eve hearing in New York

2026Although the plaintiff was on notice as of August 2015 that the defendants were challenging service, the plaintiff waited until the eve of the hearing on the validity of service of process in February 2017 to file a proposed order to show cause seeking a stay of the hearing and an extension of time to serve the defendants, which the Supreme Court declined to sign ( see JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Malik , 238 AD3d 1014 , 1016-1017; Marjam Supply Co., Inc. v Warwick Props., Inc. , 217 AD3d 853, 855 ).

2026Moreover, after the court determined in April 2017 that dismissal was warranted based on improper service, the plaintiff then waited more than 4½ years, until December 2021, more than 6 years after the plaintiff had been put on notice of the defendants' challenge to service, to make the subject motion to extend the time to serve the defendants ( see JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Malik , 238 AD3d at 1016-1017; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Gluck , 195 AD3d 904, 906 ).

2025Although the statute of limitations expired by the time the plaintiff moved to extend the time to serve the summons and complaint upon the defendant, the record demonstrates that the lengthy delay was attributable to the plaintiff's lack of diligence in prosecuting this action ( see PROF-2013-M4 Legal Title Trust 2015-1 v Morales , 211 AD3d 866, 867 ; LaSalle Bank, NA v Ferrari , 210 AD3d at 978).

2022Yet, the plaintiff waited until November 2016, on the eve of a hearing to determine the validity of service of process, to move for an extension of time to serve the defendant ( see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Fameux , 201 AD3d 1012, 1014 ; JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. v Kelleher , 188 AD3d 1484, 1486 ; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Kaul , 180 AD3d 956, 959 ).

2022Yet, the plaintiff waited until November 2016, on the eve of a hearing to determine the validity of service of process, to move for an extension of time to serve the defendant ( see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Fameux , 201 AD3d 1012, 1014 ; JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. v Kelleher , 188 AD3d 1484, 1486 ; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Kaul , 180 AD3d 956, 959 ).

2022Yet, the plaintiff waited until November 2016, on the eve of a hearing to determine the validity of service of process, to move for an extension of time to serve the defendant ( see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Fameux , 201 AD3d 1012, 1014 ; JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. v Kelleher , 188 AD3d 1484, 1486 ; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Kaul , 180 AD3d 956, 959 ).

2021The court providently exercised [*2]its discretion in precluding defendant's witnesses and documents on the grounds that he did not disclose the witnesses until the eve of the hearing, despite subpoenaing them a week earlier and despite the court order to exchange witness lists one week in advance, and that he did not disclose the "Incident Report" until the hearing was under way ( see Shmueli v Corcoran Group , 29 AD3d 309 [1st Dept 2006]).

2015The filing of the corrective declaration on the eve of the hearing on the reconsideration motion was deemed to have “mitigated only minimally” the act of filing the false declaration ( 798 F Supp 2d at 441-442 ).

2015The Magistrate ordered that Dunn disgorge the disbursement she had received from the trust subsequent to July 21, determined that the appropriate sanction was a public admonishment and directed the clerk of the court to forward a copy of the decision to the Committee on Professional Standards for the Third Department ( 798 F Supp 2d at 441-442 ).

1986Although an order denying the plaintiff’s cross motion to compel arbitration was never signed, entered or served on the plaintiff as required (see, CPLR 2219, 2220; McCormick v Mars Assoc., 25 AD2d 433 ), the plaintiff, having actual notice of the proposed order and being aware of the court’s repeated assertions of its jurisdiction in the matter, acted improperly in waiting two years, until the very eve of the hearing on the custody and visitation matter, before indicating that she was challenging the propriety of the court’s retention of jurisdiction.

1986In this instance, the Judicial Hearing Officer acted properly in raising, sua sponte, an equitable bar to relitigation of the issue, as a matter of public policy, to protect the integrity of the proceedings (cf. Simmons v Benn, 96 AD2d 507, 508 ).