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7 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Earl v. Johnson & Johnsongreen2 sentences2017Super. at 184 . 7 A-1988-15T4 For statute of limitations purposes, "'knowledge of the nature of [the] disability' connotes knowledge of the most notable characteristics of the disease, sufficient to bring home substantial realization of its extent and seriousness." Earl, supra, 158 N.J. at 163 (alteration in original) (quoting Bucuk v. Edward A. Zusi Brass Foundry, 49 N.J. 2017Super. at 184 . 7 A-1988-15T4 For statute of limitations purposes, "'knowledge of the nature of [the] disability' connotes knowledge of the most notable characteristics of the disease, sufficient to bring home substantial realization of its extent and seriousness." Earl, supra, 158 N.J. at 163 (alteration in original) (quoting Bucuk v. Edward A. Zusi Brass Foundry, 49 N.J. | 1 | 2 |
Bunk v. Port Authority of New York & New Jerseygreen1 sentence2019A-0110-18T4 6 Before us, Marconi argues that given the remedial nature of the WCA, which compels liberal construction in favor of compensation, and because of controlling dicta in the Court's decision in Bunk v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 144 N.J. 176, 180-81 (1996), residency alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on New Jersey. | 1 | 1 |
Bucuk v. Edward A. Zusi Brass Foundrygreen1 sentence2017Super. at 184 . 7 A-1988-15T4 For statute of limitations purposes, "'knowledge of the nature of [the] disability' connotes knowledge of the most notable characteristics of the disease, sufficient to bring home substantial realization of its extent and seriousness." Earl, supra, 158 N.J. at 163 (alteration in original) (quoting Bucuk v. Edward A. Zusi Brass Foundry, 49 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
MARKET FOOD DISTRIB., INC v. Levensongreen1 sentence1995See, e.g., Farrington v. Total Petroleum Inc., 442 Mich. 201 , 501 N.W. 2d 76, 83 (1993) (concluding that myocardial infarction “must be significantly caused or aggravated by employment considering the totality of all the occupational factors and the claimant’s health circumstances and nonoceupational factors”); Sellens v. Allen Products Co., 206 Neb. 506 , 293 N.W.2d 415, 417-18 (1980) (holding that question with worker who died of thrombosis of right coronary artery is “whether the injury was the result of a personal rather than employment risk” and requiring that “employment risk must offse | 1 | 1 |
Cheshire Toyota/Volvo, Inc. v. O'Sullivangreen2 sentences1995See, e.g., Farrington v. Total Petroleum Inc., 442 Mich. 201 , 501 N.W. 2d 76, 83 (1993) (concluding that myocardial infarction “must be significantly caused or aggravated by employment considering the totality of all the occupational factors and the claimant’s health circumstances and nonoceupational factors”); Sellens v. Allen Products Co., 206 Neb. 506 , 293 N.W.2d 415, 417-18 (1980) (holding that question with worker who died of thrombosis of right coronary artery is “whether the injury was the result of a personal rather than employment risk” and requiring that “employment risk must offse 1995See, e.g., Farrington v. Total Petroleum Inc., 442 Mich. 201 , 501 N.W. 2d 76, 83 (1993) (concluding that myocardial infarction “must be significantly caused or aggravated by employment considering the totality of all the occupational factors and the claimant’s health circumstances and nonoceupational factors”); Sellens v. Allen Products Co., 206 Neb. 506 , 293 N.W.2d 415, 417-18 (1980) (holding that question with worker who died of thrombosis of right coronary artery is “whether the injury was the result of a personal rather than employment risk” and requiring that “employment risk must offse | 1 | 1 |
McCloskey v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Boardgreen2 sentences1995Co., 444 A.2d 329, 337 (Me.1982) (holding that employment must contribute substantial element to offset personal risk of preexisting condition of “frozen knees,” when employee fell from stool); Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85 , 301 S.E.2d 359, 369-70 (1983) (holding that chronic obstructive lung-disease claimant also suffering from asthma and allergies was entitled to compensation if occupational exposure “significantly contributed” to disease’s development); McCloskey v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd., 501 Pa. 93 , 460 A.2d 237, 241 (1983) (holding that compensable claim exists even 1995Co., 444 A.2d 329, 337 (Me.1982) (holding that employment must contribute substantial element to offset personal risk of preexisting condition of “frozen knees,” when employee fell from stool); Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85 , 301 S.E.2d 359, 369-70 (1983) (holding that chronic obstructive lung-disease claimant also suffering from asthma and allergies was entitled to compensation if occupational exposure “significantly contributed” to disease’s development); McCloskey v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd., 501 Pa. 93 , 460 A.2d 237, 241 (1983) (holding that compensable claim exists even | 1 | 1 |
Bryant v. Masters MacHine Co.green1 sentence1995Co., 444 A.2d 329, 337 (Me.1982) (holding that employment must contribute substantial element to offset personal risk of preexisting condition of “frozen knees,” when employee fell from stool); Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85 , 301 S.E.2d 359, 369-70 (1983) (holding that chronic obstructive lung-disease claimant also suffering from asthma and allergies was entitled to compensation if occupational exposure “significantly contributed” to disease’s development); McCloskey v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd., 501 Pa. 93 , 460 A.2d 237, 241 (1983) (holding that compensable claim exists even | 1 | 1 |
Sellens v. Allen Products Co., Inc.green2 sentences1995See, e.g., Farrington v. Total Petroleum Inc., 442 Mich. 201 , 501 N.W. 2d 76, 83 (1993) (concluding that myocardial infarction “must be significantly caused or aggravated by employment considering the totality of all the occupational factors and the claimant’s health circumstances and nonoceupational factors”); Sellens v. Allen Products Co., 206 Neb. 506 , 293 N.W.2d 415, 417-18 (1980) (holding that question with worker who died of thrombosis of right coronary artery is “whether the injury was the result of a personal rather than employment risk” and requiring that “employment risk must offse 1995See, e.g., Farrington v. Total Petroleum Inc., 442 Mich. 201 , 501 N.W. 2d 76, 83 (1993) (concluding that myocardial infarction “must be significantly caused or aggravated by employment considering the totality of all the occupational factors and the claimant’s health circumstances and nonoceupational factors”); Sellens v. Allen Products Co., 206 Neb. 506 , 293 N.W.2d 415, 417-18 (1980) (holding that question with worker who died of thrombosis of right coronary artery is “whether the injury was the result of a personal rather than employment risk” and requiring that “employment risk must offse | 1 | 1 |
Farrington v. Total Petroleum, Inc.green2 sentences1995See, e.g., Farrington v. Total Petroleum Inc., 442 Mich. 201 , 501 N.W. 2d 76, 83 (1993) (concluding that myocardial infarction “must be significantly caused or aggravated by employment considering the totality of all the occupational factors and the claimant’s health circumstances and nonoceupational factors”); Sellens v. Allen Products Co., 206 Neb. 506 , 293 N.W.2d 415, 417-18 (1980) (holding that question with worker who died of thrombosis of right coronary artery is “whether the injury was the result of a personal rather than employment risk” and requiring that “employment risk must offse 1995See, e.g., Farrington v. Total Petroleum Inc., 442 Mich. 201 , 501 N.W. 2d 76, 83 (1993) (concluding that myocardial infarction “must be significantly caused or aggravated by employment considering the totality of all the occupational factors and the claimant’s health circumstances and nonoceupational factors”); Sellens v. Allen Products Co., 206 Neb. 506 , 293 N.W.2d 415, 417-18 (1980) (holding that question with worker who died of thrombosis of right coronary artery is “whether the injury was the result of a personal rather than employment risk” and requiring that “employment risk must offse | 1 | 1 |
Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarngreen2 sentences1995Co., 444 A.2d 329, 337 (Me.1982) (holding that employment must contribute substantial element to offset personal risk of preexisting condition of “frozen knees,” when employee fell from stool); Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85 , 301 S.E.2d 359, 369-70 (1983) (holding that chronic obstructive lung-disease claimant also suffering from asthma and allergies was entitled to compensation if occupational exposure “significantly contributed” to disease’s development); McCloskey v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd., 501 Pa. 93 , 460 A.2d 237, 241 (1983) (holding that compensable claim exists even 1995Co., 444 A.2d 329, 337 (Me.1982) (holding that employment must contribute substantial element to offset personal risk of preexisting condition of “frozen knees,” when employee fell from stool); Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85 , 301 S.E.2d 359, 369-70 (1983) (holding that chronic obstructive lung-disease claimant also suffering from asthma and allergies was entitled to compensation if occupational exposure “significantly contributed” to disease’s development); McCloskey v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd., 501 Pa. 93 , 460 A.2d 237, 241 (1983) (holding that compensable claim exists even | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Port Authority
green
1 sentence2019The JWC observed that our court had approved the exercise of jurisdiction over extraterritorial injuries when the petitioner was a resident and New Jersey was the "[p]lace where the employment relation exists or is carried out." 13 Larson, § 142.01. 6 Unlike the fourth factor, which "focuses on the employer's operations and presence in the state," this factor "focuses on the injured employee's duties, responsibilities, activities and operations in the state." The JWC determined Marconi failed to carry his burden of establishing jurisdiction as to his first petition — the January 31, 2015 injur | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Peck v. Newark Morning Ledger Co.
green
2 sentences2017As a result, "N.J.S.A. 34:15-34 and our courts have recognized that the period for filing an occupational claim does not run until two years after the date the worker knew the nature of the occupational disability and its relationship to employment." Peck, supra, 344 N.J. 2017As a result, "N.J.S.A. 34:15-34 and our courts have recognized that the period for filing an occupational claim does not run until two years after the date the worker knew the nature of the occupational disability and its relationship to employment." Peck, supra, 344 N.J. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ehteshamfar v. UTA Engineered Systems Div.
green
1 sentence2007Although tinnitus is often accompanied by a degree of hearing loss, it is, as the Iowa Supreme Court aptly characterized it, "a separate and distinct injury." Ehteshamfar v. UTA Engineered Systems, supra, 555 N.W. 2d at 453 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Bronico v. JT Baker Chemical Co.
green
2 sentences2007Id. at 222 , 507 A. 2d 279 . 2007Id. at 222 , 507 A. 2d 279 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Fiore v. Consolidated Freightways
green
2 sentences1996Id. at 471 , 659 A. 2d 436 . 1996Id. at 471 , 659 A. 2d 436 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Scheier v. Garden State Forge Co.
green
2 sentences1990On appeal Liberty Mutual contends that liability for an occupational hearing loss caused by exposure to loud noise over a period of years can be apportioned between compensation insurance carriers pursuant to Scheier v. Garden State Forge Company, 136 N.J. 1990Super. 555 , 347 A. 2d 362 (App.Div. 1975) if, prior to the change in coverage, the disability was disclosed by competent medical examination, working capacity, or manifest loss of physical function. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.