sexual predator determination hearing in Ohio

2006State v. Brown, 151 Ohio App.3d 36 , 2002-Ohio-5207 , 783 N.E.2d 539 ; R.C. 2950.09 ; Evid.R. 101(C).

2006State v. Purser, supra, citing State v. Brown, 151 Ohio App.3d, 2002 -Ohio-5207, 783 N.E.2d 539 ; R.C. 2950.09 ; Evid.R. 101(C). {¶ 25} Also, recidivism is not at issue at the trial of one charged with these offenses; recidivism is only at issue at the sexual predator hearing.

2006State v. Grimes (2001), 143 Ohio App.3d 86 , 89 , 757 N.E.2d 413 . {¶ 26} Furthermore, a sexual predator determination hearing is akin to a sentencing hearing in that the Rules of Evidence do not strictly apply and the trial court is allowed to examine all evidence which demonstrates some indicia of reliability, regardless of whether that evidence was authenticated as contemplated by the Rules of Evidence.

2006State v. Grimes (2001), 143 Ohio App.3d 86 , 89 , 757 N.E.2d 413 . {¶ 26} Furthermore, a sexual predator determination hearing is akin to a sentencing hearing in that the Rules of Evidence do not strictly apply and the trial court is allowed to examine all evidence which demonstrates some indicia of reliability, regardless of whether that evidence was authenticated as contemplated by the Rules of Evidence.

2006R.C. § 2950.01 et seq." State of Ohio v. Patrick Skaggs , Ohio App. 8 Dist., 2004-Ohio-4471 , not reported in N.E.2d. {¶ 35} The court in this case in concluding that Appellant was a sexual predator found that Appellant was 39 years of age while the victim was three years of age; that the child was in Appellant's care at the time of the offense; that Appellant had seven prior felony convictions, one of which included corruption of a minor; that reports of other uncharged sexual conduct with a minor were of record; that Appellant showed no remorse. {¶ 36} Also, the court noted that Appellant ha

2005R.C. 2950.09 (B)(3)(a) through (j). {¶ 21} The Supreme Court has held that the trial court "should consider the statutory factors listed in R.C. 2950.09 (B)(2), and should discuss on the record the particular evidence and factors upon which it relies in making its determination regarding the likelihood of recidivism." State v. Eppinger, 91 Ohio St.3d 158 , 166 , 2001-Ohio-247 . {¶ 22} Prior to the sexual predator determination hearing, Benjamin was examined by Dr. Michael Arnoff.

2005State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404 , 425 , 1998-Ohio-291 ; State v. Estergall, Cuyahoga App. No. 80440, 2002-Ohio-5560 .

2004State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404 , 425 , 1998-Ohio-291 .

2005Cook, supra at 426; State v. Grimes (2001), 143 Ohio App.3d 86 , 89 , 757 N.E.2d 413 . {¶ 19} Further, "an appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court when there exists competent and credible evidence supporting the findings of fact and conclusions of law rendered by the trial court judge." Schiebel, supra at 74 , citing Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77 , 80 , 461 N.E.2d 1273 . {¶ 20} In the instant case, Cook argues that the trial court erred when it considered a 2003 arrest for gross sexual imposition involving a ten-year-old boy as "a

2005Cook, supra at 426; State v. Grimes (2001), 143 Ohio App.3d 86 , 89 , 757 N.E.2d 413 . {¶ 19} Further, "an appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court when there exists competent and credible evidence supporting the findings of fact and conclusions of law rendered by the trial court judge." Schiebel, supra at 74 , citing Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77 , 80 , 461 N.E.2d 1273 . {¶ 20} In the instant case, Cook argues that the trial court erred when it considered a 2003 arrest for gross sexual imposition involving a ten-year-old boy as "a

2003Morris Co. v. Foley Construction (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279 , 8 O.O.3d 261 , 376 N.E.2d 578 , syllabus. {¶ 11} “The standard of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ is defined as ‘that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’ ” State v. Schiebel (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 , 564 N.E.2d 54 , quoting Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 O

2003Morris Co. v. Foley Construction (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279 , 8 O.O.3d 261 , 376 N.E.2d 578 , syllabus. {¶ 11} “The standard of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ is defined as ‘that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’ ” State v. Schiebel (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 , 564 N.E.2d 54 , quoting Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 O

2003Morris Co. v. Foley Construction (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279 , 8 O.O.3d 261 , 376 N.E.2d 578 , syllabus. {¶ 11} “The standard of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ is defined as ‘that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’ ” State v. Schiebel (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 , 564 N.E.2d 54 , quoting Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 O

2003Morris Co. v. Foley Construction (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279 , 8 O.O.3d 261 , 376 N.E.2d 578 , syllabus. {¶ 11} “The standard of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ is defined as ‘that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’ ” State v. Schiebel (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 , 564 N.E.2d 54 , quoting Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 O

2000This duty arises regardless of whether a sexual predator determination hearing is held pursuant to R.C. 2950.09 or not.'" (Emphasis omitted.) State v. Smith (June 23, 1999), Lorain App. No. 98CA007070, unreported, at 4, quoting State v. Rimmer (Apr. 29, 1998), Lorain App. No. 97CA006795, unreported, affirmed (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 48 .

1999This duty arises regardless of whether a sexual predator determination hearing is held pursuant to R.C. 2950.09 or not ." (Emphasis added.) State v. Rimmer (Apr. 29, 1998), Lorain App. No. 97CA006795, unreported, affirmed (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 48 . 2 See, also, State v. Goodballet (Mar. 30, 1999), Columbiana App. No. 98 CO 15 , unreported (noting that a sexually oriented offender status "does not require adjudication" and that "[a] trial court adds nothing by classifying a defendant as such and the offender is not prejudiced as the individual has in fact committed a sexually oriented offense a

2014The Fifth District overruled that assignment of error and affirmed the classification, explaining: A court does not need to interpret a statute "when statutory language is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning." Campbell v. Carlisle, 127 Ohio St.3d 275 , 939 N.E.2d 153 , 2010–Ohio– 5707, ¶ 8.

2014The Fifth District overruled that assignment of error and affirmed the classification, explaining: A court does not need to interpret a statute "when statutory language is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning." Campbell v. Carlisle, 127 Ohio St.3d 275 , 939 N.E.2d 153 , 2010–Ohio– 5707, ¶ 8.

2006State v. Cole, Cuyahoga App. No. 82338, 2003-Ohio-7061 . {¶ 33} "In this case, the transcript reflects the trial court considered the statutory factors and other relevant factors. {¶ 34} "Trial court could consider hearsay information when making a sexual predator determination; the rules of evidence did not strictly apply to a sexual predator determination hearing.

2006R.C. § 2950.01 et seq." State of Ohio v. Patrick Skaggs , Ohio App. 8 Dist., 2004-Ohio-4471 , not reported in N.E.2d. {¶ 35} The court in this case in concluding that Appellant was a sexual predator found that Appellant was 39 years of age while the victim was three years of age; that the child was in Appellant's care at the time of the offense; that Appellant had seven prior felony convictions, one of which included corruption of a minor; that reports of other uncharged sexual conduct with a minor were of record; that Appellant showed no remorse. {¶ 36} Also, the court noted that Appellant ha

2006R.C. § 2950.01 et seq." State of Ohio v. Patrick Skaggs , Ohio App. 8 Dist., 2004-Ohio-4471 , not reported in N.E.2d. {¶ 35} The court in this case in concluding that Appellant was a sexual predator found that Appellant was 39 years of age while the victim was three years of age; that the child was in Appellant's care at the time of the offense; that Appellant had seven prior felony convictions, one of which included corruption of a minor; that reports of other uncharged sexual conduct with a minor were of record; that Appellant showed no remorse. {¶ 36} Also, the court noted that Appellant ha

2005R.C. 2950.09 (B)(3)(a) through (j). {¶ 21} The Supreme Court has held that the trial court "should consider the statutory factors listed in R.C. 2950.09 (B)(2), and should discuss on the record the particular evidence and factors upon which it relies in making its determination regarding the likelihood of recidivism." State v. Eppinger, 91 Ohio St.3d 158 , 166 , 2001-Ohio-247 . {¶ 22} Prior to the sexual predator determination hearing, Benjamin was examined by Dr. Michael Arnoff.

2004State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 191 , 2002-Ohio-2128 , at ¶ 40 . {¶ 7} Because the objective of a sexual predator determination hearing is to determine the offender's status, not guilt or innocence, such hearings are broadly considered analogous to a sentencing or probation hearing.

2004State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 191 , 2002-Ohio-2128 , at ¶ 40 . {¶ 7} Because the objective of a sexual predator determination hearing is to determine the offender's status, not guilt or innocence, such hearings are broadly considered analogous to a sentencing or probation hearing.

2003State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426 , 1997-Ohio-204 , 678 N.E.2d 891 . {¶ 10} During the sexual predator determination hearing, the state presented the testimony of Detective Warden.

2003State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426 , 1997-Ohio-204 , 678 N.E.2d 891 . {¶ 10} During the sexual predator determination hearing, the state presented the testimony of Detective Warden.

2003State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426 , 1997-Ohio-204 , 678 N.E.2d 891 . {¶ 10} During the sexual predator determination hearing, the state presented the testimony of Detective Warden.

2002See, also, Morrisey v. Brewer (1972), 408 U.S. 471 , 487-490 (involving due process considerations in parole revocation hearings); Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U.S. 778 , 781-782 (concluding due process considerations in probation revocation hearings should follow the conditions as specified in Morrisey, supra).

2001Strickland v. Washington, supra; State v. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d 514 , 684 N.E.2d 47 .

2001Strickland v. Washington, supra; State v. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d 514 , 684 N.E.2d 47 .

2000State v. Jones (Sept. 30, 1999), Cuyahoga App. No. 74503, unreported at 1; State v. Thomas (Aug. 10, 1999), Meigs App. No. 98CA16, unreported at 5; State v. Jodziewicz (Apr. 16, 1999), Adams App. No. 98CA667, unreported at 1; State v. Hanrahan (Mar. 5, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APA03-394, unreported at 3-4; State v. Ramsey (Dec. 22, 1997), Clermont App. No. CA97-03-025, unreported at 2 (upheld in State v. Ramsey (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 21 ).

1999State v. Qualls (Mar. 4, 1999), Cuyahoga App. No. 72793, unreported, citing Williams v. People of State of New York (1949), 337 U.S. 241 , 69 S.Ct. 1079 ; State v. Hargis (Feb. 11, 1999), Cuyahoga App. No. 72540, unreported.

1999State v. Qualls (Mar. 4, 1999), Cuyahoga App. No. 72793, unreported, citing Williams v. People of State of New York (1949), 337 U.S. 241 , 69 S.Ct. 1079 ; State v. Hargis (Feb. 11, 1999), Cuyahoga App. No. 72540, unreported.