contractual arbitration clause in New Jersey

2004For example, if the underlying tort claim does not result in an adjudication of damages, as is often the case, the arbitration clause in the UM/UIM policy will be given full force and effect. [ Id. at 343, 676 A. 2d 1065 ].

2002For example, if the underlying tort claim does not result in an adjudication of damages, as is often the case, the arbitration clause in the UM/UIM policy will be given full force and effect. [ Id. at 343, 676 A. 2d 1065 .] Essentially, Zirger was concerned with the "avoidance of redundant litigation." Id. at 335 , 676 A. 2d 1065 .

2018Servs., LLC , 215 N.J. 174 , 186, 71 A.3d 849 (2013).

2018Servs., LLC , 215 N.J. 174 , 186, 71 A.3d 849 (2013).

2012Thereafter, the defendant, still acting pro se, filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, "asserting for the first time, just six months after the filing of the complaint," that the action was barred by the contractual arbitration clause. [ Ibid. ] Against this backdrop, we held that the defendant had not waived her right to arbitration.

2012We emphasized that this pro se defendant filed her motion just six months after the plaintiff filed his complaint in the Superior Court complaint, and " well before any meaningful exchange of discovery—much less the discovery end date—and well in advance of fixing a trial date. " Indeed, the litigation had not even reached the point of noticing and taking depositions or filing dispositive motions, save, of course, for defendant's efforts to dismiss the lawsuit. [ Id. at 516 , 959 A. 2d 290 (emphasis added).] Our holding in Spaeth relied on Hudik-Ross, Inc. v. 1530 Palisade Avenue Corp., 131 N.

2012We emphasized that this pro se defendant filed her motion just six months after the plaintiff filed his complaint in the Superior Court complaint, and " well before any meaningful exchange of discovery—much less the discovery end date—and well in advance of fixing a trial date. " Indeed, the litigation had not even reached the point of noticing and taking depositions or filing dispositive motions, save, of course, for defendant's efforts to dismiss the lawsuit. [ Id. at 516 , 959 A. 2d 290 (emphasis added).] Our holding in Spaeth relied on Hudik-Ross, Inc. v. 1530 Palisade Avenue Corp., 131 N.

2012We emphasized that this pro se defendant filed her motion just six months after the plaintiff filed his complaint in the Superior Court complaint, and " well before any meaningful exchange of discovery—much less the discovery end date—and well in advance of fixing a trial date. " Indeed, the litigation had not even reached the point of noticing and taking depositions or filing dispositive motions, save, of course, for defendant's efforts to dismiss the lawsuit. [ Id. at 516 , 959 A. 2d 290 (emphasis added).] Our holding in Spaeth relied on Hudik-Ross, Inc. v. 1530 Palisade Avenue Corp., 131 N.

2005However the issue of the binding effect on non-parties of a contractual arbitration clause has been addressed. "[N]on-signatories of a contract ... may ... be subject to arbitration if the nonparty is an agent of a party or a third party beneficiary to the contract." Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., 333 N.J.Super. 291, 308 , 755 A. 2d 626, 636 (App.Div.2000), rev'd on other grounds, 168 N.J. 124 , 773 A. 2d 665 (2001) (quoting Mutual Benefit Life Ins.

2005However the issue of the binding effect on non-parties of a contractual arbitration clause has been addressed. "[N]on-signatories of a contract ... may ... be subject to arbitration if the nonparty is an agent of a party or a third party beneficiary to the contract." Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., 333 N.J.Super. 291, 308 , 755 A. 2d 626, 636 (App.Div.2000), rev'd on other grounds, 168 N.J. 124 , 773 A. 2d 665 (2001) (quoting Mutual Benefit Life Ins.

2005Co. v. Zimmerman, 783 F.Supp. 853, 865 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 970 F. 2d 899 (3d Cir.1992)).

1996Co. v. Benson, 87 N.J. 191, 199 , 432 A.2d 905 (1981) (citation omitted).] We invalidate the contractual arbitration clause only to the extent that it requires an arbitration proceeding that duplicates the underlying litigation of the tort claim.

1996Co. v. Benson, 87 N.J. 191, 199 , 432 A.2d 905 (1981) (citation omitted).] We invalidate the contractual arbitration clause only to the extent that it requires an arbitration proceeding that duplicates the underlying litigation of the tort claim.