necessary and narrow exception in New York

2020"Generally, a jury verdict may not be impeached by probes into the jury's deliberative process; however, a showing of improper influence provides a necessary and narrow exception to the general proposition" ( People v Maragh , 94 NY2d 569, 573 [2000]; see People v Brown , 48 NY2d 388, 393 [1979]).

2017(See People v Brown, 48 NY2d 388 [1979]; People v Sprague, 217 NY 373 [1916]; Richardson on Evidence § 6-112.) A showing of improper influence provides a necessary and narrow exception to this general proposition. ( Brown at 393 .) Improper influence includes even “well-intentioned jury conduct which tends to put the jury in possession of evidence not introduced at trial.” (Id.) Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30 provides that a court may set aside a verdict, prior to sentencing, if there occurred improper conduct by a juror or by another person in relation to a juror which may have affected a su

2020"Generally, a jury verdict may not be impeached by probes into the jury's deliberative process; however, a showing of improper influence provides a necessary and narrow exception to the general proposition" ( People v Maragh , 94 NY2d 569, 573 [2000]; see People v Brown , 48 NY2d 388, 393 [1979]).

2012Our judicial system has recognized the need to severely limit posttrial juror inquiries, because if these attacks on “solemnly made and publicly returned” verdicts were so readily allowed, “(jjurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict.” (McDonald v Pless, 238 US 264, 267 [1915].) In New York, “a jury verdict may not be impeached by probes into the jury’s deliberative process; however, a showing of improper influence provides a necessary and narrow exception to the

2011As a general rule, “a jury verdict may not be impeached by probes into the jury’s deliberative process; however, a showing of improper influence provides a necessary and narrow exception to the general proposition” (People v Maragh, 94 NY2d 569, 573 ; see People v Brown, 48 NY2d 388, 393 ; People v Scerbo, 59 AD3d 1066, 1068 , lv denied 12 NY3d 821 ).

2011As a general rule, “a jury verdict may not be impeached by probes into the jury’s deliberative process; however, a showing of improper influence provides a necessary and narrow exception to the general proposition” (People v Maragh, 94 NY2d 569, 573 [2000]; see People v Brown, 48 NY2d 388, 393 [1979]; People v Scerbo, 59 AD3d 1066, 1068 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 821 [2009]).

2012Our judicial system has recognized the need to severely limit posttrial juror inquiries, because if these attacks on “solemnly made and publicly returned” verdicts were so readily allowed, “(jjurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict.” (McDonald v Pless, 238 US 264, 267 [1915].) In New York, “a jury verdict may not be impeached by probes into the jury’s deliberative process; however, a showing of improper influence provides a necessary and narrow exception to the

2012Our judicial system has recognized the need to severely limit posttrial juror inquiries, because if these attacks on “solemnly made and publicly returned” verdicts were so readily allowed, “(jjurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict.” (McDonald v Pless, 238 US 264, 267 [1915].) In New York, “a jury verdict may not be impeached by probes into the jury’s deliberative process; however, a showing of improper influence provides a necessary and narrow exception to the

2012Our judicial system has recognized the need to severely limit posttrial juror inquiries, because if these attacks on “solemnly made and publicly returned” verdicts were so readily allowed, “(jjurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict.” (McDonald v Pless, 238 US 264, 267 [1915].) In New York, “a jury verdict may not be impeached by probes into the jury’s deliberative process; however, a showing of improper influence provides a necessary and narrow exception to the

2012Our judicial system has recognized the need to severely limit posttrial juror inquiries, because if these attacks on “solemnly made and publicly returned” verdicts were so readily allowed, “(jjurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict.” (McDonald v Pless, 238 US 264, 267 [1915].) In New York, “a jury verdict may not be impeached by probes into the jury’s deliberative process; however, a showing of improper influence provides a necessary and narrow exception to the

2012Our judicial system has recognized the need to severely limit posttrial juror inquiries, because if these attacks on “solemnly made and publicly returned” verdicts were so readily allowed, “(jjurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict.” (McDonald v Pless, 238 US 264, 267 [1915].) In New York, “a jury verdict may not be impeached by probes into the jury’s deliberative process; however, a showing of improper influence provides a necessary and narrow exception to the

2012Our judicial system has recognized the need to severely limit posttrial juror inquiries, because if these attacks on “solemnly made and publicly returned” verdicts were so readily allowed, “(jjurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict.” (McDonald v Pless, 238 US 264, 267 [1915].) In New York, “a jury verdict may not be impeached by probes into the jury’s deliberative process; however, a showing of improper influence provides a necessary and narrow exception to the

2011“Generally, a jury verdict may not be impeached by probes into the jury’s deliberative process; however, a showing of improper influence provides a necessary and narrow exception to the general proposition” (People v Maragh, 94 NY2d 569, 573 [2000]; see People v Brown, 48 NY2d 388, 393 [1979]; People v Davis, 86 AD3d 59, 64 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 805 [2011]).