Whistleblower Act claim in Texas

2025See Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 881 (holding elements of a Whistleblower Act claim are jurisdictional and may not be waived); Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1993) (holding jurisdiction “may be raised for the first time on appeal” and may not be waived by the parties).

2025See Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 881 (holding elements of a Whistleblower Act claim are jurisdictional and may not be waived); Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1993) (holding jurisdiction “may be raised for the first time on appeal” and may not be waived by the parties).

2010Upon reviewing the email, the court concluded that Smith failed to initiate the appeal process required for a Whistleblower Act claim because “no reasonably prudent employer could have been subjectively aware that Smith, by virtue of [her] e-mail, desired to invoke the [hospital district’s] disciplinary appeal process with respect to her termination.” Id. at 850 ; cf Gregg County v. Farrar, 933 S.W.2d 769, 773-74 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, writ denied) (holding that Farrar sufficiently presented notice of his Whistleblower Act claim during his grievance committee hearing). 3 Simply asking the empl

2010Upon reviewing the email, the court concluded that Smith failed to initiate the appeal process required for a Whistleblower Act claim because “no reasonably prudent employer could have been subjectively aware that Smith, by virtue of [her] e-mail, desired to invoke the [hospital district’s] disciplinary appeal process with respect to her termination.” Id. at 850 ; cf Gregg County v. Farrar, 933 S.W.2d 769, 773-74 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, writ denied) (holding that Farrar sufficiently presented notice of his Whistleblower Act claim during his grievance committee hearing). 3 Simply asking the empl

2013Analysis Issues Through five issues Ahmed asserts the trial court erred by sustaining the plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing his Whistleblower Act violation claim, his breach of contract claim, and his due course of law claim under the Texas Constitution, granting the motion to dismiss Dove, and denying his motion for continuance and discovery. 3 Sovereign Immunity “Sovereign immunity and its counterpart, governmental immunity, exist to protect the State and its political subdivisions from lawsuits and liability for money damages.” Mission Consolidated Independent School District v. Garci

2013Sovereign Immunity "Sovereign immunity and its counterpart, governmental immunity, exist to protect the State and its political subdivisions from lawsuits and liability for money damages." Mission Consolidated Independent School District v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2008); Reata Constr.

2011The defendants argued that pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court opinion in City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. 2008), Dr. Wu’s exclusive state statutory remedy is the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (CHRA), and therefore sovereign immunity for a Whistleblower Act claim has not been waived.

2011The defendants argued that pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court opinion in City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. 2008), Dr. Wu’s exclusive state statutory remedy is the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (CHRA), and therefore sovereign immunity for a Whistleblower Act claim has not been waived.

2021See Rodriguez, 605 S.W.3d at 198 (rendering judgment in favor of state employer on Whistleblower Act claim because there was no evidence that whistleblowing activity was but-for cause of employee’s termination); see also Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 (stating that if defendant presents proof that trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to raise material issue of fact regarding jurisdiction, or the plea will be sustained).

2011Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.2004).

2019With regard to the Whistleblower Act, the supreme court has recognized that this act “has its own statutory remedies and procedures that do not require exhaustion with the 21 Commissioner under the Education Code.” Canutillo ISD v. Farran, 409 S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex. 2013) (explaining that Farran had no cognizable Whistleblower Act claim and that to the extent he sought relief for common law breach of contract, he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under education code section 7.057(a)(2)(B)).

2016Dist. v. Farran, 409 S.W.3d 653, 656 (Tex.2013) (in Whistleblower Act claim, plaintiff failed to show his report to law enforcement caused the adverse personnel action, because the personnel action occurred before plaintiffs report to'law enforcement).

2013Arts Hosp. v. Robison, 216 S.W.3d 38, 44 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.) (holding trial court erred in denying plea to jurisdiction because employee failed to give employer notice of Whistleblower Act claim prior to filing suit).

2013McQuary, 310 S.W.3d at 177 (holding employee required to give employer reasonable notice that she was asserting Whistleblower Act claim); see also Robison, 216 S.W.3d at 44 (citing Montgomery Cnty.

2006See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 554.002 (a) (West 2004); Hill v. Burnet County Sheriff's Dep't & Burnet County , 96 S.W.3d 436, 440-41 (Tex. App.--Austin 2002, pet. denied). 4.

2006See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.002(a) (West 2004); Hill v. Burnet County Sheriffs Dep’t & Burnet County, 96 S.W.3d 436, 440-41 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied). 4 .

2025See Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 881 (holding elements of a Whistleblower Act claim are jurisdictional and may not be waived); Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1993) (holding jurisdiction “may be raised for the first time on appeal” and may not be waived by the parties).

2025See Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 881 (holding elements of a Whistleblower Act claim are jurisdictional and may not be waived); Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1993) (holding jurisdiction “may be raised for the first time on appeal” and may not be waived by the parties).

2021Cf. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d at 70 (declining to consider whether liability under the Whistleblower Act can be based on a “conduit” causation theory); Vernagallo, 181 S.W.3d at 26 n.15 (declining to apply “conduit” theory to Whistleblower Act claim because Texas Supreme Court has not adopted theory).

2013City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Tex.2000).

2014Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 882 (quoting Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001), as holding "Mere reference to the . . .

2014Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 882 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001), as holding “Mere reference to the . . .

2013In Lawson , a faculty member of the university brought a Whistleblower Act claim against the university after it terminated his employment. 87 S.W.3d at 518 .

2013In Lawson , a faculty member of the university brought a Whistleblower Act claim against the university after it terminated his employment. 87 S.W.3d at 518 .

2010Upon reviewing the email, the court concluded that Smith failed to initiate the appeal process required for a Whistleblower Act claim because “no reasonably prudent employer could have been subjectively aware that Smith, by virtue of [her] e-mail, desired to invoke the [hospital district’s] disciplinary appeal process with respect to her termination.” Id. at 850 ; cf Gregg County v. Farrar, 933 S.W.2d 769, 773-74 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, writ denied) (holding that Farrar sufficiently presented notice of his Whistleblower Act claim during his grievance committee hearing). 3 Simply asking the empl

2010Upon reviewing the email, the court concluded that Smith failed to initiate the appeal process required for a Whistleblower Act claim because “no reasonably prudent employer could have been subjectively aware that Smith, by virtue of [her] e-mail, desired to invoke the [hospital district’s] disciplinary appeal process with respect to her termination.” Id. at 850 ; cf Gregg County v. Farrar, 933 S.W.2d 769, 773-74 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, writ denied) (holding that Farrar sufficiently presented notice of his Whistleblower Act claim during his grievance committee hearing). 3 Simply asking the empl

2025It follows that “an appellate court must consider all of a defendant’s immunity arguments, whether the governmental entity raised other jurisdictional arguments in the trial court or none at all.” Dallas Metrocare Servs. v. Juarez, 420 S.W.3d 39, 41 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam); see also Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex. 2012) (even “if immunity is first asserted on interlocutory appeal, [the interlocutory-appeal statute] does not preclude the appellate court from having to consider the issue at the outset in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction to address the merits”).

2025It follows that “an appellate court must consider all of a defendant’s immunity arguments, whether the governmental entity raised other jurisdictional arguments in the trial court or none at all.” Dallas Metrocare Servs. v. Juarez, 420 S.W.3d 39, 41 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam); see also Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex. 2012) (even “if immunity is first asserted on interlocutory appeal, [the interlocutory-appeal statute] does not preclude the appellate court from having to consider the issue at the outset in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction to address the merits”).

2025What clued us in was that “[t]he term ‘must’ residence” were “merely venue provisions,” not create[d] a condition precedent,” so “a claim that fail[ed] to jurisdictional); State v. Pounds, 525 S.W.2d 547, 548 (Tex. meet that deadline may properly be disposed of by a Civ.

2025What clued us in was that “[t]he term ‘must’ residence” were “merely venue provisions,” not create[d] a condition precedent,” so “a claim that fail[ed] to jurisdictional); State v. Pounds, 525 S.W.2d 547, 548 (Tex. meet that deadline may properly be disposed of by a Civ.

2025It follows that “an appellate court must consider all of a defendant’s immunity arguments, whether the governmental entity raised other jurisdictional arguments in the trial court or none at all.” Dallas Metrocare Servs. v. Juarez, 420 S.W.3d 39, 41 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam); see also Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex. 2012) (even “if immunity is first asserted on interlocutory appeal, [the interlocutory-appeal statute] does not preclude the appellate court from having to consider the issue at the outset in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction to address the merits”).

2025It follows that “an appellate court must consider all of a defendant’s immunity arguments, whether the governmental entity raised other jurisdictional arguments in the trial court or none at all.” Dallas Metrocare Servs. v. Juarez, 420 S.W.3d 39, 41 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam); see also Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex. 2012) (even “if immunity is first asserted on interlocutory appeal, [the interlocutory-appeal statute] does not preclude the appellate court from having to consider the issue at the outset in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction to address the merits”).

2025See Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Okoli, 440 S.W.3d 611, 617 (Tex. 2014) (concluding there was no evidence that the plaintiff reported the alleged violations to an appropriate law-enforcement authority in good faith and dismissing plaintiff’s claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Barth, 403 S.W.3d at 853 (concluding there was no evidence of two of the elements in plaintiff’s Whistleblower Act claim and dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).

2025See Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Okoli, 440 S.W.3d 611, 617 (Tex. 2014) (concluding there was no evidence that the plaintiff reported the alleged violations to an appropriate law-enforcement authority in good faith and dismissing plaintiff’s claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Barth, 403 S.W.3d at 853 (concluding there was no evidence of two of the elements in plaintiff’s Whistleblower Act claim and dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).

2022See id.

2021Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000); see also Miranda, 113 S.W.3d at 223–24. 3 When, as in this case, a jurisdictional challenge to a Whistleblower Act claim challenges the existence of one or more elements of the claim, the challenge must be denied if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, creates a genuine issue of material fact as to each of the challenged elements.

2021Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000); see also Miranda, 113 S.W.3d at 223–24. 3 When, as in this case, a jurisdictional challenge to a Whistleblower Act claim challenges the existence of one or more elements of the claim, the challenge must be denied if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, creates a genuine issue of material fact as to each of the challenged elements.

2020See Hart, 917 S.W.2d at 783–84.

2020University of Tex. at Austin v. Hayes, 327 S.W.3d 113, 115 (Tex. 2010); State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. 2009).

2020Accordingly, we reverse and render judgment that Rodriguez take nothing on her Whistleblower Act claim. ________________________________ Jane N. Bland Justice OPINION DELIVERED: June 12, 2020 engaged in by a male employee whom [the company] retained.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Davin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 678 F.2d 567, 570 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982))). 25