Corporation Counsel claim in New York

2007(See Corning v Village of Laurel Hollow, 48 NY2d 348, 351 [1979]; Judson v City of Niagara Falls, 140 App Div 62, 65-67 [4th Dept 1910], affd 204 NY 630 [1912]; Blood v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 121 AD2d at 134 .) The motion to be relieved as counsel is denied with leave to renew after determination of any renewed motion by plaintiff for a penalty for violation of the August 9, 2006 order of Honorable Martin M.

2007Corp., 306 AD2d 394, 395 [2d Dept 2003].) A conflict of interest would also “excuse the Corporation Counsel’s defense obligation pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-k (2).” (See Blood v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 121 AD2d at 134 .) A conflict created in part by the Corporation Counsel’s own actions might present the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify retention of separate counsel for the City or the employee.

2007(See Corning v Village of Laurel Hollow, 48 NY2d 348, 351 [1979]; Judson v City of Niagara Falls, 140 App Div 62, 65-67 [4th Dept 1910], affd 204 NY 630 [1912]; Blood v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 121 AD2d at 134 .) The motion to be relieved as counsel is denied with leave to renew after determination of any renewed motion by plaintiff for a penalty for violation of the August 9, 2006 order of Honorable Martin M.

1980(Beetz v City of New York, 73 AD2d 925, 926 ; see, generally, Vina v City of New York, 104 Misc 2d 958 , and cases cited therein; Crump v City of New York, NYLJ, Jan. 25, 1979, p 11, col 6; Worrell v City of New York, 101 Misc 2d 267 .) As suggested by Justice Greenfield in Vina v City of New York (supra, p 961), the Corporation Counsel’s prior conduct in the prosecution or defense of City actions "if not a willful and deliberate default [demonstrates at least] a clear indifference to legal procedures”.

1980(Beetz v City of New York, 73 AD2d 925, 926 ; see, generally, Vina v City of New York, 104 Misc 2d 958 , and cases cited therein; Crump v City of New York, NYLJ, Jan. 25, 1979, p 11, col 6; Worrell v City of New York, 101 Misc 2d 267 .) As suggested by Justice Greenfield in Vina v City of New York (supra, p 961), the Corporation Counsel’s prior conduct in the prosecution or defense of City actions "if not a willful and deliberate default [demonstrates at least] a clear indifference to legal procedures”.

1980(Beetz v City of New York, 73 AD2d 925, 926 ; see, generally, Vina v City of New York, 104 Misc 2d 958 , and cases cited therein; Crump v City of New York, NYLJ, Jan. 25, 1979, p 11, col 6; Worrell v City of New York, 101 Misc 2d 267 .) As suggested by Justice Greenfield in Vina v City of New York (supra, p 961), the Corporation Counsel’s prior conduct in the prosecution or defense of City actions "if not a willful and deliberate default [demonstrates at least] a clear indifference to legal procedures”.

1980(Beetz v City of New York, 73 AD2d 925, 926 ; see, generally, Vina v City of New York, 104 Misc 2d 958 , and cases cited therein; Crump v City of New York, NYLJ, Jan. 25, 1979, p 11, col 6; Worrell v City of New York, 101 Misc 2d 267 .) As suggested by Justice Greenfield in Vina v City of New York (supra, p 961), the Corporation Counsel’s prior conduct in the prosecution or defense of City actions "if not a willful and deliberate default [demonstrates at least] a clear indifference to legal procedures”.

1980(Barasch v Micucci, 49 NY2d 594 .) Nor may the Corporation Counsel claim a special privilege in this regard, since "as the law firm for the City of New York, the Corporation Counsel’s office and the many attorneys employed * * * have an obligation to conduct lawsuits in a disciplined and efficient manner in order both to protect the interests of the almost 8 million city residents and also to assure plaintiffs that their claims will be expeditiously and fairly resolved”.

1980(Barasch v Micucci, 49 NY2d 594 .) Nor may the Corporation Counsel claim a special privilege in this regard, since "as the law firm for the City of New York, the Corporation Counsel’s office and the many attorneys employed * * * have an obligation to conduct lawsuits in a disciplined and efficient manner in order both to protect the interests of the almost 8 million city residents and also to assure plaintiffs that their claims will be expeditiously and fairly resolved”.

1979The Corporation Counsel’s brief memorandum of law relies on a 1940 Court of Appeals decision, Commissioner of Public Welfare v Koehler ( 284 NY 260 ), and a 1977 Second Department decision, Matter of Salvatore S. v Anthony S. ( 58 AD2d 867 ), based thereon, for the proposition that the husband is not a necessary party, since the action is a limited one deciding merely the issue of support and is not an adjudication of the child’s status or the rights of the mother’s husband or the putative father.

1979The Corporation Counsel’s brief memorandum of law relies on a 1940 Court of Appeals decision, Commissioner of Public Welfare v Koehler ( 284 NY 260 ), and a 1977 Second Department decision, Matter of Salvatore S. v Anthony S. ( 58 AD2d 867 ), based thereon, for the proposition that the husband is not a necessary party, since the action is a limited one deciding merely the issue of support and is not an adjudication of the child’s status or the rights of the mother’s husband or the putative father.

1977In Matter of Gregory W. ( 19 NY2d 55 ) the Court of Appeals described a delinquency proceeding as one being quasi-criminal in nature.

1976In Matter of Zucker v New York City Employees’ Retirement System ( 27 AD2d 207 , affd 21 NY2d 904 ) the decedent’s estate had been informed by the Secretary of the Retirement System that in the opinion of the Corporation Counsel the claim should be processed under section B3-32.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York.

1976In Matter of Zucker v New York City Employees’ Retirement System ( 27 AD2d 207 , affd 21 NY2d 904 ) the decedent’s estate had been informed by the Secretary of the Retirement System that in the opinion of the Corporation Counsel the claim should be processed under section B3-32.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York.

1972The special legislation requiring filing of claims (Administrative Code, § 394a-1.0, subd. a) and endorsement of payroll checks 1 under protest ’ (Administrative Code, § 93o-2.0) is only applicable to plaintiff, not to his coworkers who have no need to seek a recovery against the City Ct. (sic) Quayle v. City of New York, supra, ( 278 N. Y. 19 ).” (See Corporation Counsel’s brief, unnumbered p. 12.) Quayle (supra) has been cited for many things and properly so.

1972The special legislation requiring filing of claims (Administrative Code, § 394a-1.0, subd. a) and endorsement of payroll checks 1 under protest ’ (Administrative Code, § 93o-2.0) is only applicable to plaintiff, not to his coworkers who have no need to seek a recovery against the City Ct. (sic) Quayle v. City of New York, supra, ( 278 N. Y. 19 ).” (See Corporation Counsel’s brief, unnumbered p. 12.) Quayle (supra) has been cited for many things and properly so.

1960In any event, the city has not sustained the burden which is upon it of proving that this case does not come within “ the general rule that money paid under a mistake of a material fact may be recovered back, although there was negligence on the part of the person making the payment,” and that “ if circumstances exist which take the case out of the general rule, the burden of proving them rests upon the party resisting the repayment.” (Mayer v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 455, 457 , supra.) The Corporation Counsel’s brief in this case is most comprehensive.