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7 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Handygreen2 sentences2020Moreover, the facts here bear no resemblance to those in State v. Urbina, 221 N.J. 509 (2015), principally relied upon by defendant, which held that "before allowing a defendant to waive a claim of self-defense, we require 'a thorough and searching inquiry' into 'his or her understanding of the nature of the right being waived and the implications that flow from that choice." Id. at 528 (quoting State v. Handy, 215 N.J. 334, 362 (2013)). 2015As such, before allowing a defendant to waive a claim of self-defense, we require “a thorough and searching inquiry” into “his or her understanding of the nature of the right being waived and the implications that flow from that choice.” State v. Handy 3 , 215 N.J. 334, 362 , 73 A.3d 421 (2013); see also McCarthy, *529 supra, 394 U.S. at 466 , 89 S.Ct. at 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d at 425 (noting waiver cannot be deemed knowing, intelligent, and voluntary “unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts”). | 2 | 3 |
McCarthy v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015As such, before allowing a defendant to waive a claim of self-defense, we require “a thorough and searching inquiry” into “his or her understanding of the nature of the right being waived and the implications that flow from that choice.” State v. Handy 3 , 215 N.J. 334, 362 , 73 A.3d 421 (2013); see also McCarthy, *529 supra, 394 U.S. at 466 , 89 S.Ct. at 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d at 425 (noting waiver cannot be deemed knowing, intelligent, and voluntary “unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts”). 2015As such, before allowing a defendant to waive a claim of self-defense, we require “a thorough and searching inquiry” into “his or her understanding of the nature of the right being waived and the implications that flow from that choice.” State v. Handy 3 , 215 N.J. 334, 362 , 73 A.3d 421 (2013); see also McCarthy, *529 supra, 394 U.S. at 466 , 89 S.Ct. at 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d at 425 (noting waiver cannot be deemed knowing, intelligent, and voluntary “unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts”). | 2 | 2 |
Corbitt v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38-39 , 91 S.Ct. 160, 168 , 27 L.Ed. 2d 162, 171-72 (1970) (guilty plea not compelled or invalid under Fifth Amendment where made voluntarily and intelligently because induced by fear of possible death penalty); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 216 , 99 S.Ct. 492, 496 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 466, 472-73 (1978) (upholding statutory scheme where a defendant who pled non vult to a murder, rather than proceeding to a jury trial, could receive, at the discretion of the sentencing judge, the second-degree murder sentence of up to thirty years rather than t 1994See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38-39 , 91 S.Ct. 160, 168 , 27 L.Ed. 2d 162, 171-72 (1970) (guilty plea not compelled or invalid under Fifth Amendment where made voluntarily and intelligently because induced by fear of possible death penalty); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 216 , 99 S.Ct. 492, 496 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 466, 472-73 (1978) (upholding statutory scheme where a defendant who pled non vult to a murder, rather than proceeding to a jury trial, could receive, at the discretion of the sentencing judge, the second-degree murder sentence of up to thirty years rather than t | 1 | 1 |
Bordenkircher v. Hayesgreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38-39 , 91 S.Ct. 160, 168 , 27 L.Ed. 2d 162, 171-72 (1970) (guilty plea not compelled or invalid under Fifth Amendment where made voluntarily and intelligently because induced by fear of possible death penalty); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 216 , 99 S.Ct. 492, 496 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 466, 472-73 (1978) (upholding statutory scheme where a defendant who pled non vult to a murder, rather than proceeding to a jury trial, could receive, at the discretion of the sentencing judge, the second-degree murder sentence of up to thirty years rather than t 1994See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38-39 , 91 S.Ct. 160, 168 , 27 L.Ed. 2d 162, 171-72 (1970) (guilty plea not compelled or invalid under Fifth Amendment where made voluntarily and intelligently because induced by fear of possible death penalty); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 216 , 99 S.Ct. 492, 496 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 466, 472-73 (1978) (upholding statutory scheme where a defendant who pled non vult to a murder, rather than proceeding to a jury trial, could receive, at the discretion of the sentencing judge, the second-degree murder sentence of up to thirty years rather than t | 1 | 1 |
North Carolina v. Alfordgreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38-39 , 91 S.Ct. 160, 168 , 27 L.Ed. 2d 162, 171-72 (1970) (guilty plea not compelled or invalid under Fifth Amendment where made voluntarily and intelligently because induced by fear of possible death penalty); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 216 , 99 S.Ct. 492, 496 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 466, 472-73 (1978) (upholding statutory scheme where a defendant who pled non vult to a murder, rather than proceeding to a jury trial, could receive, at the discretion of the sentencing judge, the second-degree murder sentence of up to thirty years rather than t 1994See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38-39 , 91 S.Ct. 160, 168 , 27 L.Ed. 2d 162, 171-72 (1970) (guilty plea not compelled or invalid under Fifth Amendment where made voluntarily and intelligently because induced by fear of possible death penalty); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 216 , 99 S.Ct. 492, 496 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 466, 472-73 (1978) (upholding statutory scheme where a defendant who pled non vult to a murder, rather than proceeding to a jury trial, could receive, at the discretion of the sentencing judge, the second-degree murder sentence of up to thirty years rather than t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Duffy v. Currier
green
2 sentences1974There was no suggestion of striking the defendant’s answer though the court, after pointing out that the Federal Court Rules, as ours, contemplate “ Tull and equal mutual discovery in advance of trial’ so as to prevent surprise, prejudice and perjury”, in dicated that it would not tolerate any effort by the defendant to waive the privilege and testify at trial after having persisted in his refusal to testify at pretrial examination. 291 F. Supp. at 815 ; cf. Kaminsky, supra, 39 Brooklyn L. 1974There was no suggestion of striking the defendant's answer though the court, after pointing out that the Federal Court Rules, as ours, contemplate "`full and equal mutual discovery in advance of trial' so as to prevent surprise, prejudice and perjury", in dicated that it would not tolerate any effort by the defendant to waive the privilege and testify at trial after having persisted in his refusal to testify at pretrial examination. 291 F. Supp. at 815 ; cf. Kaminsky, supra, 39 Brooklyn L. | 2 | 1974–1974 |
In re Filosa
green
2 sentences2020Moreover, the facts here bear no resemblance to those in State v. Urbina, 221 N.J. 509 (2015), principally relied upon by defendant, which held that "before allowing a defendant to waive a claim of self-defense, we require 'a thorough and searching inquiry' into 'his or her understanding of the nature of the right being waived and the implications that flow from that choice." Id. at 528 (quoting State v. Handy, 215 N.J. 334, 362 (2013)). 2020Moreover, the facts here bear no resemblance to those in State v. Urbina, 221 N.J. 509 (2015), principally relied upon by defendant, which held that "before allowing a defendant to waive a claim of self-defense, we require 'a thorough and searching inquiry' into 'his or her understanding of the nature of the right being waived and the implications that flow from that choice." Id. at 528 (quoting State v. Handy, 215 N.J. 334, 362 (2013)). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2002Miranda held that in order for a defendant to waive the privilege of self-incrimination, the government has the burden of demonstrating that any waiver was made "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 444 , 86 S.Ct. at 1612 , 16 L.Ed. 2d at 707 . 2002Miranda held that in order for a defendant to waive the privilege of self-incrimination, the government has the burden of demonstrating that any waiver was made "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 444 , 86 S.Ct. at 1612 , 16 L.Ed. 2d at 707 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Costanza, Jr. v. Costanza
green
1 sentence1974Rev. at 151: "[T]he court should take whatever steps are necessary to assure that the defendant has not utilized the privilege to foreclose pre-trial discovery by his adversary, only to surprise him at trial, years later, with a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege and belated revelation of his own version of the facts." See Costanza v. Costanza, 66 N.J. 63 (1974). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.