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7 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1872–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oboler v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2024Although an exception to the prior written notice rule indeed exists where "the locality created the defect or hazard through an affirmative act of negligence" ( Amabile v City of Buffalo , 93 NY2d 471, 474 [1999]), it is well settled that such exception is "limited to work by the [municipality] that immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition" ( Bielecki v City of New York , 14 AD3d 301, 301 [1st Dept 2005]; see Yarborough v City of New York , 10 NY3d 726, 728 [2008]; Oboler v City of New York , 8 NY3d 888, 889-890 [2007]). | 1 | 1 |
Amabile v. City of Buffalogreen1 sentence2024Although an exception to the prior written notice rule indeed exists where "the locality created the defect or hazard through an affirmative act of negligence" ( Amabile v City of Buffalo , 93 NY2d 471, 474 [1999]), it is well settled that such exception is "limited to work by the [municipality] that immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition" ( Bielecki v City of New York , 14 AD3d 301, 301 [1st Dept 2005]; see Yarborough v City of New York , 10 NY3d 726, 728 [2008]; Oboler v City of New York , 8 NY3d 888, 889-890 [2007]). | 1 | 1 |
Yarborough v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2024Although an exception to the prior written notice rule indeed exists where "the locality created the defect or hazard through an affirmative act of negligence" ( Amabile v City of Buffalo , 93 NY2d 471, 474 [1999]), it is well settled that such exception is "limited to work by the [municipality] that immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition" ( Bielecki v City of New York , 14 AD3d 301, 301 [1st Dept 2005]; see Yarborough v City of New York , 10 NY3d 726, 728 [2008]; Oboler v City of New York , 8 NY3d 888, 889-890 [2007]). | 1 | 1 |
Bielecki v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2024Although an exception to the prior written notice rule indeed exists where "the locality created the defect or hazard through an affirmative act of negligence" ( Amabile v City of Buffalo , 93 NY2d 471, 474 [1999]), it is well settled that such exception is "limited to work by the [municipality] that immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition" ( Bielecki v City of New York , 14 AD3d 301, 301 [1st Dept 2005]; see Yarborough v City of New York , 10 NY3d 726, 728 [2008]; Oboler v City of New York , 8 NY3d 888, 889-890 [2007]). | 1 | 1 |
Muller v. Sturmangreen1 sentence2005There were no “clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing and dependent relationship between the client and the at torney” (Muller v Sturman, 79 AD2d 482, 485 [1981]) or “a mutual understanding of the need for further representation on the specific subject matter underlying the malpractice claim” (McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 306 [2002]). | 1 | 1 |
McCoy v. Feinmangreen1 sentence2005There were no “clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing and dependent relationship between the client and the at torney” (Muller v Sturman, 79 AD2d 482, 485 [1981]) or “a mutual understanding of the need for further representation on the specific subject matter underlying the malpractice claim” (McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 306 [2002]). | 1 | 1 |
Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalogreen1 sentence2003In moving for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against him, defendant Walter Ronfeldt affirmatively established that the case fell within the rule set forth in Ingersoll v Liberty Bank of Buffalo ( 278 NY 1, 7 [1938]), thereby absolving him of any liability as a matter of law. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dokesgreen1 sentence1993The Appellate Division affirmed ( 191 AD2d 183 ), holding that the case fell within the exception to the presence requirement enunciated in Dokes if the defendant’s presence would have been "superfluous” (People v Dokes, supra, at 662). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
CLP Leasing Co., LP v. Nessen
green
1 sentence2005Respondent made a prima facie showing that the statute of limitations expired approximately 13 years prior to the initiation of this proceeding, and petitioner failed to meet her burden of making an evidentiary showing that the case fell within the exception of the continuous representation doctrine (CLP Leasing Co., LP v Nessen, 12 AD3d 226 [2004]). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Odiat
neutral
1 sentence1993The Appellate Division affirmed ( 191 AD2d 183 ), holding that the case fell within the exception to the presence requirement enunciated in Dokes if the defendant’s presence would have been "superfluous” (People v Dokes, supra, at 662). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Payton v. New York
green
1 sentence1981The court below held, on the papers submitted, that this case fell within the rule of Payton v New York ( 445 US 573 ). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Thompson v. . Blanchard
neutral
1 sentence1916It was said: “The New York authorities are to the effect that a party calling a witness cannot attack his credibility by general evidence of character (People v. Safford, 5 Den. 112, 118 ; Thompson v. Blanchard, 4 N. Y. 303 ), or prove by other witnesses self-contradictory statements (Nichols v. White, 85 id. 531, 535; O’Doherty v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 113 App. Div. 636 ), or show prior inconsistent statements in order to discredit him (Berkowsky v. New York City R. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
O'Doherty v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co.
neutral
1 sentence1916It was said: “The New York authorities are to the effect that a party calling a witness cannot attack his credibility by general evidence of character (People v. Safford, 5 Den. 112, 118 ; Thompson v. Blanchard, 4 N. Y. 303 ), or prove by other witnesses self-contradictory statements (Nichols v. White, 85 id. 531, 535; O’Doherty v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 113 App. Div. 636 ), or show prior inconsistent statements in order to discredit him (Berkowsky v. New York City R. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Power v. Brooklyn Heights Railroad
neutral
1 sentence1916The cross-examination of the witness and not his impeachment was deemed to be involved, and it was considered that the case fell within the rule that “a party may be permitted to cross-examine a witness called by him and to call his attention to prior statements made, for the purpose of refreshing his recollection, inducing him to correct his testimony by showing him that he is mistaken, or even for the purpose of showing the circumstances which induced the party to call him.” But it was decided that the party calling him could not, after the same witness was called by the adverse party, impea | 1 | 1916–1916 |
People v. Safford
neutral
1 sentence1916It was said: “The New York authorities are to the effect that a party calling a witness cannot attack his credibility by general evidence of character (People v. Safford, 5 Den. 112, 118 ; Thompson v. Blanchard, 4 N. Y. 303 ), or prove by other witnesses self-contradictory statements (Nichols v. White, 85 id. 531, 535; O’Doherty v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 113 App. Div. 636 ), or show prior inconsistent statements in order to discredit him (Berkowsky v. New York City R. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Hopkins v. Adams
neutral
1 sentence1872But in Hopkins v. Adams (supra), the effect of the provisions of the Revised Statutes first above referred to, was fully discussed, and this court held, that, although an action in the nature of replevin did not survive the death of the defendant, an action sounding in damages only, and in which the judgment, when recovered against an executor or administrator, is to be paid out of the estate in due course of administration, does survive, and maybe continued against defendant’s representative. | 1 | 1872–1872 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.