234 P.2d 16 and In re Van Buren Plaza (Bkrtcy.C.D.Cal.1996) 200 B.R. 384, 386 .) In 1992, however, the Legislature enacted California Uniform Commercial Code section 3311, which provides in pertinent part: "(a) If a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (1) that person in good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the claim, (2) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, and (3) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, the following subdivisi | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Adams v. Estate of Smith
green
2 sentences1959(Adams v. Estate of Smith, 88 Cal.App.2d 910 [ 199 P.2d 730 ]; Hahn v. Curtis, 73 Cal.App.2d 382, 389 [ 166 P.2d 611 ]; Hails v. Martz, 28 Cal.2d 775, 778 [ 172 P.2d 52 ]; see generally: Cook, Legal Analysis in the Law of Prescriptive Easements, 15 So.Cal.L.Rev. 44.) As stated in Lindsay v. King, 138 Cal.App.2d 333, 340 [ 292 P.2d 23 ]: ‘‘There can be no doubt, of course, that acquisition of a title by prescription requires that there be an invasion of the rights of the owner of the servient estate, because, without such invasion, the owner of the servient estate has no cause of action, and so 1959(Adams v. Estate of Smith, 88 Cal.App.2d 910 [ 199 P.2d 730 ]; Hahn v. Curtis, 73 Cal.App.2d 382, 389 [ 166 P.2d 611 ]; Hails v. Martz, 28 Cal.2d 775, 778 [ 172 P.2d 52 ]; see generally: Cook, Legal Analysis in the Law of Prescriptive Easements, 15 So.Cal.L.Rev. 44.) As stated in Lindsay v. King, 138 Cal.App.2d 333, 340 [ 292 P.2d 23 ]: ‘‘There can be no doubt, of course, that acquisition of a title by prescription requires that there be an invasion of the rights of the owner of the servient estate, because, without such invasion, the owner of the servient estate has no cause of action, and so | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Parker v. James Granger, Inc.
green
1 sentence1939The person invoking the doctrine must not be in a position to know the cause of the accident. ...” (Parker v. Granger, Inc., 4 Cal. (2d) 668, 674, 675 [ 52 Pac. (2d) 226 ].) As to the first-condition, it is clearly the general experience of mankind that telephone or other wires within several feet of the ground are not charged with a deadly current of electricity. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.