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7 New York opinions name it 1 courts 1988–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ruffino v. Isadore Rosen & Sonsgreen2 sentences2014Moreover, while the Special Fund does not have standing “to litigate the primary issues of compensability of the underlying claim for benefits” or “to reopen a claimant’s case and contest the compensability of the claim,” it does have standing with respect to proceedings involving claims against such fund (Matter of Ruffino v Rosen & Sons, 142 AD2d 177, 180 [1988], affd on op below 74 NY2d 861 [1989] [citation omitted]; see Matter of McDonald v Water Tunnel Contrs., 51 AD3d 1151, 1152-1153 [2008]). 2014Moreover, while the Special Fund does not have standing “to litigate the primary issues of compensability of the underlying claim for benefits” or “to reopen a claimant’s case and contest the compensability of the claim,” it does have standing with respect to proceedings involving claims against such fund (Matter of Ruffino v Rosen & Sons, 142 AD2d 177, 180 [1988], affd on op below 74 NY2d 861 [1989] [citation omitted]; see Matter of McDonald v Water Tunnel Contrs., 51 AD3d 1151, 1152-1153 [2008]). | 3 | 4 |
Claim of McDonald v. Water Tunnel Contractorsgreen2 sentences2014Moreover, while the Special Fund does not have standing “to litigate the primary issues of compensability of the underlying claim for benefits” or “to reopen a claimant’s case and contest the compensability of the claim,” it does have standing with respect to proceedings involving claims against such fund (Matter of Ruffino v Rosen & Sons, 142 AD2d 177, 180 [1988], affd on op below 74 NY2d 861 [1989] [citation omitted]; see Matter of McDonald v Water Tunnel Contrs., 51 AD3d 1151, 1152-1153 [2008]). 2014Moreover, while the Special Fund does not have standing “to litigate the primary issues of compensability of the underlying claim for benefits” or “to reopen a claimant’s case and contest the compensability of the claim,” it does have standing with respect to proceedings involving claims against such fund (Matter of Ruffino v Rosen & Sons, 142 AD2d 177, 180 [1988], affd on op below 74 NY2d 861 [1989] [citation omitted]; see Matter of McDonald v Water Tunnel Contrs., 51 AD3d 1151, 1152-1153 [2008]). | 3 | 3 |
Matter of Richards v. Allied Universal Sec.green1 sentence2022Auth. , 171 AD3d 1429 , 1429-1430 [2019] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Workers' Compensation Law § 10 [1]; see Matter of Richards v Allied Universal Sec. , 199 AD3d 1207, 1208 [2021]). | 1 | 1 |
Sturtevant v. Broome Countygreen1 sentence2006Rather, the Fund concedes the existing prior impairment, but challenges whether that impairment hindered decedent’s job potential, an issue not previously resolved by the Board (see Matter of Rosa v Britt Fast Frgt., supra at 603-604; Matter of Brigandi v Town & Country Linoleum & Carpet, supra at 728-729; Matter of Sturtevant v Broome County, 188 AD2d 893, 894 [1992]). | 1 | 1 |
the Claim of Brigandi v. Town & Country Linoleum & Carpetgreen1 sentence2006Rather, the Fund concedes the existing prior impairment, but challenges whether that impairment hindered decedent’s job potential, an issue not previously resolved by the Board (see Matter of Rosa v Britt Fast Frgt., supra at 603-604; Matter of Brigandi v Town & Country Linoleum & Carpet, supra at 728-729; Matter of Sturtevant v Broome County, 188 AD2d 893, 894 [1992]). | 1 | 1 |
Claim of Rosa v. Britt Fast Freight, Inc.green1 sentence2006Rather, the Fund concedes the existing prior impairment, but challenges whether that impairment hindered decedent’s job potential, an issue not previously resolved by the Board (see Matter of Rosa v Britt Fast Frgt., supra at 603-604; Matter of Brigandi v Town & Country Linoleum & Carpet, supra at 728-729; Matter of Sturtevant v Broome County, 188 AD2d 893, 894 [1992]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Ruffino v. Isadore Rosen & Sons
neutral
2 sentences2014Moreover, while the Special Fund does not have standing “to litigate the primary issues of compensability of the underlying claim for benefits” or “to reopen a claimant’s case and contest the compensability of the claim,” it does have standing with respect to proceedings involving claims against such fund (Matter of Ruffino v Rosen & Sons, 142 AD2d 177, 180 [1988], affd on op below 74 NY2d 861 [1989] [citation omitted]; see Matter of McDonald v Water Tunnel Contrs., 51 AD3d 1151, 1152-1153 [2008]). 2014Moreover, while the Special Fund does not have standing “to litigate the primary issues of compensability of the underlying claim for benefits” or “to reopen a claimant’s case and contest the compensability of the claim,” it does have standing with respect to proceedings involving claims against such fund (Matter of Ruffino v Rosen & Sons, 142 AD2d 177, 180 [1988], affd on op below 74 NY2d 861 [1989] [citation omitted]; see Matter of McDonald v Water Tunnel Contrs., 51 AD3d 1151, 1152-1153 [2008]). | 4 | 1992–2014 |
Claim of Regeiro v. Harbor Distributing Corp.
green
1 sentence2006Corp. ( 182 AD2d 932 [1992]) on the ground that, unlike that case, the Fund here does not seek to relitigate the compensability of the claim or the existence of a prior permanent impairment. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Claim of Lalla v. Astoria Air Conditioning
green
2 sentences1992Since the presence of a preexisting permanent physical impairment is a necessary element in establishing the compensability of a claim (see, supra, at 179; cf, Matter of Lalla v Astoria Air Conditioning, 156 AD2d 808 ), in our view the Fund’s challenge falls squarely within the parameters outlined in Matter of Ruffino v Rosen & Sons (supra). 1992Since the presence of a preexisting permanent physical impairment is a necessary element in establishing the compensability of a claim (see, supra, at 179; cf, Matter of Lalla v Astoria Air Conditioning, 156 AD2d 808 ), in our view the Fund’s challenge falls squarely within the parameters outlined in Matter of Ruffino v Rosen & Sons (supra). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Schempp v. City of New York
neutral
1 sentence1988This, however, would clearly be contrary to the purpose of earlier amendments to the statute enacted "to avoid extended medical controversies and delays in benefits” (Schempp v City of New York, 30 AD2d 129, 133 , affd 24 NY2d 939 ). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Claim of Sinacore v. Dreier Structural Steel, Inc.
green
1 sentence1988The authority to reopen a claim is a discretionary one vested in the Board, not the Fund (see, Matter of Sinacore v Dreier Structural Steel, 97 AD2d 659 ). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Schempp v. City of New York
neutral
1 sentence1988This, however, would clearly be contrary to the purpose of earlier amendments to the statute enacted "to avoid extended medical controversies and delays in benefits” (Schempp v City of New York, 30 AD2d 129, 133 , affd 24 NY2d 939 ). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.