finding of fundamental error in New Mexico

2021See State v. Nick R., 2009-NMSC-050, ¶ 37 , 147 N.M. 182 , 218 P.3d 868 (“[I]n an actual use case involving an unlisted weapon, the jury must find, among other elements, that an object was actually used as a weapon and that it was capable of causing the wounds described in the statute.”); see also § 30-1-12(A)-(B) (defining “deadly weapon” as “any weapon which is capable of producing death or great bodily harm,” including listed weapons and “other weapons with which dangerous wounds can be inflicted[,]” and defining “great bodily harm” as “injury . . . which creates a high probability of death

2021See State v. Nick R., 2009-NMSC-050, ¶ 37 , 147 N.M. 182 , 218 P.3d 868 (“[I]n an actual use case involving an unlisted weapon, the jury must find, among other elements, that an object was actually used as a weapon and that it was capable of causing the wounds described in the statute.”); see also § 30-1-12(A)-(B) (defining “deadly weapon” as “any weapon which is capable of producing death or great bodily harm,” including listed weapons and “other weapons with which dangerous wounds can be inflicted[,]” and defining “great bodily harm” as “injury . . . which creates a high probability of death

2021The jury explicitly found that Defendant “walked towards Officer Gutierrez with a knife and made a stabbing motion[,]” placing the officer in an objectively reasonable fear for his “bodily integrity or personal safety.” This amounts to a finding that Defendant used the knife as a weapon. 7 Cf. State v. Herrera, 2015-NMCA-116, ¶¶ 11, 16-17 , 362 P.3d 167 (analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the defendants’ aggravated assault convictions and treating the jury’s finding that the defendants either brandished a knife or held a knife to one victim’s throat and placed the victims in an obje

2021See, e.g., Campos, 2007-NMSC-021, ¶ 19 . 7The State did shift gears in closing argument, focusing on the W-4 and arguing, without any basis in the evidence, that Defendant used Tafoya’s information to “defraud” the American taxpayers by claiming more dependents than he should have.

2021Cf. Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 19-20 (basing a finding of fundamental error in part on the Court’s conclusion that a reasonable jury “would [not] graft the correct burden of proof” from a self-defense instruction addressing aggravated battery and voluntary manslaughter onto a separate elements instruction addressing second-degree murder). 14 statutory definition of “deadly weapon” lists a number of specific kinds of knives, it does not list the generic “knife.” Accordingly, our Supreme Court has held that a “knife” is not a per se deadly weapon.

2019State v. Orosco, 1992-NMSC-006 , ¶ 12, 113 N.M. 780 , 833 P.2d 1146 ; see also State v. Jett, 1991-NMSC-011 , ¶ 19, 111 N.M. 309 , 805 P.2d 78 (stating the doctrine of fundamental error applies “under exceptional circumstances and solely to prevent a miscarriage of justice”).

2019State v. Orosco, 1992-NMSC-006 , ¶ 12, 113 N.M. 780 , 833 P.2d 1146 ; see also State v. Jett, 1991-NMSC-011 , ¶ 19, 111 N.M. 309 , 805 P.2d 78 (stating the doctrine of fundamental error applies “under exceptional circumstances and solely to prevent a miscarriage of justice”).

2014See Romero, 2013-NMCA-101, ¶¶ 23-25 (concluding that where the district court “admonish[ed] the foreperson to avoid disclosing whether the votes were for or against conviction” and inquired into whether additional deliberations would aid the jury in reaching a verdict, the district court’s actions did not warrant a finding of fundamental error). {27} We hold that the district court’s actions were neither coercive nor amounted to issuance of a shotgun instruction.

2001The doctrine of fundamental error "is bottomed upon the innocence of the accused or a corruption of actual justice." State v. Sanchez, 58 N.M. 77, 84 , 265 P.2d 684, 688 (1954).

2001The doctrine of fundamental error "is bottomed upon the innocence of the accused or a corruption of actual justice." State v. Sanchez, 58 N.M. 77, 84 , 265 P.2d 684, 688 (1954).

1990See State v. Escamilla, 107 N.M. 510 , 760 P.2d 1276 (1988) (even when defendant did not move for mistrial until after verdict, trial court had duty to make record and rule on any fundamental error regarding whether one juror did not understand English and regarding communications about that subject between court and jury outside defendant's presence). [9] Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229-30 , 74 S.Ct. at 451-52 . [10] Id. at 229 , 74 S.Ct. at 451 (any direct or indirect private communication, contact, or tampering with a juror during trial about the matter pending before the court is deemed presumptiv

1990See State v. Escamilla, 107 N.M. 510 , 760 P.2d 1276 (1988) (even when defendant did not move for mistrial until after verdict, trial court had duty to make record and rule on any fundamental error regarding whether one juror did not understand English and regarding communications about that subject between court and jury outside defendant's presence). [9] Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229-30 , 74 S.Ct. at 451-52 . [10] Id. at 229 , 74 S.Ct. at 451 (any direct or indirect private communication, contact, or tampering with a juror during trial about the matter pending before the court is deemed presumptiv

1990See State v. Escamilla, 107 N.M. 510 , 760 P.2d 1276 (1988) (even when defendant did not move for mistrial until after verdict, trial court had duty to make record and rule on any fundamental error regarding whether one juror did not understand English and regarding communications about that subject between court and jury outside defendant's presence). [9] Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229-30 , 74 S.Ct. at 451-52 . [10] Id. at 229 , 74 S.Ct. at 451 (any direct or indirect private communication, contact, or tampering with a juror during trial about the matter pending before the court is deemed presumptiv

1990See State v. Escamilla, 107 N.M. 510 , 760 P.2d 1276 (1988) (even when defendant did not move for mistrial until after verdict, trial court had duty to make record and rule on any fundamental error regarding whether one juror did not understand English and regarding communications about that subject between court and jury outside defendant's presence). [9] Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229-30 , 74 S.Ct. at 451-52 . [10] Id. at 229 , 74 S.Ct. at 451 (any direct or indirect private communication, contact, or tampering with a juror during trial about the matter pending before the court is deemed presumptiv

1990See State v. Escamilla, 107 N.M. 510 , 760 P.2d 1276 (1988) (even when defendant did not move for mistrial until after verdict, trial court had duty to make record and rule on any fundamental error regarding whether one juror did not understand English and regarding communications about that subject between court and jury outside defendant's presence). [9] Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229-30 , 74 S.Ct. at 451-52 . [10] Id. at 229 , 74 S.Ct. at 451 (any direct or indirect private communication, contact, or tampering with a juror during trial about the matter pending before the court is deemed presumptiv